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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***Military Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-89-006

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06 March 1989

[ERRATUM: In JPRS-UMA-89-005 OF 22 February 1989 the copyrights for the following journals were inadvertently omitted: KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL; TEKHNKA I VOORUZHENIYE; VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY. The copyrights should read: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1988; "Tekhnika i vooruzheniye", 1988; "Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony", 1988]

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**Pros, Cons on Serviceman's Religion-Motivated Pacifism**

18010179 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA  
in Russian No 22, Nov 88 pp 29-30

[Article under the rubric "On Antireligious Subjects"]

[Text]

**"I Am Sowing Good..."**

**Pvt Aleksandr Muzhkevich, a military construction worker, has refused to take the oath, will not handle weapons and avoids combat training, although he is a diligent worker and successfully performs the construction jobs assigned to him. What is the explanation for the soldier's behavior?**

**A. Muzhkevich himself explained it to Maj V. Mukhin, our correspondent:**

I am a believer and a member of the Evangelical Christian Baptist sect. Upon entering the army, none of the young men in our church take your formal oath. We have already taken an oath to the Lord God, after all, and one does not take an oath twice. I do not touch weapons, because that is a sin. If every person on Earth were to do as I do and treat other people as brothers, there would be neither wars nor conflagrations on Earth.

Why enclose borders and guard the nation in which we live? It is purely a formality, after all. The fatherland is our entire Earth, on which we exist only a short time. We shall then meet God and begin a new life. Centuries and millions of years will pass, the Sun will die, the Earth and the stars will disappear, but we shall never cease to exist....

I am certain that only a belief in God provides true conviction. I cannot say that I arrived at this conclusion all at once. No, I tried many things before I accepted baptism by water. Once I even wanted to join the Komsomol, but I changed my mind. In my opinion, today's Komsomol members do not have the kind of conviction and purpose which can infect them and inspire them to great deeds. The affectation and phoniness merely repulse one. Take the Komsomol members in our subunit, for example. Officially, almost every one of them has some kind of assignment, is listed somewhere as an agitator or editor. Generally speaking, however, all of that is phony. The Komsomol members do not independently perform any sort of interesting work.

You should see what kind of celebrations, shows and concerts we have at our church. We present scenes from biblical life, sing church songs, compose and learn new ones. No one forces us to do this. Each of us feels an inner need for it.

I have told my colleagues about our church life more than once. I regard myself as a sower, and I do not hide that. My goals are lofty and important, you see: I am trying to develop correct views on life in the soldiers.

I can honestly say the thing which disappoints me the most in the subunit is the fact that I am sometimes unable to prevent rudeness, humiliation and physical violence. Unfortunately, some of my colleagues commit these sins. Our so-called activists are passive in these situations. I myself consider it my duty to cheer up, comfort and say a kind word to the victim: "God also suffered and found happiness. You need to be kind-hearted. If you are struck on the cheek, turn the other. We can only save one another with universal love for our fellow man."

I have a lot of time left in the army, and I believe that I will be able to open the eyes of many to the world while I am here.

**But What Will the Sowing Produce?**

**The opinion of Maj Gen (Res) K. Payusov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor:**

Pvt Aleksandr Muzhkevich calls himself a "sower" and has set himself the "lofty" goals of "opening the eyes of people to the world" and developing in his colleagues "correct views on life." Let us figure out what he is "sowing."

Having come to believe in God, he regards universal religious pacifism as the best means of preserving peace. Muzhkevich's teachings are, alas, not new. Attitudes condemning armed force and the participation of believers in it have existed throughout the history of Christianity, particularly in the teachings of the religious sects of Donatists, Bogomils, Albigenses, Valdenses, Moravian Brothers, Mennonites, Quakers, Dukhobors, Tolstoyans and others. A few believers take this "moral" position even today among the Jehovah's Witnesses, Reformed Adventists, Evangelical Christian Baptists....

Christian sermons on love and brotherhood have been given for almost 2,000 years, but these things do not and cannot exist between oppressors and the oppressed. Appeals to love one's neighbor (including enemies) as brothers disarm not the oppressors and aggressors, but their victims. The abstract-pacifistic advocacy of peace only makes it difficult for the workers to understand objective reality and diverts them away from effective ways and means of struggling for peace.

There is no place for violence against people in our ideal. "The end of wars," V.I. Lenin taught us, "peace among peoples and the ending of plunder and violence—precisely these things are our ideal...." Moreover, the military doctrine of the Soviet State and its Warsaw Pact

allies is based on the prevention of war. The Soviet people do not count on God to give them peace and good will; they struggle persistently for it.

The promotion of peace is inherent in the socialist system, but it is not reduced to a matter of pacifism in religious or any other form. As we struggle for peace and support pacifist movements in the bourgeois nations, we cannot permit pacifist sentiments in our midst, cannot relax our vigilance to the intrigues of aggressors. This is particularly inadmissible in the military. Assessing the moral position taken by Pvt Muzhkevich, let us frankly say that it is nothing other than capitulation to a social evil, to the aggressive imperialist forces. His conscience is deaf to the needs of the homeland and his people. Focusing on the fulfillment of duty to God, it comes into conflict with duty to the Soviet society and promotes anarchic rejection of the homeland's armed defense.

...Pvt Muzhkevich is disappointed most by the fact that "he is unable to prevent rudeness, humiliation, physical violence" and other "sins" of his colleagues and complains that in such cases the subunit's "so-called activists" are "passive." Perhaps Muzhkevich himself actively opposes such "sins"? Unfortunately, he does not. His is only an internal, abstract, impersonal condemnation of them. He limits his role to comforting the wronged, degrading for a Soviet fightingman: "God suffered and bade you," he says, "if they strike you on the cheek, turn the other cheek."

It would actually be naive to expect a convinced Baptist actually to support discipline and order in the subunit or to criticize specific transgressors directly and openly. After all, he honors the evangelical commandment: "Judge not, lest ye be judged." His rule is the following: "Conceal another's sin, and God will forgive two." Comforting and the preaching of patience and all-forgiveness cannot serve as a barrier to nonregulation relations in the subunit, however. Religious-moral "sowing" will not eliminate the "sins." An active stance is needed, the kind, from all accounts, not taken by the subunit Komsomol members. It would not be a bad thing to heed Pvt Muzhkevich's critical comments on measures conducted "formally," at the bidding of "higher-ups" and "boringly." There would then be no fertile soil for the "sower."

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**Baltic MD Commander on Troops Cuts,  
Territorial Formations**

18010178 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
29 Dec 88 p 3

[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA interview with Col Gen V.I. Grishin, commander of the Baltic Military District, under the rubric "A Topical Interview": "Army Universities of Internationalism"]

[Text] The mail received by the editors contains letters on problems of international relations in the military, questions of military organizational development and the performance of military service, and others pertaining to the

activities of various military departments. We selected the most frequently asked questions and requested Col Gen V.I. Grishin, commander of the Red Banner Baltic Military District, to answer them.

[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA] The resolution passed at the 19th All-Union party conference, "On International Relations," states the following: "Service in the Armed Forces of the USSR should become a true school of internationalism." This sentence has now become common in the press and, in the opinion of some readers, is used for effect. What specific lessons in internationalism do the soldiers gain during their time in the service? Another thing. There is not just a difference, but actually a distance, between the concepts "should become" and "has become." Nonetheless, the second term frequently predominates in press statements by military leaders. Is the desired not being passed off for the reality?

[Grishin] First, about lessons in internationalism which the young people receive in the military formation. The first thing they learn is good international communication. Nothing, neither books nor the press nor movies—can take the place of personal communication. In the multinational military collective (and as a rule, they are all multinational in our country), every soldier comes into contact with representatives of various nationalities and ethnic groups. He can talk with each of them, ask them about their national traditions, customs and culture. In short, he can enlarge his outlook. This is a cognitive lesson, so to speak.

Another lesson, a political and moral one, is more important. In the army the soldier is aware of the equality of all nations and ethnic groups—in fact and not just in words. This is a school of moral values, with its criteria for assessing the individual. Respect and honor according to one's work. One receives what he earns. Neither one's origin in this or that nation nor one's social position or background counts. It is not important whether you are a Russian, an Uzbek or an Armenian, but if you fire with excellence, serve properly and are irreproachably disciplined, efficient and honest in all things, then you are outstanding and a respected member of the collective.

It would probably not occur to any fightingman to flaunt his national origin or social background. The first test of his combat maturity puts everything into its place and reveals who is who. Even if, prior to his induction into the military, a young man was exposed to the virus of national exclusivity or chauvinistic arrogance, these "maladies" cannot develop in the military situation, for they have no nourishing medium there. The way of life and the moral criteria place all people onto an equal footing and help them to rid themselves of erroneous views, biases and national egotism.

Now, with respect to the terms "should become" and "has become" relative the school of internationalism. The vast majority of the military collectives have

become precisely such a school. Naturally, the international indoctrination is organized better in some, worse in others. It depends upon the specific conditions and factors. There are deviations from the norm: the banding together of servicemen from the same area and cases of national conceit, or vice versa, withdrawal and egotism.

The matters of international indoctrination of the personnel and the uniting of the collectives on a wholesome moral basis are constantly at the focus of attention of the district military council, the commanders, political organs, party committees and bureaus. At the present time they are being placed onto a solid foundation and are conducted specifically, purposefully and taking into account the particular features of the groups of draftees and actual conditions. The commission on international relations set up under the district political directorate and groups for international relations in the political sections, party committees and bureaus are designed to reveal and take into the account the national interests of the servicemen, to summarize and disseminate progressive know-how and to work out proposals and recommendations for making the international indoctrination more effective.

Special attention is given to fightingmen with a poor knowledge of the Russian language, for whom it is difficult to master a military specialty. Military comradeship among fightingmen of different nationalities is thoroughly encouraged as a means of providing them with help. Such methods of international indoctrination as meetings of servicemen of various nationalities with prominent people, war and labor veterans, of the young generation with fightingmen completing their service, the formal transfer of weapons and military equipment to the young soldiers, days or 10-day periods devoted to Union and autonomous republics and celebrations of the dates they were founded have acquired great popularity in district units and subunits. Ties between servicemen and labor collectives, local party and soviet organs are growing stronger, and joint activities are conducted with the workers and the youth of the Soviet Baltic area.

Other forms and methods of international indoctrination are also used. All of them taken together make up that school of internationalism through which every young man in the Armed Forces passes to one extent or another. One would like to think that the lessons derived here will continue to help enhance the ideological maturity, to shape civic-mindedness in the nation's young generation and to surmount various kinds of deviations and prejudices.

[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA] Bewilderment and indignation are evoked by various kinds of mobs and pickets at the building housing district headquarters, displaying slogans like the following: "We Are For National Military Formations!" "Latvia—Without Soviet Weapons!" "Occupiers Go Home!" "Latvia for Latvians!" and so forth. What is the reaction of the district command element to such actions?

[Grishin] The readers are absolutely right: these actions are disgraceful and can have serious consequences. The organizers of such actions obviously do not consider what they can lead to, but nudge a part of the irresponsible youth toward irrational acts, frankly speaking, thereby creating dangerous precedents. Everyone knows, after all, that military facilities are protected, that the people guarding them are governed by regulations which are established by ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and have the force of law. It is therefore not necessary to explain the fact that a sentry at his post is vested with special authority, that he is an inviolable person, because he is carrying out a combat mission and is required to take all necessary steps reliably to protect and defend the post and the facility he is guarding, even to the point of using a weapon. So that the instigative, hooligan acts at military facilities directed against individuals performing a combat mission are nothing other than playing with fire in the literal and the figurative sense.

Blasphemous attacks on those who have performed and are performing their international duty in Afghanistan evoke particular bewilderment, or more precisely, indignation. The Afghan veterans are surrounded by the people's love and deserve universal respect. They are our army's gold reserve, a model of courage, loyalty to the oath and international duty.

Many fightingmen who went through the fire in Afghanistan serve in the district forces. Around 10 percent of the officers have combat experience acquired there. Their feats, their valor and courage have been singled out for state awards and for the love and appreciation of the Afghan people. What kind of shameless heart one would have to have to cast aspersions upon these remarkable people!

[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA] How do you assess the role of the mass media in publicizing the life of the military at the current stage of the restructuring? This subject was previously essentially closed to the civilian press, after all. Is everything in order in this area today?

[Grishin] The influence of the mass media is well known, and I do not think it needs to be explained. The press, radio and television have now begun actively to invade military life and shed light on various aspects of the service and personal life of the troops. And that is only natural. People are entitled to know about the life of their creation, how the Armed Forces are performing their important mission of defending the gains of socialism and the state interests of the Union of SSRs.

The desire of the soldiers' parents to know more about the life of their sons is also perfectly understandable. It should be stated that there is more and more information of this kind. And this is gratifying, of course. There are also costs, however, sometimes annoying, which produce bewilderment, sometimes valid indignation. When the errors and inaccuracies are a result of a journalist's

inadequate competence or a poor knowledge of the specifics of military life, that can somehow be understood and explained. And let us not judge journalists too harshly for individual "goats." It would be better to think together about how to avoid them in the future, how to enhance the competence of mass media workers specializing in military subjects. Incidentally, a great deal is being done in this respect: press conferences and briefings are conducted, as well as visits by the journalists to military units to gain a closer and more detailed grasp of the life and circumstances of the Baltic fightingmen. The effort will increase in this area, and contacts will be strengthened.

But I want to say something about another matter, about articles which are clearly biased and even insulting, I would say. Let me cite some facts. One of the November issues of the newspaper PADOMYU YAUNATNE contained a group of letters defaming the military and its way of life, even with a nationalistic tinge. Workers with the district political directorate decided to visit the addresses indicated. And what did they find? Some of the individuals disclaimed authorship, and some of the facts proved to be distorted. What happened next? The editor of the newspaper was summoned for an explanation to a session of the bureau of the republic's Komsomol CC. He made his apologies there. But they were made in camera, within the walls of the CC. And what about that bucket of filth which has already been spilled? Who is going to clean it up, and who is going to answer for the false information, which thousands of the newspaper's readers have already taken in and formed a certain concept of our military based on it?

Another youth newspaper, KOMYAUNIMO TIESA (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA), the organ of the Lithuanian Komsomol CC, also committed an improper act. It recently printed an open letter from fightingmen/internationalists, signed by representatives of clubs in a number of republic cities. Moreover, the signatures were selected geographically so that they embraced all of Latvia, and so that the content of the letter seemed to express the general opinion of the fightingmen/internationalists. The tone of the letter was sharp and rude.

It was decided to verify the letter's authenticity. And what was learned? It was learned that the copyright belonged exclusively to two Kaunas residents from the city club for fightingmen/internationalists, a certain R. Ruzas and K. Brazhyunas. The youth newspaper had obligingly made its pages available for a forgery. Following its publication Afghan veterans began to protest. They expressed their indignation with the act. How is one to evaluate this "contribution" by the popular youth magazine to international indoctrination? Finally, how can this be reconciled with journalistic ethics, with the rules governing the preparation of material for publication?

In short, some publications owe even more [than others] to the readers and to the truth.

[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA] Various circles are now extensively debating the "idea" recently put forth for forming the Armed Forces on a territorial basis. Essentially what it means is that young men drafted into the military would serve in their own republic. Please comment on this matter.

[Grishin] I frequently speak on this subject. A great deal can be said about it, and with good arguments, based on the Leninist concepts of the international nature of socialism's defense and the need for a military alliance of all the Soviet Union republics. I shall try to be as brief as possible.

Just what do certain "agents" want? To disperse our Armed Forces among national barracks, with the forces guarding only their own borders and territory? And who is to protect our Polar region and the Far East borders? The ethnic groups living in the Far North? Image that a military conflict should break out despite our wishes. What would happen then? Would each republic and its army wait until the enemy had reached its borders? The absurdity and inhumanity of such a position is so obvious, I believe, that there is no point in spending a lot of time demonstrating it.

We can best talk about something else. Should we let those young draftees serve "on the edge of their own village, across the road"? Would we not be impoverishing them spiritually, not infringing upon their interests and lawful rights? What if a Tajik or an Armenian wants to serve in the navy? What if a Latvian or Belorussian, for example, is thinking about trying on the service cap of the Far East border guards? And could territorial troops from each republic include all services and troop arms and train specialists in all the fields? Of course not.

My 17 years of service in the Far East and the Transbaikalian permit me to say that young men from the Soviet Baltic area serve better there than they do near their own home. And this also says a lot.

One final thing. Would this system for manning the military not lead to even greater exacerbation of the current problems in international relations—among other things, to national exclusivity and isolation? And would it not promote the growth of attitudes of dependency and priority for local interests, which the resolution passed at the 19th All-Union party conference, "On International Relations," warned us about? The answer is obvious and unequivocal: it would. A valid question arises: Just how would this fit in with the struggle for restructuring so loudly proclaimed by certain new sociopolitical organizations? There is a clear incongruity here, a divergence of objectives and means.

Just what follows from all of this? The fact that all of us need to demonstrate the greatest of restraint and political maturity, be guided by reason and not emotions, and make the keystone not errors of the past and old offenses, but constructive measures to overcome them and the

consolidation of all efforts in the name and for the good of unity, harmony and solidarity in our common socialist home, which, incidentally, cannot exist without reliable and all-around protection.

[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA] A great deal is being said and written today about detente and the reduced danger of war. Important arms reduction agreements have been signed, and new ones are being prepared. Our military is to be reduced by 500,000 men. Are any changes planned in connection with this with respect to the military draft—specifically, with respect to VUZ students and married students with a child?

[Grishin] The problems of detente, disarmament and the elimination of the threat of world war affect all mankind, affect each of us. The efforts of our state in this area and the successes are well known.

Due to the real parity of forces there exist also possibilities for preventing a world war, for reducing the danger of one and the burden of the arms race. Our party and government are taking maximum advantage of these possibilities. Detente is a two-way process, however. It depends not just upon us, but also upon the actions of the other side, and they are not always predictable. I would mention Lenin's wise caution: "...Our steps toward peace must be accompanied by the exertion of all our military preparedness...."

Our steps toward peace continue. The time will come and we will no doubt learn of new peace initiatives and specific measures toward the implementation of our peace-loving policy. We cannot get ahead of events, however, and give in to carelessness and pacifist illusions.

And there is no question that changes will come. When will their time arrive? This was stated in most definite terms by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev at a meeting with the youth of Moscow and the Moscow area. "I believe," he said, "that we are moving toward an understanding of this very important group of problems. You know that we cannot simply up and disband our military while at the same time all of the others are preserving their armies and are arming. That would not be right. Let us therefore, together with the other states, proceed along the path of reducing armies and armaments. And in general, we need to look carefully into the matter of military service and the draft. I believe that the question of the service term will also arise. It can be changed. But all of this will be part of a normal process, which will include our actions and the moves of our friends and our partners. There is therefore some rational element in the posing of the question, but when voices are raised to ask 'Why should we have an army?' that is not to be taken seriously."

I believe that those words will clear up a great deal also with respect to the other aforementioned issues.

### Military-Technical Policy of the CPSU

81440388 Moscow VESTNIK

PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian  
Dec 1988 pp 40-43

[Article by Lt Col A. Kiselev, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Text] The modern world, a world of anxieties and hopes, is the product of aggravation of a large number of contradictions and opposing trends. To mankind, they make up one of the most acute problems of war and peace, and of the future of civilization. In this connection the 27th CPSU Congress, subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee and the 19th All-Union Party Conference paid special attention to a contradiction that has evolved in the international situation. On one hand the possibility for preserving and strengthening peace has never been as real. The first practical step in realizing this possibility was the signing and subsequent ratification of the treaty between the USSR and the USA to reduce medium and lesser range missiles. On the other hand the threat to peace on the part of imperialistic militarism and the threat of nuclear war still persist, since "the guarantees of the irreversibility of the positive processes that have begun have not yet been established."<sup>1</sup> The USA and NATO are still making attempts to disrupt the existing equilibrium, and attain military strategic superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries.

The monopolistic bourgeoisie views the arms race today as a means of maintaining a military threat that is no less effective than the direct use of force. In this case the arms race, which is doubtlessly a means of extracting superprofits for monopolies, has the goal of both decelerating and forcing the economic development of competitors off course, and exhausting the USSR and its allies economically by forcing them to create increasingly more expensive armament systems.

The CPSU and the Soviet state are cognizant of the fact that the direct goal of the military-technical policy of modern imperialism is to acquire strategic advantages ensuring military and technical superiority. American imperialism has been the initiator in the creation of new weapon systems threatening the existence of mankind. It was the USA that first created nuclear weapons in the 1940s, intercontinental strategic bombers and nuclear submarines in the 1950s, nuclear aircraft carriers and individually aimed multiple reentry vehicles for missiles in the 1960s, and cruise missiles, neutron ammunition and binary chemical weapons in the 1970s. Today, as part of its military-technical policy the USA is developing offensive chemical weapons,<sup>2</sup> actively improving spy satellites, developing interceptor satellites, and creating fundamentally new resources for hitting targets in space, including laser and beam weapons and military space platforms equipped with antisatellite missiles and anti-missile resources. Ground control centers for military space systems are being deployed. Various types of laser



weapons, antiballistic missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads, electromagnetic cannons and other weapons are to make up the basis of the antiballistic missile defense systems presently being planned.

All of this compels us to maintain a sufficient level of equipment in the army and navy, and keep the armed forces highly vigilant and combat ready so as to ensure a decisive repulse to any aggressor. Implementation of the party's course toward acceleration of the country's socio-economic development, and implementation of the military-technical policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, directed at supporting the fighting potential of the Soviet Armed Forces, is a prerequisite of this important state task.

The goals of the military-technical policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state are inseparably associated with the demands of Lenin's policy of peace, of the new way of political thinking, and of the basic directions and principles spelled out at the 27th CPSU Congress and in party documents published subsequently. This policy is directed at ensuring favorable external conditions for the existence of the socialist society, preventing both nuclear and conventional war, and confirming reasonable sufficiency in military technology. These positions are at the basis of the development of the USSR Armed Forces, and they determine the content and orientation of the CPSU's military-technical policy. Planning its implementation, the CPSU and the Soviet state are coordinating this activity with regard for the plans of Warsaw Pact states.

In recent years, a new way of political thinking, which is manifesting itself in military political ideas and initiatives and affecting the military-technical policy of the Warsaw Pact states, has been typical of the decisions and statements made at conferences of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee. Thus the document "On the Military Doctrine of Warsaw Pact States," which was adopted at the May 1987 conference, states that the military doctrine of these countries is defensive, and that they will continue to make an effort to maintain **a balance of military forces at a lower level**<sup>3</sup> (emphasis mine.—A. K.). As far as the state of the armed forces is concerned, their combat readiness will be maintained at a level sufficient to prevent their being caught unawares. This approach is based on a deep understanding of the present situation, which is distinguished by a confrontation between enormous nuclear weapon arsenals jeopardizing the destiny of mankind. This is why under these conditions nuclear war can no longer be a means of attaining political goals.

**Beginning radical reduction of the military potentials (armament and military equipment) of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—is proposed in a statement by the Political Consultative Committee dated 15 July 1988. In this case only resources necessary for defense but insufficient for a surprise attack and for offensive operations are to remain,**

**which would promote further progress on the path of disarmament, growth of trust and reduction of the military threat.**<sup>4</sup> Signing a treaty on a 50 percent reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the USA, with the condition of strict compliance with the antiballistic missile defense treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, and its nonabrogation for an agreed-upon period of time, was identified as the first among the priority objectives in this direction.

Strict fulfillment of the obligations of the treaty to eliminate medium and lesser range missiles is a prerequisite of developing trust, and the first real step toward reducing the military threat. This process was initiated on 1 August 1988 at the weapon range in the vicinity of Saryozek in the presence of a group of American inspectors, journalists and public officials from the USA, Western Europe and Asia.<sup>5</sup>

Demonstration of the Soviet MiG-29 fighter in the international aircraft exhibition hall at Farnborough, Great Britain in September was a practical manifestation of the new way of thinking in military-technical policy, and of good will and trust, and it was the first public showing of the qualitative level of our defense equipment. According to a leading specialist this is one of the world's best fighters. It is no wonder it is referred to as an "air supremacy fighter." In addition it is capable of escorting transport airplanes and even a slow-moving helicopter at low speed.<sup>6</sup>

Demonstration of a modern Soviet military airplane in the international market is both a means of publicizing the level of development of science and technology in our country, and evidence of our confidence in the potentials of the scientists and designers whose ideas and plans are constantly ahead of models already in the inventory.

All of this is evidence that a new way of thinking is making itself felt in the military policy of Warsaw Pact states, which is doubtlessly having influence on the military-technical policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state as well. At its basis is a purely defensive orientation, the qualitative side of which has decisive significance to all of the armed forces, and especially the air defense forces. This is why the effectiveness of our **defensive development "from this day forward must be ensured predominantly by qualitative parameters—both in relation to technology and military science, and in relation to the composition of the armed forces."**<sup>7</sup>

An so, the military-technical policy of the CPSU is presently being implemented with regard for a number of factors.

**First, the desire of the USA to attain military superiority over the USSR is bringing about further militarization of American science and encouraging the use of scientific and technical accomplishments chiefly in the military sphere to create increasingly more sophisticated arms.**

The present period of the arms race is characterized on one hand by the initiation of a large number of long-range programs for developing weapons and combat equipment and concentrating efforts on **introducing fundamentally new types of weapons** within the framework of the infamous Strategic Defense Initiative. On the other hand the spirit of the new way of political thinking demands sober evaluation of the results of producing nuclear weapons, and the initiatives and proposals of the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries.

**Second**, the high combat characteristics of modern weapons and combat equipment have fundamentally altered the nature of armed conflict. Greater striking range, accuracy, striking power, mobility and speed of weapons is bringing about growth of the fluidity and scope of operations and an increase in the volume of combat missions carried out, coupled with a shorter time and, in a number of cases, an extreme lack of time to carry them out. Under these conditions the role of military information resources grows dramatically, and the significance of their use in troops that must maintain constant combat readiness, such as the Air Defense Forces, increases especially. The nature and success of their combat activities depend in many ways on the effectiveness with which all forms of reconnaissance operate, on the dependability and combat stability of communication systems and equipment, and on the level of automation of troop command and control.

**Third**, the 27th CPSU Congress made a major issue of economizing on resources. This pertains fully to expenditures on the country's defense as well. The task of satisfying the armament needs of the armed forces has always been carried out within certain resource constraints. However, in conditions where the requirements of the army and navy for increasingly more complex and expensive armament are objectively increasing, the complexity of this task is rising as well; in order to carry it out, we need to **improve predominantly the qualitative characteristics of defensive weapons and military equipment**. This is why the results of comprehensive research conducted by scientific institutions and enterprises are being laid at the basis of decisions determining the directions of today's military- technical policy.

In general, the CPSU focuses its greatest attention in military- technical policy on the following:

- on ensuring priority and preferential development of those resources of armed conflict upon which successful attainment of the objectives of maintaining stable parity with the probable adversary and preventing his strategic superiority depends the most;
- on scientifically substantiating the sensible composition of armament for each of the USSR's armed services and branches of troops, with regard for their joint use in operations and combat activities during repulsion of enemy aggression;

- on raising the effectiveness with which the latest accomplishments of the present stage of the scientific and technical revolution are utilized when developing, modernizing and producing weapons and combat equipment;
- on making industrial production of armament increasingly more efficient, on attaining a high level of unification of its components, and on achieving standardization with the goal of reducing outlays on series production;
- on sensibly improving weapons and military equipment in the inventory and the technical base of the armed forces;
- on all-out improvement of existing control methods and equipment, developing new methods and equipment and raising the effectiveness of its combat use;
- on comprehensively improving scientific prediction and forecasting of the possible directions of development of weapons and military equipment.

Democratization of all aspects of social life, radical economic reform and, what is extremely important, fundamental change in the attitude toward science and the country's scientific potential will promote restructuring and a qualitative leap in implementing these basic directions of the CPSU's military-technical policy. The quality of defense technology is equated chiefly with the quality of science, especially military-technical science. After all, the needed rate of development and the effectiveness of armament are ensured chiefly through timely creation of a scientific and technical foundation, and consequently by an increase in the volume of applied and especially fundamental research determining the prospects of military-technical progress. Military-technical policy requires development of those directions of science which would ensure creation of the most effective defensive resources and promote a quest for as yet unknown scientific and technical concepts for armament of the future in the interests of socialism's defense. This approach allows us to promptly determine how well conceptions pertaining to a given model of armament would work, the time it would take for this armament to be developed and its qualitative parameters and cost, and it opens up extensive possibilities for effectively retarding obsolescence of armament owing to anticipatory modernization. This is why USSR Defense Minister Army General D. T. Yazov called narrowing the existing gap between military theoretical and military technical research and actively implementing scientific conclusions and recommendations in the day-to-day activities of the troops the priority task in military science.<sup>8</sup>

With this end in mind, science is being oriented on the problems concerned with economizing military labor and mechanizing it, and on effecting a transition to full automation of the most important processes of equipment operation, typically in the equipment-intensive armed services that are saturated with highly complex

military equipment—the Air Defense Forces for example. In this case special attention is being devoted to all-out improvement of existing methods of controlling weapons and troops and developing new ones on the basis of accomplishments in the development of state-of-the-art technologies—microelectronics, robot technology, information science.

V. I. Lenin taught us that it is useless to have the most progressive resources of armed conflict “in the absence of people capable of knowledgeably utilizing the latest improvements in military technology.”<sup>9</sup> Military-technical policy is not only guiding the development of weapons and military equipment, but it also requires high spiritual qualities in the personnel, and their ideological steadfastness, military proficiency and discipline in military labor. This discipline is achieved through deep knowledge of, and precise compliance with, the rules and guidelines of instructions and manuals on maintaining, repairing and storing military equipment and using it in combat.

The personal example of officers has special significance to the mastery of equipment and its competent use. There is no better method of indoctrination than indoctrination by one's actions, by an interested attitude toward learning, by an “understanding” of equipment and weapons, and by personal example in studying and using them. The experience of military affairs reveals that officers who have a deep knowledge of military equipment are capable of effectively carrying out their indoctrination function in the troops. Development of the initiative, independence and creativity of soldiers depends in many ways on regular officers. In this aspect the need for instilling, in the soldiers, a thrifty attitude toward everything the people give us, and for raising their technical culture and their ability to get everything from a weapon that is designed into it and effectively use it in any situation is important today.<sup>10</sup>

#### Footnotes

1. Gorbachev, M. S., “O khode realizatsii resheniy XXVII syezda KPSS i zadachakh po uglubleniyu perestroiki: Doklad na XIX Vsesoyuznoy konferentsii KPSS, 28 iyunya 1988 g.” [Progress in Implementing Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks of Deepening Restructuring: Report to the 19th All-Union CPSU Congress, 28 June 1988], Moscow, 1988, p 34.

2. See “Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru” [Where the Threat to Peace Comes From], Moscow, 1987, pp 7-10.

3. “Soveshchaniye Politicheskogo konsultativnogo komiteta gosudarstv- uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora. Berlin. 28-29 maya 1987 g.: Dokumenty i materialy” [Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States. Berlin. 28-29 May 1987: Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1987, pp 8-9.

4. See PRAVDA, 17 July 1988.

5. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 3 August 1988.

6. See IZVESTIYA, 17 July 1988.

7. Gorbachev, M. S., “O khode realizatsii resheniy XXVII syezda KPSS i zadachakh po uglubleniyu perestroiki,” Moscow, 1988, p 35.

8. See “Dependably Protecting the People's Labor,” KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 July 1988.

9. Lenin, V. I., “Poln. sobr. soch.” [Complete Collected Works], Vol 9, p 156.

10. See “Dependably Protecting the People's Labor,” KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 July 1988.

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#### Representativeness of Electoral Process for Peoples' Deputies Discussed

18010338 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Jan 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Major V. Kazakov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: “Election of USSR Peoples' Deputies. Feedback. Without It There Can Be No Real Democracy In the Nomination of Candidates for Peoples' Deputies”]

[Text] Colonel A. Tsalko has requested the election committee on the election of USSR peoples' deputies from the Communist Party to explain the reasons why his candidacy to the peoples' deputies was turned down.

“You should understand me correctly,” said Aleksandr Valeryanovich, “I am guided least of all by ambition and pride. But communists who proposed my candidacy want to know what kind of criteria were followed by the committee of the political directorate of the VVS [Air Force] with participation by representatives of political organs when 32 candidates to the peoples' deputies nominated by local party organizations were being considered.”

We agree that the question is appropriate. But in this case, what is more disturbing is not the question but the reasons that gave rise to it. Because according to the requirements of the Law guaranteeing glasnost and democracy in the nomination of candidates, questions like this were to be resolved locally. But, as you see in our example, the possibilities inherent in the standard document were not realized in practice. The candidacy of Col A. Tsalko, an unusual person capable of thinking in a government way and who proposes interesting solutions to many painful army problems, went through three stages in the preelection campaign: local party organization, conference of party activists of the unit, and the committee of the political department of the VVS of the district. It should be noted that in these

stages, as in all elections, some candidacies collected a majority of the votes and moved on and others were knocked out of the preelection race.

This is the way Col V. Sharun, an official of the political directorate of the VVS, describes the nomination procedure:

"A list of candidates was read out at a committee of the political directorate of the VVS from which preference was given to one of them—to Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Yefanov. All those present, except for one who abstained, voted for him."

It would seem that everything was proper formally. But there were people from among the representatives of subordinate organs, it turns out, who did not know their candidates well and, therefore, they preferred to remain silent in order "not to make a poor showing" before that high-level meeting. But is it only this that can explain the passivity (all told only two persons spoke at the meeting) and the haste with which they agreed to the proposed candidacy, the candidacy of a person who is unquestionably competent and deserving. Did not the practice of the stagnant years have an effect here: better to be silent, not to show oneself, hold out one's hand—and then there is an end to the matter?

And are not Col A. Tsalko and his electors, who counted on feedback from the political directorate of the VVS to local party organizations, perhaps correct? It seems that if there were an explanation as to why candidates nominated locally were refused, then a visit to Moscow and to the election committee would not be needed.

In failing to explain this to communists, it is impossible to speak of glasnost, and passing this over in silence gives rise to false rumors and reduces the political tension of the preelection campaign in its very first stage.

"It seems to me," says A. Tsalko, "that a candidate himself, or a person who knows him well and shares his views, should stand up for his candidacy at the level of a political directorate of a service of the armed forces and higher."

I would like to add to this that readers express the opinion in letters that obviously little time is spent on nominating candidates from public organizations and that as a result there is haste at times in nominating candidates.

Something else also disturbs readers. Today's elections for the first time in many years reveal genuine leaders who enjoy the trust and support of collectives and who are able to stand up for their interests. Does the general public know these nominees [vydvizhenets] who did not go through the regular election stages, will their competence, energy and knowledge be used for the cause of perestroika, and will many and many of their bold and

constructive proposals, which they intended to include in their preelection programs, be realized? These questions cannot be left unanswered today.

### **Admiral Refutes Proposal to Rescind Military Electoral Rights**

*18010359a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Jan 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Yu. Shebalkin, correspondent of the newspaper KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA: "Admiral Outlines His Program"]

[Excerpt] Learning about democracy... In the course of perestroika, this formula has become the determinant in our society. We felt the need for it yet more powerfully as a result of implementing the political reform developed by the 19th All-Union Party Conference in its specific aspect—the election campaign to the supreme state organ of Soviet power based on a new legal foundation.

The nomination of candidate people's deputies has literally stirred our consciousness. Heated discussions and arguments occurred at meetings and conferences, in workforces and military collectives, at plenary meetings of social organizations where possible candidates were named. The new Electoral Law has worked out completely: its letter and spirit are the yardstick for the opinions and decisions of the electorate. We are becoming more and more aware of the fact that the future of perestroika, and thus of every Soviet man, depends on us, on who we "delegate" to the congress of people's deputies and who we elect, on whether we [come out in favor of] old customs, the stagnation mentality and bureaucratic mechanisms or give our votes to perestroika, to its leaders, to people with contemporary political thinking and constructive views on solving acute problems, responsible, honest and principled individuals who have made concern for people the cornerstone of their electoral platform. These are people for whom perestroika is not a slogan, not yet another campaign, but a personal, deep-down matter.

Such candidates have been named. At present, after the beginning of the second stage of preparations for the elections, they are being registered by electoral boards in territorial and ethnic-territorial districts. Following registration, meetings between candidates and voters will begin. These meetings will be very different from the previous ones, when there was only one contender per seat. At present, one needs genuine rather than faked electoral struggle in order to defend one's right to be a deputy and capture a majority of votes on election day. A lot will depend on the platform of a candidate, on his eagerness to defend the interests of his electorate, on his ability to carry on convincing, argumentative discussion. We should note that thus far not all of the contenders for deputy mandates are prepared to do that. This means that candidates themselves, their representatives and voters who have nominated a candidate need to learn in this matter as well.

The course of the election campaign points up other problems as well. The editorial board intends to provide newspaper space for readers in the columns "Getting Ready for the Election: Request to Speak..." Today, we publish more letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

The nomination of candidate people's deputies of the USSR has brought so many new and unc customary things to our life that sometimes it is difficult to figure out to which shore the tumultuous stream of free will is carrying some voters. Not so long ago I attended an electoral meeting at my place of residence (Central Rayon of the city of Kaliningrad). It was sponsored by informal youth associations. In the course of the meeting, which, by the way, was very stormy, shouts from the floor suddenly grated on our ears: "Take electoral rights away from the military—the army [should be] apolitical," "It makes no sense to nominate military men: they are here today, gone tomorrow," "Military men decide nothing on their own"...

The voices were young and perky... Maybe we should not listen to them? However, as far as I know, speeches calling for giving votes at the forthcoming elections mostly to "civilian" representatives were made to audiences of a more respectable age as well. The arguments are familiar: military men are allegedly out of touch on issues of concern to the inhabitants of the oblast.

At the same time, some non-military candidate people's deputies have included in their programs certain issues associated with military developments in our country. As they say, the naked eye suffices in order to see their profoundly lopsided thrust—reduction of the Armed Forces, exemptions for students from military draft, cancellation of drafting reserve officers into the cadres... The question is why they should force an open door, because these issues are now being resolved.

As I and some others see it, this is being done with a view to gaining the sympathy and support of the student audience (let us recall that it is quite numerous in Kaliningrad). One unwittingly arrives at the conclusion that in a bitter pre-election struggle some people lose the sense of proportion in belittling the role of the Armed Forces in maintaining the necessary security of the state, in the social life of the country and in educating the young people.

It appears to me that, in view of the above, the position of every candidate people's deputy from the Armed Forces during the election campaign, the balance and realism of his electoral platform acquire particular significance. This is exactly the kind of program commander of the Baltic Fleet Adm B. Ivanov presented at a meeting of voters in the collective of the publishing house of KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA.

More than 100 collectives of industrial enterprises, state farms, educational establishments and military units nominated Vitaliy Pavlovich as a candidate people's

deputy of the USSR. There is no way to say that the Baltic Fleet is out of touch with the life of the oblast and the region! The commander communicated the following facts to the audience. Military medical facilities of the fleet receive about 5,000 citizens annually. Military builders have constructed a good number of social and infrastructural facilities in the oblast: shops, schools, day care and nursery facilities, cafeterias, libraries. Hundreds of families not directly associated with the Armed Forces live in buildings erected by the fleet. Tens of thousands of people are served by military retail trade. At present, construction of a new tourist center has been suspended by the fleet for 2 years, and the funds have been invested in building pollution control installations.

Dwelling on military issues proper, the admiral provided convincing proof that military forces of the NATO in the Baltic Theater display a stable trend towards augmenting their potential. Nonetheless, along with taking care to maintain the appropriate combat readiness of the fleet forces, the command advocates detente in this region and undertakes specific steps with this in view: recently, the Baltic Fleet unilaterally invited military observers and journalists from countries of the Baltic region to tactical exercises.

Issues with social overtones also gained our support in the program of the candidate of the Baltic. V. Ivanov believes that funds released in the process of reducing the Armed Forces should be primarily allocated to carrying out the food and housing programs. The fleet commander advocates an unambiguous position on the role of the Armed Forces in upbringing, which is appreciated by many people: they should play the role of a school of collectivism, good organization, internationalism, moral and physical hardening still more vigorously.

The collective of our publishing house supported the candidacy of Vitaliy Pavlovich Ivanov (with one abstention). Ultimately, the confidence of thousands of Kaliningraders reflects the high prestige of the army and the navy in our society. As we can see, the voters are convinced: interests of our entire people are close to the heart of military personnel.

#### **Military View on Proposed General Theses on Judicial Service**

*18010359b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Jan 89 First Edition p 2*

*[Article by Judicial Service Col I. Vashkevich: "Judicial Service. What It Should Be Like"]*

[Text] A socialist state of law cannot do without formidable, efficient judicial services of ministries and departments. These services, unlike the prosecutor's office, courts and arbitration bodies, are called upon to uphold the rule of law directly in the process of managerial operations. This is why the interest shown by specialists in the draft new "General Theses on the Judicial Service in the National Economy" published in the journal KHOZYAYSTVO I PRAVO, 1988, No 10 is understandable.

Certainly, the new document is of interest to military lawyers as well. After all, theses on the judicial services of all ministries and departments, including the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, will be developed on the basis of the general theses. How does the draft presented look in its entirety?

Firstly, it codifies the already evolved forms and methods of participation by judicial services in the operations of the managerial apparatus.

Secondly, the draft envisages additional guarantees of efficient operations by legal services. For example, they are endowed with the right to take part in the meetings of the boards of ministries and departments, in conferences called by managers of all ranks; they may submit to managers proposals to eliminate violations of the law, to grant indemnification for losses and to bring to trial those guilty of violating the law, the consideration of which is mandatory.

If a violation displaying the signs of crime is found, the legal service notifies not only the relevant manager of this, but also the investigative agencies. The elimination of a legal division or a position of the chief of the legal service of a ministry or department is allowed only with the written consent of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR or a constituent republic.

It is apparent that the authors of the project strove to restore the role of judicial services as guarantors of upholding the law in everyday operations of the management organs and officials, while preserving for other judicial organs their inherent functions of control and adjudication of conflicts which cannot be resolved at the level of a ministry or department. However, this is seen between the lines rather than stated in the draft of the new document. Hence an array of complaints about it.

First, there is the legal status of the new document. It is not clear why the use of the general theses rather than the Law on the Judicial Service in the USSR is proposed. Is it just because the theses on the judicial service of the soviets of people's deputies are now removed from it? However, the legal unsoundness of some decisions by the organs of authority, including at the highest levels, is widely known at present. To mention one, let us recall the recently voided decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR. Therefore, the legal status of lawyers working for these organs as well should be determined, and this should be done exactly within the framework of a law, similar to the manner in which the operations of courts, prosecutors' offices, attorneys and arbitration bodies are now regulated.

Now, remarks on the merits of the content of the draft. Unfortunately, the actual position of the judicial service within the apparatus of one organ of power or another is impossible to "figure out" on the basis of the draft.

Article 6 reads: "The subordination of the judicial service of a ministry or department is determined by the head of the ministry or department."

It is clear, however, that no minister will get directly involved in organizing judicial work, whereas no special agency for that is envisaged so far.

In practice, a situation may develop due to this when there is not anybody to organize judicial activities at all. For example, a dozen injunctions and warnings by a military prosecutor caused by violations of the law may be found in a regiment, but this fact in no way influences the overall performance of the regiment. This is part of the reason why there is no interest in organizing judicial work.

The role of the judicial service in reinforcing the rule of law depends directly on the degree to which it participates in working out managerial decisions. So far, such participation is most often based on prohibition. When endorsing a document, a lawyer may state that this cannot be done in the event the document is in contravention of the law. Thus far, his constructive suggestions on how it should be done are not mandatory.

Some provisions of the draft give cause for satisfaction, such as the duty of the manager who signed a document contrary to the opinion of the judicial service to notify his superior agency of this within 5 days, or the right of the judicial service to bring to the attention of the council of the labor collective cases of failure to take measures aimed at eliminating violations of the law. At the same time, representatives of the service should be protected from possible conflicts with managers in conjunction with carrying out these and other responsibilities (notifying investigative organs of a crime). Again, experience of this nature is available. For example, in the Ministry of Defense legal advisors—servicemen are appointed and relieved by orders of a higher-up rather than immediate commander. This is why the thesis included in the draft and stating that this is to be done only "with subsequent confirmation by a superior organization" (article 5) appears to be a step backward.

The specific status of documents signed against the opinion of the judicial service should probably be determined in the draft (article 16, point "v"). The lack of such a regimen at present brings about a situation when documents found by a judicial review to be in contravention of the law are not only signed at times, but apply for a long period of time until appealed by the prosecutor.

Further development of judicial services of ministries and departments and their increased role will make it possible not only to reinforce the rule of law in the operation of management agencies (which is extremely important all by itself) but will improve the prestige of these organs and make their operations more efficient.

**Proposal to Eliminate Disciplinary Battalions**  
*18010359c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*28 Jan 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Judicial Service Col A. Bilokon: "Is 'Disciplinary Battalion' Needed?"]

[Text] The word "disbat" [short for "disciplinary battalion"] does not appear in the draft Basic Criminal Law of the USSR and constituent republics submitted for discussion by the people, as well as in the legislation in effect. However, the words "disciplinary battalion" are there. However, the term used to denote the existence in our army of what is, speaking plainly, a penal battalion is beside the point.

Meanwhile, according to the penal legislation in effect since 1926, no such punishment was imposed on servicemen. There were no disciplinary units in the Red Army until the most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War. On 28 September 1942, the people's commissar of defense issued order No 298 on forming penal battalions and companies. This order is of the same caliber as the well-known order No. 227 dated 28 July 1942. Both of them played their part.

Let me note right away that people were sent to penal units for 1 to 3 months not only by a sentence of the military tribunal but also by order of the command, and not only Red Army men but also commanders.

The war came to an end, but disciplinary units continued to exist. We still have them now. The draft Basic Criminal Law suggests that we enter the 21st century with them.

What are the drafters of the new legislation guided by? It is hard to judge. Any arguments on the expediency of such punishment will not be found in a modern criminal law textbook either.

My suggestion is to eliminate disciplinary units. Active service military personnel should serve the time for crimes in general-purpose correctional facilities. It is worthwhile to point out in the law that a reduction in the security category of confinement or parole for such a person are possible no sooner than his age bracket is released to reserves.

I would also like to dwell on article 87 of the draft Basic Criminal Law which proposes a new penalty for officers, ensigns, warrant officers and extended service personnel convicted by a military tribunal—restrictions in service. It is envisaged that it will not be possible to appoint to a higher position or promote to the next military rank those to whom the article will apply. The term of the restriction will not be included in the tenure in rank for promotion to the next military rank, the leave for this time is reduced by one-half, and withholding of 10 to 12 percent of the pay is possible.

However, now that a reduction of the Armed Forces has been announced, the situation has changed profoundly: the best of the officers, ensigns and extended service personnel should serve in the army and the navy. We hardly need to keep in the service those who have a criminal penalty under their belt. Also, will they have a moral right to indoctrinate their subordinates?

I think that this penalty proposed for the first time is hardly expedient.

**Need for Humane Approach to Reduction in Force**  
*18010391a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*15 Feb 89 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed report: "The Provision Envisages..."]

[Text] In all my 32.5 years of service in the army I have never written to the newspapers. This letter was composed after I read in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA the comment on the conflict situation concerning the retirement of officers to the reserve at the district military hospital in Kiev (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 January 1989, "Physicians Are Being Retired by ... a Computer?").

I am not a candidate of science, even less a physician. By I still have victories, my victories. During the 8 years that I have commanded units (before that I held positions as unit deputy commander and subunit commander) none of my subordinates died or was censured or was maimed. And I can look hundreds and hundreds of mothers and fathers straight in the eye. For me, the service has been more than life.

And suddenly everything is abruptly brought to an end... The chief of the section close to our unit told me on the telephone that he had received a telegram from headquarters. Above the signature of his chief, a lieutenant general, it informed him that I was being transferred to the reserve. My documents must be in Moscow by 1 March.

Yes, on 2 March 1989 I shall be 50. Yes, I have served the established time. But why such haste? Where is the observance of the provisions on service by the officer corps? Is there not a provision for a personal interview in such a case?

Who asked me about my requests and wishes? For example, I have a son in ninth grade. He has changed schools more than once during our moves. I shall be unable to remain in the city where I live. This means that my son faces another change of school... All kinds of circumstances can arise for officers, can they not?

[signed] O. Yurchenko, colonel.

### From the Editor

Today, in connection with the reductions in the Armed Forces, the subject raised by Colonel Yurchenko is acquiring special significance. An officer is transferred to the reserve... For him, a new time in his life has started. He faces a psychological break and encounters living problems that are difficult to resolve here.

This is why the provision on service by the officer corps of the USSR Armed Force, approved by decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, makes provision in the instructions on the procedure for using this document for a well-considered and humane approach to resolving matters involving the transfer of officers to the reserve.

One of the requirements is mandatory personal interviews with servicemen. To clarify his future place of residence and deal with other request. And this is not merely a pro forma ritual. It is showing a person maximum attention and kindness and recognizing his service in the Armed Forces.

Of course, in life there can also be extraordinary circumstances dictated by a need (and the author of this letter has mentioned nothing of this). But even in that kind of situation, tact, kindness and respect for people should be shown.

### Question of Permanent Residence of Military Candidates Raised

18010391b Moscow KRASNAYAZVEZDA  
in Russian 15 Feb 89 First Edition p 1

[Report by Snr Lt S. Babichev and Col B. Karpov: "The Third Vote. Only This Could Determine the Winners at the District Election Meeting for the Local Territorial Electoral District"]

[Text] In the struggle at this next stage of the election campaign 15 candidates came forward for the post of USSR people's deputy. They included hero of the Soviet Union Lt Col R. Aushev. Those attending the meeting got to know all the candidates and they carefully and comprehensively considered their election programs. Now the candidates for the mandate of deputy had to respond to questions from the voters.

One of the first questions for Lt Col Aushev is now being asked of candidates everywhere who are candidates from military collectives:

You are a military person. They give you an order and you leave the Far East. But we need our own deputy, who can always safeguard our interests...

Yes, orders must be obeyed, the officer responded. But in the event of being elected as a deputy I shall submit a request to the top command not to be sent outside the electoral district. I did my service in the Far East with my brothers. I now have a profound respect for your people and our kray, and I think that I understand their concerns and know their problems, and I will protect their interests at all levels.

In Aushev's program the problems of the Far East take up a significant place. Those present at the meetings were interested in learning about the candidate's thoughts on the introduction of territorial cost accounting and economic independence for enterprises in use of their own resources, and in the establishment of direct links with firms abroad. Lt Col Aushev has set forth in detail in his election program extension of rights for enterprises and utilization by them of their own profit as a powerful lever for improving labor productivity...

Other candidates also responded to voters' questions. Those present at the meeting decided to hold a secret ballot.

When they counted the votes there was some embarrassment in Aushev's "command." He had received less than half of the votes. Aushev would have to fight on. But the other candidates had also failed to get more than half of the votes.

Again the candidates and their agents mounted the rostrum. Col A. Popov talked about the contribution made by Aushev to perestroika, his sense of principle as a communist and a commander, and the way this officer is loved by his subordinates, and how he has been given high awards of the motherland for the fulfillment of his international duty.

Cases of nonregulation relationships have been eradicated from the regiment. For last year's results the collective was awarded a pennant of the USSR Ministry of Defense "For Courage and Military Valor." Awards for service above and beyond the call of duty were awarded to many servicemen. It seemed that now the sympathy of most votes would be with Aushev. But many fine things were also said about other candidates.

The second round of voting also failed to produce a result.

Again the candidates faced the voters at the meetings. Not one of them retreated from the businesslike and specific questions on each point.

In these days both the candidates for the post of USSR people's deputy and the voters are going through a school of democracy. Each person sees that without collective wisdom and without all-around participation in resolving the burning and acute problems we shall not emerge from stagnation and we shall not achieve successes in perestroika and the renewal of our life.

These thoughts were expressed by physician Natalya Mikhaylovna Nedorostkova just before the third vote at the meeting, when she declined to accept nomination as a candidate.

Today I am voting for the candidate not by considering his career and vital well-being but who will protect the interests of the people and the interests of the voters and the country, she stated.

Other people present at the meeting supported her.

At the third vote Lt Col Aushev got the necessary number of votes. Together with other candidates he will continue the struggle for the mandate of deputy at the next stage of the election campaign.



**GSFG Air Force Political Leadership Criticized  
on Response to Complaint**

18010333 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Nov 88 p 2

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Follow-Up to  
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Feature": "'Deformation'"]

[Text] That was the name of an article by the first deputy chief of the political section of the GSFG Air Force, Col V. Yudin, that was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on May 5 of this year. It raised the problems of personal responsibility and setting an example by communist leaders in ensuring flight safety and the training and placement of personnel, and expressed critical observations toward a number of officials, especially the first deputy commander of the the GSFG Air Force, Maj Gen Avn V. Ivannikov.

In an official reply of October 24 over the signature of the deputy chief of the political directorate of the air force, Maj Gen Avn Baskakov, it was reported that the article "Deformation" was topical and necessary, raised a problem vitally important to the Air Force and that interest in it was not weakening today either, some six months after the time of publication.

The article's author, V. Yudin, the reply emphasizes, displayed high principles and boldness in the presentation of the problems whose solution is being slowed through the fault of certain commanders. A verification of the facts on the scene by the secretary of the party commission under the political directorate of the air force, Maj Gen Avn N. Vasilyevskiy, as well as the reports of a number of officials in the GSFG Air Force, confirmed the serious flaws in the work of the command staff of the GSFG Air Force and the group leading flight operations and the prevention of near-accidents in flight. This was also acknowledged by the military council of the GSFG Air Force in a discussion of the article at one of its sessions, where existing shortcomings in the organization of flight training and in the style of its activity were pointed out to Maj Gen Avn V. Ivannikov.

The party commission under the political directorate of the air force in turn also pointed out to communist Ivannikov the serious omissions in the cultivation of exemplary conduct by the command staff in ensuring flight safety and the lack of a self-critical attitude toward the observations that were made in the article "Deformation."

The report of a member of the military council—air force group political section commander Maj Gen Avn K. Shapkin—was heard at the political directorate of the air force on October 10. Serious flaws in reacting to the critical observations and materials raised in the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and questions of flight safety and model behavior in their resolution by the command staff were pointed out to him.

The insufficient ability to prove a series of factors used in the article was pointed out to the deputy commander of the political section, Col V. Yudin.

Col V. Bondarik, who had permitted two gross near-accidents in flight, was subjected to party disciplinary action at his new service location in the Leningrad Military District [MD]. He was reprimanded for omissions in personal flight training.

The unconscientious fulfillment of official duties was pointed out to Lt Col A. Pospekhov at a party meeting of the regimental directorate. Lt V. Deshin will be subject to party disciplinary action upon return from regular leave for incompetence and an inability to see flaws in the work of the officers of the groups in raising flight safety in investigating the near-accidents in flight.

The political directorate of the air force is planning to assist the political section of the GSFG Air Force in assimilating political methods of leadership in December of 1988 and January of 1989 so as to raise their influence on a rise in end results in air training, preventive work in flight safety and the reinforcement of military discipline.

The editors have received a second version of the reply from the GSFG Air Force over the signatures of Lt Gen Avn Ye. Shaposhnikov and Maj Gen Avn K. Shapkin.

A digression is needed here. During a period of widespread glasnost, when criticism in the military press often reaches the highest officials and is aimed at fighting shortcomings in the most important areas of combat training and the life of soldiers, there are occasions when the authors of official replies to sharp newspaper features, supporting in words the position of the press organ in a "positive" manner, then try to latch onto actual or imaginary petty inaccuracies, to divert, hiding behind various types of insignificant little facts, sometimes distinctively interpreted, the discussion away from the main issue, concentrating attention on the claims of the author. In short, instead of the brush-offs that were common before, there are attempts to "torpedo" the sharpness of the feature with distracting "trifles." The first version of the reply clearly suffered from this, although it at least acknowledged the topical nature of the problems raised, but its edge was directed first and foremost against the author of the feature. After the intervention of the political directorate of the air force, the reply was recalled by a telegram from a member of the military council—GSFG Air Force Political Department Maj Gen Avn Shapkin—"in connection with the discovery of additional circumstances."

The second version of the reply contains the positions set forth in the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA feature that were deemed correct. It is noted that the article has struck a positive chord and has facilitated a more responsible and critical evaluation of the state of affairs in the principal areas of activity of communist leaders. It is confirmed

that in the course of the incorporation of proposals developed by Maj Gen Avn V. Ivannikov to strengthen monitoring over the individual training of the flight staff, the so-called "pilot's passport," there were elements of a command-pressure method of leadership.

The feature, the authors of the reply emphasized, justly indicated the insufficiently sharp reaction of the leadership of the GSFG Air Force upon the discovery of near-accidents in flight committed by a pilot being trained in the course of a flight with instructor Col V. Bondarik. All of the circumstances of the matter were not uncovered in investigating it, and Bondarik, leaving for a new service location in the Leningrad MD, was not subjected to party disciplinary action.

*The editors were also informed of measures that were taken toward the specific perpetrators upon the appearance of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA feature. In confirming the connection of Col Bondarik with the "rapid advancement of his son-in-law, Lt Col S. Romashchenko," however, the authors of the detailed six-page reply furnished no evaluation of the instance of clear protectionism. The colonel, by the way, who permitted the two near-accidents, was awarded a valuable gift upon his transfer from the Group of Soviet Forces Germany. And, as it became known to the editors, evidently "inspired" by this evaluation of his affairs, Bondarik had the next near-accident in flight comparatively quickly at his new location.*

*Complaints about some elements of the acutely critical feature were also set forth in the report from the GSFG Air Force. Since a fundamental evaluation of all of these instances was contained in the official reply from the political directorate of the Air Force, the editors feel it would not be expedient to comment on them.*

**Novosti-Ministry of Defense Brochure on European Balance of Forces**  
18010369 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Feb 89 First Edition p 3

[Review by M. Ponomarev of Novosti-Ministry of Defense brochure "Varshavskiy Dogovor i NATO: sootnosheniye sil v Yevrope" [The Warsaw Pact and NATO: The Balance of Forces in Europe]: "How the Calculations Were Made: A New Brochure on the Balance of Warsaw Pact and NATO Forces in Europe"]

[Text] The Publishing House of the Novosti Press Agency has demonstrated enviable efficiency. Working jointly with and aided by the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it published an excellently composed brochure, "Varshavskiy Dogovor i NATO: sootnosheniye sil v Yevrope," literally the day after the text of the statement by the Committee of

Ministers of Defense of the Warsaw Pact States, "On the Balance of Numerical Strength of the Armed Forces and Weapons of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe and Adjacent Bodies of Water," appeared in the newspapers.

The document issued by the Committee of Ministers of Defense exposed to glasnost for the first time official data on the numerical strength of the armed forces and conventional weapons of the two alliances. We now have the opportunity to see the true, objective picture of the balance of military forces in Europe and adjacent bodies of water. This was made possible by the fact that the compilers of the document took a comprehensive approach and counted all the components of the OVD [Warsaw Pact Organization] and NATO armed forces: ground troops, air forces, naval forces, air defense forces and civil (territorial) defense forces.

The brochure put out by the APN [Novosti Press Agency] permits one to see this with his own eyes. It contains the complete text of the statement of the Committee of Ministers of Defense of the Warsaw Pact States and appended tables showing the balance of numerical strength of the armed forces and the main types of weapons of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic alliance in Europe and adjacent bodies of water as of 1 July 1988. The compilers of the brochure did not stop there, however. They included a schematic map reproduced here [map not reproduced], of the zone in which the overall numerical strength of the armed forces and conventional weapons of the two alliances were calculated, as well as diagrams depicting this numerical strength and the balance of forces. The diagrams graphically illustrate both the substantial imbalances and asymmetries on both sides and their superiority with respect to specific components, as well as the basic fact of approximate military parity between the OVD and NATO on the continent of Europe and in adjacent waters.

Talks on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe are to begin in a month under a decision adopted at the Vienna meeting in the capital of Austria of the seven Warsaw Pact states and 16 nations of the North Atlantic alliance. The data published by the allied OVD nations are not a substitute for the subject of the future talks. However, these data—and the APN brochure makes that absolutely apparent—indisputably attest to the only correct method of evaluating the military forces on the continent and in adjacent bodies of water. These forces have to be considered comprehensively, in their totality. This approach is designed ultimately to focus the attention of the participants on making the talks realistic from the outset and rejecting the pursuit of unilateral advantages.

**Lobov, Moiseyev, Others Promoted**

18010374 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 Feb 89 First Edition p 1

[Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet  
On the Awarding of Military Rank]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet  
decrees:

the awarding of the military rank of:

**General of the Army** on Colonel-General Lobov, Vladimir  
Nikolayevich; Colonel-General Moiseyev, Mikhail Alekseye-  
vich; Colonel-General Shuralev, Vladimir Mikhaylovich.

**Marshal of Artillery** on Colonel-General Mikhalkin,  
Vladimir Mikhaylovich.

**Marshal of Aviation** on Colonel-General of Aviation  
Volkov, Aleksandr Nikitovich.

[Signed by] The Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR  
Supreme Soviet, M. Gorbachev.

The Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR, T.  
Menteshashvili.

Moscow, The Kremlin. 15 February 1989.

**Private Killed While Under Arrest**

18010332a Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
17 Nov 88 p 4

[Text] As previously reported in the press (KOMU-  
NISTI, 29 July; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 31 July), on 22  
April 1988 a military court initiated criminal proceed-  
ings against Warrant Officer Kamenko, a guardhouse  
commander accused of a criminal act leading to the  
death of Private M. Arabuli, a military construction  
crewman.

As communicated to a GRUZINFORM correspondent  
by Justice Colonel V. Ivanov, Transcaucasus Military  
District prosecutor, he was charged with committing a  
crime, in violation of Article 260 P "B" of the RSFSR  
Criminal Code.

A trial was held in October of 1988. It was established  
that Kamenko, who was commander of a guardhouse,  
did in fact exceed his authority by employing illegal  
methods to force prisoners to comply with guardhouse  
procedures. He also employed illegal methods on previ-  
ous occasions against Privates Rokhmonov, Abbasov,  
Groz, and others.

Kamenko in exceeding his authority caused Private M.  
Arabuli to suffer serious bodily injuries that resulted in  
his death. The court found Kamenko criminally liable, in

violation of Article 260 P "B" of the RSFSR Criminal  
Code, and sentenced him to eight years' incarceration to  
be served under high-security conditions.

**One Killed During Attempted Theft of Military  
Weapons**

18010332b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Nov 88 Second Edition p 4

[Text] On 18 November at about 19:30, shots were heard  
on Khabarovsk-Moscow train No 183 as it approached  
Glazov Station. In an ensuing scuffle, one of the partic-  
ipants was shot and killed by Junior Sergeant I. Poluk-  
hin, a member of a Moscow Military District unit. In  
response to a request for information initiated by the  
editors, Colonel O. Frunze, chief of the Troop Service  
Section of District Headquarters, stated the following:

"As described by the duty officer of the Ural Military  
District, four intoxicated civilians armed with knives  
attacked a guard detail from our unit that was returning  
after having delivered military supplies to their destina-  
tion. It may be assumed that the attackers intended to  
steal military weapons. The guard detail, consisting of  
Junior Sergeant I. Polukhin and Privates S. Dashin, I.  
Shvetsov, and A. Bogdanov, warned the four attackers—  
all of whom had records of previous offenses, incident-  
ally—that it would use its weapons if necessary. Two  
warning shots were fired into the air. Only after that did  
the guard commander use his weapon. The attackers  
were removed from the train by military organs upon  
arrival in Glazov. The incident is under investigation."

The newspaper will publish additional information on  
the incident upon completion of work by investigative  
organs.

**Cases of Draft Avoidance in Novosibirsk**

18010332c Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian  
20 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent F.  
Yakushev: "A Disgraceful Son"]

[Text] I recently received a telephone call from I. F.  
Astashov, military commander of the Kirovskiy Locality  
of Novosibirsk, who said:

"Come here to the induction station. You will see young  
men who offer all kinds of excuses to avoid military  
service. Maybe you will see fit to tell their story to all  
honorable people."

When the young man entered the draft board's office, all  
the board members exchanged glances. They all had  
expected to see some kind of sickly and homely fellow.  
Instead, a veritable athlete stood before them. There was  
a disparity between M. Mayzik's looks and his file, which  
was thick with various medical documents.

A student at the electrotechnical institute, I. Mayzik had been slated for active military duty this past spring. However, at that time he appeared before the draft board with a document attesting to a kidney illness. The document had been issued by Hospital No 11. After undergoing a thorough examination in the hospital, however, Mayzik was pronounced fit for military service, after which he was handed his draft papers. However, the young man ran away from the oblast joint induction station. This fact was entered into his file.

The young man reported to the draft board a second time. He was adamant in his refusal to answer questions. This time Mayzik was found to have high blood pressure. The doctor serving on the draft board did not exclude the possibility that the youth took a strong substance to achieve this effect. It was possible for Mayzik to do this, since his mother manages a pharmacy. Mayzik was requested to undergo another examination.

Our next "hero" went a step further. He passed his medical examination. Although he was judged fit for active military duty, he failed to report to the draft board. He simply went home. I leafed through the personal file of conscript Ye. Gaydyshev, a graduate of School No 101. It is a good school, one I have visited a number of times. The school for many years has housed a museum specializing in displaying the combat glories of guards Siberians. However, there is a black sheep in every family, as they say. For several years the Kirovskiy Military Commissariat had been trying to induct Gaydyshev into the Army.

I read the file: "On 5 November 1986 the Kirovskiy Military Commissariat turned over to the Kirovskiy Locality Prosecutor's Office information for the purpose of bringing criminal charges against conscript Ye. P. Gaydyshev in connection with his refusal to accept the notice to report for active military service." I read Writ No 7485 of 10 October 1987 issued by the district military hospital and the conclusion signed by the Main Military Medical Board. The document states that conscript Ye. P. Gaydyshev is fit for unlimited line duty.

The military commissariat sent dozens of inquiries to various offices, including the Kirovskiy People's Court. The commissariat came to understand that it was caught in a vicious circle. Then something unexpected occurred: Conscript Gaydyshev was ordered to undergo an in-hospital forensic psychiatric examination, by specialists at Psychoneurological Hospital No 3. The subject's criminal file was forwarded to the hospital. It was handed to nurse M. P. Kravchenko. Gaydyshev himself did not report to the hospital. Later, on 8 February, the conscript was delivered there, under escort, no less. He was not admitted, however, since the criminal file had disappeared without a trace!!

"This sad state of affairs," said Astashov, "led the Kirovskiy People's Court to drop the criminal charges."

Let us become better acquainted with Gaydyshev. His personal file contains his profile. His record through secondary school is unblemished. The record from the electrotechnical institute where he studied at one time is likewise faultless. His profile points to a special interest in sports, particularly hang gliding and parachute jumping. This is an indication of the youth's excellent health. The record from the Novosibirsk State University, where Gaydyshev is a student in the physics department, also describes him in glowing terms. We asked the Novosibirsk State University if it knew that criminal charges were pending against one of its students in connection with his refusal to be inducted for active military service. It seems that it did. However, no one had spoken with Gaydyshev about this. It was decided that the matter was personal. The student was not censured in any way.

The military commissariat nevertheless handed Gaydyshev his notice. Whether or not he will be inducted into the Army in November is another question. Recently the conscript's mother, a physician (another physician!), visited the commissariat. She gave the commissariat workers a severe dressing down and held a serious conversation with the commissar. Unfortunately, I cannot give any details of what was said, since that very evening Ivan Fomich Astashov was hospitalized.

I believe that there is no need to provide additional disheartening information on such machinations. What has been said is most likely sufficient. It seems to me that it is more important for us to get together and combat this evil.

I can recall an event from my early childhood. We—four brothers—were having dinner. One of us was picking at his food. Suddenly Grandfather Ivan spoke up: "What kind of man will you grow up to be? The Army will not take you! But if you eat a lot of kasha, you will become a brave soldier, just like your Great-Grandfather Zosim."

We had never seen our great-grandfather, of course. Our only tie to him was a large photograph which grandfather had placed next to an icon. The photograph was of a dashing cavalryman on horseback with drawn sabre. Inscribed below were the words "Zosim Ponamarev, Bearer of the Order of St. George, His Majesty's Household Troops, mounted on his horse Orlik."

Grandfather often told us that his father was the first in the village to become a bearer of the Order of St. George. He participated in the famous Brusilov Breakthrough. He was killed in action in the Civil War while commanding a company of red partisans.

The boyhood dream of serving in the Army we village boys had was rekindled when we became adults. Any fellow who did not qualify for the draft for any reason

was considered to be somewhat deficient. As a rule, girls were not interested in that kind of lad. Why is the prestige of military service declining among some of our youth?

The author of these lines would not like to leave the reader with a heavy heart after he has read this article. Fortunately, there are not many of the so-called military refusers. Most young men of our Siberian city are enthusiastic about entering military service and do everything they can to prepare for it.

I would like to give my heartfelt thanks to the parents of conscripts S. Aderikhin, A. Altimonov, S. Chichilo, I. Bykov, A. Terekhin, and Yu. Androsov, among others. Their sons successfully completed the Novosibirsk Model General Technical School of the DOSAAF, graduating as navigation radar specialists. They were drawn to this training organization by their dream of serving in the Navy. The dream has come true. The draft board pronounced them fit for duty in the Navy.

School graduates A. Baykov and S. Kurmyshev have been assigned to radiotechnical troops, where they have earned the specialty of radar operators. Conscript O. Zhdanov completed Novosibirsk Motor Vehicle School No 1. He has been assigned to the motor vehicle troops. None of these young men ever entertained a thought of avoiding service in the Armed Forces.

The problem of the military refusers still exists, however. Silence will accomplish nothing. It is time to determine the root cause of the serious moral shortcomings of some young people.

The draft is a great state activity, an important event not only for youth, but also for their friends, labor collectives, schools, and social organizations. For this reason, we all must work together to inculcate in conscripts high feelings of citizenship and responsibility as they go forth to fulfill their sacred constitutional obligation.

#### **New Check System in Military Trade**

18010296a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Dec 88 First Edition p 2

[Unsigned Article: "'Berezka,' 'Yuzhnyy' and Others—New Trading Procedure Established in Specialized Stores"]

[Text] Since July 1988, as is known, stores of the Berezka firm and the like have been closed. In Tashkent, for example, the Yuzhnyy store, in which citizens of our country arriving from the Republic of Afghanistan acquired goods, has been eliminated. The sale of goods was organized through special demonstration halls and stores. They were opened in Moscow, Leningrad, the capitals of the union republics, and certain other cities.

Now in order to buy, say, a radio set, the purchaser must first sign up in a store, and then, having waited for a postcard, take it to the store, write out a commercial check and go to a bank. After a few days the bank notifies the store that the purchaser has a special account, and that the appropriate transfer has been made from his account. Only after this can the purchase be taken. Compared with cash payments by personal checks this system is less convenient for the purchaser. However, it closes a loophole for speculators.

As was explained by the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Finance Directorate, the shift to the written order form of payments for goods also fully and entirely applies to a certain portion of military personnel, workers and employees of the Soviet Army and Navy, who are travelling abroad. Personnel of Soviet forces temporarily located on the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan are given the opportunity to acquire goods through garrison military trade enterprises.

For this purpose, special checks of Vnesheposyltorg [as written] with a red stripe have been issued, which are not circulated on USSR territory and are not to be accepted for deposit at USSR Vneshekonombank [Foreign Economic Bank] and USSR Sberbank [Savings Bank]. They can be exchanged for Soviet rubles at face value through the Turkestan Military District Financial Service. For this it is necessary to go to the financial unit at one's place of service.

#### **SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS DEPARTMENT**

#### **Lt Gen Krylov on Officers' Training Competition**

18010296b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 20 Dec 88 First Edition p 1

[Interview of Lt Gen Ye. Krylov, deputy chief, Ground Forces Main Military Training Directorate: "Competition Reveals the Best"]

[Text] By order of the USSR Minister of Defense, the conditions for conducting field, air and naval training competitions among Soviet Army and Navy officer personnel are announced.

Lt Gen Ye. Krylov, deputy chief, Ground Forces Main Military Training Directorate, who has taken an active part in the development of the guidance documents, discusses the purpose of the competitions, their nature, time periods and the places where they will be held, at the request of the editors.

[Question] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, what are the goals of the competitions?

[Krylov] With their assistance we hope to activate independent work by officers on improving their professional and methodological training, and to increase their interest in deepening their military-theoretical level, developing practical skills in controlling subunits, and mastering

weapons and equipment. The competitions will determine worthy candidates for promotion to higher positions, and assignments for study at military academies.

[Question] Who will take part in the competitions?

[Krylov] Those who desire from among commanders of platoons, companies and batteries, battalions and artillery battalions, and deputy commanders of companies, battalions and their equivalent, regardless of education and term of service.

[Question] How will the competitions be held?

[Krylov] In odd years, beginning 1 January 1989. All participants who have expressed the desire to compete in professionalism will be divided into three groups: platoon commanders; company and battery commanders, their deputies and the equivalent; and battalion and artillery battalion commanders, their deputies and the equivalent. And the competition itself will be conducted in three stages. The first stage will end by Soviet Army and Navy Day. It will take place in large units, units and military educational institutions, for all three groups of participants. The second stage will be conducted in military districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies and flotillas, only for company commanders, battalion commanders, their deputies and the equivalent. Its results will become known by the Victory holiday. The victors in the second stage from among the commanders of battalions, artillery battalions their deputies and the equivalent, may take part in the third stage of the competition, held under the leadership of the commanders of the USSR armed services, commanders (chiefs) of branches of arms, and chiefs of USSR Ministry of Defense main and central directorates. The third stage of the competition will be held at military educational institutions. Say, for officers of motorized rifle and assault subunits, the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze; for Air Forces officers, the Air Force Academy imeni Yu. A. Gagarin; for officers in motor transport subunits and rear services, the Rear Services and Transport Military Academy, etc. The results of the concluding stage will be given by the anniversary of Great October.

[Question] What tests await the competition participants?

[Krylov] Very serious ones. They will be tested on tactical or tactical-specialized training; firing training or control of missile strikes, artillery fire, or air defense; driving combat or specialized vehicles; and physical training. Test topics are determined by the commanders of the armed services, based on the commanders' training programs. Each stage of the competition includes theoretical and practical tests. A system of coefficients by which the assessments obtained will be multiplied, will ensure that priority is given to practical skills.

[Question] How will incentives be given to the winners of the competitions?

[Krylov] Large unit and unit commanders and chiefs of military educational institutions will give incentives to the winners of the first stage. Company and battery commanders and the equivalent, who take first, second and third places in the second stage of the competitions, will be awarded valuable (engraved) presents, and will receive priority in promotion to a higher position or will be presented for early awarding of the next military rank. The same incentives are also provided for those who come in first, second and third in the final stage of the competition. Awards are also provided for those who take fourth and fifth places in the final.

One more important incentive is provided for. Commanders of companies, batteries and the equivalent, who take first place in the second stage of the competition, and commanders of battalions, artillery battalions, their deputies and the equivalent, who have the best result in the final, may be sent to study at military academies, and if they pass the entrance exams they will be enrolled on a non-competitive basis. This has already been put into law.

[Question] How can an officer become a participant in the competition?

[Krylov] He submits an application to his immediate commander before 15 January of next year, stating his desire to take part in the competition.

#### **Chief Discusses Work of New Internationality Relations Commission**

*18010296c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Dec 88 First Edition p 2*

[Excerpts of interview by Col V. Gavrilenko, correspondent, of Maj Gen A. Ivanov: "To Become a School of Internationalism"]

[Text] *Commissions on internationality relations have been created in the Armed Forces. The commission in the Moscow Air Defense District is headed by Maj Gen A. Ivanov, first deputy chief of the district political directorate. Our correspondent talks with him.*

"First of all," stated Aleksandr Sergeyevich, "these commissions are called upon to make a contribution to solving the tasks formulated at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which derived from the requirement: 'Service in the ranks of the USSR armed forces must become a true school of internationalism.' Second, their appearance is stipulated by recent complex, at times tragic events in internationality relations. Even in the difficult hour of testing on Armenian soil, when all of the country's peoples are displaying courage and true internationalism in eliminating the consequences of the earthquake, politicians are not ceasing extremism. Nationalistic elements are inflaming internationality

discord, and playing on people's emotions. They are succeeding in confusing some young people. At a recent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev emphasized: '...Life goes forward, new generations enter it, who are not born internationalists...' Understandably, these young people also come to our units and subunits.

"It is enough to say that today soldiers from more than 50 nationalities are serving in the district. And there is no need to hide the fact that at times the relations among them are not simple. Therefore, in speaking about the state of relations among nationalities and international indoctrination in district units and subunits, we should acknowledge honestly that here there are still numerous unsolved problems. Many of us commanders and political workers until recently underestimated the role of the national factor in the lives of military collectives. Even today, in my view, there is still not sufficient democratism or deep understanding by each commander and political worker of the need to take people's national interests and particularities into account, in the process of international indoctrination." [passage omitted]

[Gavrilenko] Aleksandr Sergeyevich, I cannot forget the well known incident in the district that took place between military construction workers, privates I. Godzhayev and I. Ibragimov. Ibragimov raised his hand to his comrade...

[Ivanov] Yes, a tragedy occurred. Godzhayev died from his wounds. Tracing this entire grievous history from beginning to end, one sees the omissions, incomplete work, and out and out negligence of the commanders and political workers. The military construction detachment, which is led by Lt Col V. Tsvetkov, is multinational. But we could not find any traces of international indoctrination in it. This work was completely allowed to take its own course here.

Pvt I. Godzhayev, a military construction worker, was known for his lack of discipline, and was crude and brash in his relations with his coworkers. Godzhayev began to fail to go to work and to behave defiantly in the new collective where he was sent for "reindoctrination." In the fog of such bullying, he insulted the national sensitivities of Pvt I. Ibragimov. The latter bore a grudge. And he decided to pay back his offender himself. What can one say? The commanders and political workers, and the party and komsomol aktiv, overlooked the formation of a dramatic situation.

[Gavrilenko] Not so long ago, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, an inspection team from the USSR Ministry of Defense was working in the district. How did it assess the state of international indoctrination in the units and subunits? What shortcomings were revealed? What has already been done to eliminate them?

[Ivanov] Along with positive aspects in indoctrination work, the inspectors also noted a number of existing shortcomings. One of them is that not enough attention is being paid to indoctrinating the soldiers in the spirit of mutual respect and military comradeship. Examples of ignorant behavior among soldiers from different nationalities are also encountered. Not only soldiers, but even some officers have a superficial impression about the history and national particularities of the union republics. The sergeants, and the party, komsomol and especially the ideological aktiv, are selected without taking into account the multinationality of the military collectives. The topic of internationalism is poorly presented in propaganda work. This was felt particularly keenly at a recent "round table" of propagandists, devoted to international indoctrination and internationality relations. It was learned that a considerable number of the propagandists were still in the prison of past stereotypes concerning lack of conflict in internationality relations, and a rigid approach to their interpretation. Once I heard one of our regimental propagandists. He spoke to the auditorium about international unity in the unit. But his talk had a stagnant air about it. His turn of phrase, terminology, and the primitive nature of his examples convinced me that this ideological worker boiled down the problem of international unity to one of internationality uniformity. In general, this has been our common failure in recent years—reducing problems to a one-sided understanding, and forgetting the Leninist view that the international grows on the foundation of the development of the national. [passage omitted]

[Gavrilenko] All the same, what specific steps did the district military soviet outline to improve international indoctrination?

[Ivanov] Our task is to teach officers to penetrate deeply into the essence and dynamics of the processes taking place in multinational collectives, and ably control them. This is not a simple matter. Therefore, it was decided that members of the military soviet, and officers from the staff and political directorate, are to visit the units and render specific, businesslike assistance in reinterpreting the problems, forms and methods of international indoctrination. A brochure published by the political directorate became a good help in the work of the commander and political workers. It contains methodological recommendations on the use of national particularities, ways and customs of the soldiers called up from the different republics in the practice of political indoctrination work with the personnel.

The military district newspaper, NA BOYEVOM POSTU, is making its contribution to the international indoctrination of the soldiers. I would also like to note the fact that this year subscriptions to newspapers and journals of the union republics increased.

A program has been developed and is being put into practice for implementing the decisions of the 19th Party Conference, where, in particular, a mechanism for ensuring the principle of social justice with respect to soldiers

of different nationalities, and an equal and equitable attitude toward each has been defined. A few days ago we held a session of the district commission on internationality relations, and each of its members received a definite sector of work. It was decided to pay particular attention to the younger generation. It is necessary to study effectively the frames of mind of the young soldiers, and the degree of influence on them of those alarming events that they undoubtedly witnessed. It is not unimportant to determine their enthusiasm for service, and understanding of their place and role in the multinational army collective, and their rights and duties in their relationship with their comrades. The alarming, and at times tragic events of recent months, weeks and even days require from us serious thinking and specific and responsible actions. And their essence is, most importantly, to bring to the young soldier, no matter from where he and we have come, the truth about what has taken place, to expand the information he has, and to help him to understand who is sowing the seeds of enmity between fraternal peoples and why, and who is engaged in political manipulations of extremist minded nationalists.

[Gavrilenko] Once an officer told me about a soldier who had never taken a mop in his hands during his entire service. National custom supposedly did not permit him to do so. [passage omitted]

[Ivanov] It seems as though you and I have talked to the same person. I also know about this case. But, he was not entirely frank in his conversation with you. This is convenient—to write off his own shortcomings to the particularities of national character. But this was not the case at all. I know representatives of this nationality. They are honest, hard working and hospitable people with a unique code of masculine honor. But, when they are in a male collective they are able to displace and replace certain concepts. It is simply necessary to look deeply into these subtleties. But what did the officer do? Having learned from the first sergeant about his refusal to work, through the first sergeant he “delivered up” the soldier, “lock, stock and barrel.” This was repeated several times. In the end the commander gave up on the stubborn fellow as a lost cause, and the latter continued to serve conscientiously in other areas and capacities. What is there to say? It is a “ticklish situation.” A soldier’s summary on this account is utterly clear: Why is it that we can “scrub” the toilet, and our coworker doesn’t? So dissension arose in the collective. And this need not have happened, had the officer gotten a bit more deeply involved in the situation, and personally and intelligently broken down the position, which was based on youthful maximalism and a falsely understood male sense of worth. And it is absolutely necessary in such cases to rely on the coworkers, and to form in the platoon, in the company, a “collective indoctrinator.”

[Gavrilenko] It is clear that this officer adheres to outmoded views on international indoctrination. What new has appeared in this area recently?

[Ivanov] For example, the district commission on internationality relations will now have its counterparts. Internationality relations groups have been created in all garrisons and separate units, to which the best first-term soldiers of different nationalities have been democratically elected. Their main task is to strengthen friendship and comradeship, and to analyze and prevent nationality motivated conflicts. The groups’ functions also include analysis of international relations in the unit or garrison, taking into account national particularities of the soldiers, working out recommendations on patriotic and international indoctrination, organizing union republic 10-day commemorations, and participating in the creation of libraries in the languages of the USSR peoples, methodological centers for teaching the culture of international communication, etc.

[Gavrilenko] As I understood it these groups are just developing their work. And it is a real fact that in a number of units there exist so-called “national associations” of soldiers.

[Ivanov] It is entirely true that these “national associations” exist; this cannot be avoided. Life is life. But, speaking quite frankly, it is necessary to acknowledge that they even began to arrive when soldiers in one unit or another began to sense inattention, and even indifference, toward their national affiliation. “National associations” arose as an answer to the poverty and inertness of the forms of our attention to the life of the collective. In some places, frankly speaking, the situations got out of the control of the commanders, political workers, and party and komsomol organizations, and the “national associations” were isolated and withdrawn. I believe that here the internationality relations groups that are being created will play a positive role.

[Gavrilenko] Is there a connection between non-regulation and internationality relationships?

[Ivanov] I think that we ourselves sometimes introduce confusion into these concepts. We must learn to analyze the situation at all levels of consciousness—social and everyday—and think about the consequences of every word, every gesture, and every decision.

Let us say that two soldiers quarreled in the mess hall; one took the seat of the other. No doubt such situations cannot be avoided in the diverse army life. What is this, an internationality conflict? Some of the officers classify it as such, and moreover, do so publicly. There is much greater harm than good from such “principles and decisiveness.” But, we must also not close our eyes to the fact that at times conflicts arise that subsequently arouse many and unite the opposing sides along national lines. Wise indoctrinary work also must play here an active preventive role.



[Gavrilenko] Aleksandr Sergeyevich, is national affiliation taken into account in manning units with commanders and political personnel, or in elected party and komsomol organs?

[Ivanov] It must be noted that among the officers there are still rather few from the union republics in the Baltic, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. If there were more of them our palate of indoctrinating influence on the soldiers would be richer. It is necessary to solve this problem.

As for elected komsomol organs, I must admit that sufficient attention is still not being paid to the selection of the komsomol aktiv by national affiliation. There is not quite enough democratism, fairness and glasnost here. This is due not only to inattention toward selection of the aktiv, but also to the fact that many who arrive from Central Asia, the Baltic and the Transcaucasus have a poor knowledge of Russian. But, nevertheless, we strove to correct the situation concerning representation in the elective organs during the komsomol election campaign. In short, everywhere there are vital and dynamic processes, that do not stand for routine thinking and passive actions. All of us must restructure in this spirit.

#### **Dependents of Servicemen Working in Armenia Ignored**

*18010326 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 Jan 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major A. Plotnikov: "Instructions Have Not Been Received: Why Service Dependents Evacuated from the Calamity Zone Have Received no Help or Support"]

[Text] "My daughter and her two small children were brought to Moscow from Leninakan," said the female voice hesitantly on the phone. "Her husband, Senior Lieutenant Sergey Pagin, is participating in the elimination of the consequences of the natural calamity in Armenia. She has no belongings or any money, and her father's and my pension must support all of us. Everyone is talking about the aid being given to the victims, but my daughter and her children are receiving none. She appealed to the Lyublinskiy Military Commissariat, where she was told that they know nothing of this, having received no instructions."

We were soon to learn that the family of Captain Konstantin Terekhov, who is located in Spitak, was experiencing a similar situation. The captain's wife, who with her two children was flown from the affected area to Moscow, is also living with her pensioning parents. She applied for help from the rayispolkom, the local militia office, and the Oktyabrskiy Military Commissariat, but was treated with indifference.

What is going on? Everyone knows that funds have been set aside to assist victims, that account No 700412 continues to receive contributions from both Soviet people and from foreign citizens, and that there is no end to help from people who wish to send warm clothing to Armenia. How is it that none of this has reached the families of servicemen?

"It was decided to fly service families from the affected area to various cities of the Soviet Union," explained Major General L. Ivanov of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. "From the 10th through the 19th of December, for example, more than a thousand families were processed in Moscow and sent to other destinations. Field kitchens, a medical aid station, and mobile commissaries were set up directly at the airport. Soldier caps, padded jackets, gloves, and socks were handed out to those who needed them. This was done by officers functioning as a special task force. Personnel from a local military post also did their part. They collected money to purchase winter coats, valenki (felt boots), and boots for children. The victims also received nonreturnable financial aid in the amount of 25 or 50 rubles per person depending on their intended destination. The task force officers helped them all depart."

"What can these families expect in the future? Who will take care of them at their destination? Will they receive material assistance?"

"Troop commanders of military districts have been issued an order that addresses the situation," explained Major General L. Ivanov. "They are to organize at the points of arrival task forces which will process service families that have suffered from the calamity. In addition, they are to instruct military commissariats to act as go-between with the local organs of power."

We telephoned the Oktyabrskiy Military Commissariat of Moscow city while still at Major General L. Ivanov's office. This is where Captain K. Terekhov's wife had appealed for help from Deputy Military Commissar Lieutenant Colonel A. Savelyev.

"Did you receive an order relative to rendering aid to service families that have fallen victim to the earthquake?" we asked Lieutenant Colonel A. Savelyev.

"No," answered the officer. "We did not. What is the matter?"

"Was your assistance solicited by Tatyana Vasilyevna Terekhova, wife of a serviceman now located in Spitak?"

"It is possible. How can I help her?" the military commissariat worker asked in an irritated tone of voice.

About three weeks had passed since the families of victims had been flown out of the calamity zone. However even here, in the capital, the military commissariats

did not know about them. As a result, people who suffered much in the way of grief and trials fell into the humiliating position of asking for help.

The same Tatyana Terekhova was given a guest registration good for 45 days by Militia Station No 114. She had requested a temporary registration so that she could enroll her children in kindergarten and find employment for herself.

She made a request of Deputy Chairman V. Gerasimov of the Oktyabrskiy rayispolkom for temporary housing. Her parents—and her brother—live in an apartment measuring 27 square meters. Where can she and her two children go? "I do not know what I can do for you," said Comrade Gerasimov. "We have received no orders to this effect."

Tatyana Terekhova spent some time in the capital's stores to acquire winter clothing and footwear for herself and her children. She was unsuccessful. Then Tatyana remembered a document issued by the military commander back in Leninakan. The document attested to the fact that the bearer had suffered as a result of the earthquake and requires assistance. She showed the document to the sales personnel. They shrugged their shoulders: no instructions had been received.

In addition, according to Major General L. Ivanov, all families remaining in Moscow had his telephone number and could count on his help if they encountered difficulties. There were however several families who had not been taken into account, so to speak. How many more of them were there in the capital? In other cities of the country?

"This is how service families will receive help," continued the general. "Officers and warrant officers remaining in the calamity zone are to compose a statement testifying to their having suffered a loss, and the local organs of power of the Armenian SSR are to pay them the sum of money due. The money is to be sent to the families. This is the procedure for assisting victims as specified by government decree and by a concomitant order issued by the USSR minister of defense."

However, the question is: How are the service families to live now? What are they going to use for money? Almost a month has passed since the earthquake. Also, if aid is to be given to victims only at the place of occurrence, what is to be done about the people who have been evacuated?

"That is not in my area," said Major General L. Ivanov while making a gesture of helplessness. "Our task was to process and send them to their choice of destination."

I visited the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Directorate Deputy Chief Lieutenant General Tishin stated the following:

"Material assistance to service personnel who have suffered as a result of the earthquake is indeed rendered at their duty station. Assistance measures are taken in accordance with general guidelines. Colonel Ulyanchuk, our representative in the calamity zone, has reported that most servicemen have already received their money."

Local authorities however have not made any payments to servicemen and their families. Most likely no instructions have been received.

#### Readers Discuss Troop Cuts

18010192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Feb 89 p 3

[Article: "Letters About Reduction of the Armed Forces. For Those Being Released into the Reserve—Social Protection"]

[Text] The forthcoming reduction in the armed forces in the next 2 years, an understandable matter, is evoking the increased interest of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers. After all, it concerns many of them directly. The most diverse problems are raised in the letters. The theme of providing social protection for those who are to be discharged into the reserve in connection with the reduction holds a very important place in reader mail. More and more letters that raise this problem are coming in. We are publishing some of these.

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I served more than 20 years in the armed forces. And I cannot help but be worried about my personal fate because of the planned reduction in the army. Explanations published in the press give assurances that measures will be taken so that not one officer would suffer a loss of morale or material. But, nonetheless, the worry remains.

The fact is that officers released into the reserve today wait for years for housing. And in the course of 2 years this waiting line increases sharply and by much more. Or, take the question of pensions as an example. Someone like me, who does not have far to go to 25 years of service, will be allowed a half pension if discharged into the reserve. Is this really just?

A. IVANOV, officer.

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I read KRASNAYA ZVEZDA regularly, especially in the last 3 years, even though I retired long ago. I have seen more than one reduction in our armed forces during my long years of service. How did the first one of them go, in the years 1946-1947? All it took was for an officer to make his report, and he was released without any special

examination. It turned out this way: the one who should have been discharged, remained, and the one who should have been retained—he was discharged.

In the 1950's, reductions were carried out even more quickly. They did not let some officers or extended-servicemen complete even a year's service needed for a pension, even a half year. The prestige of the officer profession dropped. It is not high even now. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA at times criticizes individual schools, rayons and even oblasts where the percentage of youth enrolling in military schools is low. As a rule, this is attributed to deficiencies in military-patriotic education. This is so. But the most active agitator is life. I became convinced of this more than once.

And if now, in the next army reduction, the concern about people remains only in words, military schools will find themselves empty tomorrow.

**M. ZHILACH, participant in the Great Patriotic War.**

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The conditions of today's army life compel me to write to the editorial office. As far as I gathered from publications concerning the procedures for reducing the armed forces, the very important question about providing families of servicemen discharged into the reserve with dwelling space was set aside for some reason.

It is problem No. 1 even at the present time. It is clear that local soviets are not able to cope with it. This will be even more so after the reduction, when an additional arrival of families of servicemen discharged into the reserve occurs. Who awaits us there? Who needs us?

I fear that under the existing situation my family and I will suffer a loss of morale, and afterwards, a material loss also, because, after arriving in any city, we will be forced to knock about in search of housing and pay 40-70 rubles for it.

My suggestion. In the period of reduction, it will be necessary to take into account the provision of an apartment for officers and warrant officers, so that they would not simply be left out on the street.

**Maj A. LAVRICHENKO**

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I am one of those who supported the combat capability of the country for a period of 25 years. And now my fate is with those whom they plan to reduce. I served honorably. What awaits us, the officers, after being discharged into the reserve, on the question of providing us with housing? Even in Zhitomir now, where I am thinking of

going after discharge and where I was born and grew up, the preferential treatment line means waiting for an apartment 4-5 years. This is almost the same picture in all cities of the Ukraine. . .

**Maj G. GUSAK**

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I am glad that the time has arrived when we are reducing the armed forces. At the same time, I am troubled about what the army will be like after this step is taken, and will it not lose its combat readiness?

If I were making the decision on reducing the armed forces, then, in the first place, it would be at the expense of students of higher educational institutions. Especially those where there are military faculties. This would be a tangible help to the national economy. And from the officers and warrant officers, it would be at the expense of those who do not desire to serve, who are at odds with discipline, who are without a backbone and who are lazy.

**Sr Lt A. SIZOV.**

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I have been reading frequently recently about officers discharged into the reserve. They are worried about housing, and that they will have to wait a long time for their turn. . . But why do they all want to live in large cities?

When my husband was discharged into the reserve, we went on leave to relatives, and we remained there. We took a loan from the state, bought a little house with a plot of land, and we do not regret it at all, and, to the contrary, we are satisfied. Gradually, we settled in, acquired household items, and we live no worse than others.

So, do not be upset, comrade officers and warrant officers, come to the village. Now the kolkhoz's and the sovkhoz's are building comfortable homes, and people are living prosperously. Work will be found for everyone. You can buy a home in any village. Quietly, calmly, and there is fresh air. Come on!

**M. LUKYANOVA.**

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I do not know what kinds of orders have been published or are being prepared in connection with the reduction in the armed forces, but I consider it necessary to suggest that, along with other paragraphs on social protection for those being discharged, this one also be included: for all officers being discharged, as they desire, in lieu of the prescribed clothing allowance articles, authorize the grant of monetary compensation equivalent to their cost regardless of the date of issue.

**Col G. MORDOVETS**

### **Lack of Forward Air Controller Nullifies Cooperation with Ground Unit**

*18010339 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Jan 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Captain V. Lavrenyuk, Transbaykal Military District: "Officer Training: A Look at the Problem. If There Was a Desire . . ."]

[Text] This was at one of the exercises. Despite the support of the helicopter section, the motorized rifle battalion under the command of Guards Major V. Grigoryev executed the assigned task with great difficulty. In other words, the battalion did not derive any kind of practical benefit from the presence of "friendly" aviation over the battlefield.

On the whole, the battalion commander was not a novice on questions of organization of coordination in combat, but the coordination of the operations of subordinate subunits with helicopter pilots somehow did not happen in practice. He knew the peculiarities and complexities of such work only theoretically. Even though he also firmly knew that it was very important in such situations to determine accurately the moment for delivering a strike by helicopters on the enemy's main line of resistance and that here the air controller is "to play first fiddle." On that day there was no air controller in the battalion, and so Grds Maj Grigoryev decided to direct the section personally. And at the appropriate, in his opinion, moment, having estimated that the battalion would arrive in time before the helicopters flew in and "unloaded their bombs," he called for air support.

The section under the command of Captain V. Kuznetsov took off into the air and came onto the target, but . . . there was no one to support—the battalion obviously was late.

It was only later disclosed that the battalion commander had a poor idea of helicopter flight speed and, moreover, that he grossly erred in supposing that they would take off from the airfield (actually the section was located much closer—at a jumpoff site). And in those minutes Capt Kuznetsov did not clearly understand what should be done. Deliver a strike on the strongpoint? But this is pointless work without fire adjustment from the ground. To turn back? Then where is the guarantee that the second run will not be prevented by the "enemy's" PVO system?

In general, it was now difficult to speak of any kind of surprise strike. In any case, the fact that the battalion still occupied a favorable position was of no service to the aviators: the tankers and artillerymen attached to the motorized riflemen had their say.

The battalion commander, of course, on the whole was acutely aware of the situation and his errors in the organization of coordination, and he made a firm mental note of this. But how does everything look from the sky?

Captain Kuznetsov, for example, evaluates the decision of Grds Maj Grigoryev as incorrect in principle. In his opinion, the air controller should be assigned either from among aviation specialists or, as he said, at worst, from motorized rifle or tanker officers who have gone through appropriate training and who are free from any other duties for the period of cooperation with aviation. The reasons? Continuous communication has to be maintained with the helicopters, not interrupting it even for a second. The battalion commander, in whose hands all of the combat control strings rest, is not in a position to concern himself with this as well. Major A. Leva, a helicopter squadron commander, is even more emphatically inclined: he excludes altogether (perhaps except for emergency situations) the assignment of "ground troops" [sukhoputchik] as air controllers.

"An air controller in a flight uniform will much more quickly establish contact with helicopter pilots, and the competence and timeliness of his commands from the ground can be relied upon. And then if you select air controllers specifically in those squadrons that you know for certain will be coordinating with tank and motorized rifle subunits, these people on the whole will take everything into account: right down to the fact of how capable each of their colleagues is in the air."

Indeed, say what you like, the art of an air controller is a tricky business and here, as in no other case, the coordination of subunits of different combat arms has the meaning the ability of people "to speak the same language" regardless of departmental affiliation. I somehow had occasion to become a witness to an air controller's obvious failure—a chief of staff of a tank battalion who guided a helicopter section right onto the firing position of the "enemy's" PVO system. And what is especially sad—the section lost its battle essentially even before it began. And this was in spite of the fact that there were on the whole pilots with high qualifications on the crew roster. They, by the way, asserted in one voice that it was the tanker who "ruined the job." And not without reason. The officer, let us say, gave the reference points, barely visible in the terrain, but from the air, at helicopter speeds, it was altogether difficult to spot them. Target designations had many details and adjustments, but they were not specific. In a word, he handled the matter as if the helicopter was just the same as a tank or an armored personnel carrier, which can be stopped, turned and reaimed.

Captain Kuznetsov on the whole proposes to look at things in a broader way:

"For some reason we frequently think of the helicopter as only a means of fire support for ground forces. But it, as we joke among ourselves, can do everything except dig trenches. . ."

Well, in principle one can understand the aviators who are sometimes let down by the "land," in their words, psychology of combined arms commanders. But what

prevents the pilots themselves as interested persons from displaying initiative and suggesting to the battalion commander or regimental commander himself the best way to employ helicopters attached to them? The more so since such a practice exists in many places and justifies itself.

I will cite a specific example. Close ties in this sense were established between a tank battalion where Maj V. Yepatko serves and a helicopter squadron under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V. Vorobyev. An exchange of "delegations" takes place here on specific questions: the tankers study the capabilities of rotary wing craft and the tactical features of their operations. The aviators study the methods tankers employ against low-flying targets.

It is true that such meetings are usually held the day before exercises where one and the other have to operate side by side. But, nevertheless, the benefit here is obvious. At least the situation does not arise when the combined arms commander requires the helicopter pilots to destroy a point target that is better handled by tankers and artillerymen. Therefore, one should think that the idea of involving officers of helicopter units in exercises of officers of motorized rifle and tank units is both urgent and feasible locally. If only the desire was there.

**Computer-Based Tank Training Simulator Tested**  
*18010372 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*8 Feb 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article: "Like in a Tank"]

[Text] "The principal specialists of tank subunits will use this fundamentally new microprocessor-equipped device," said Major General A. Zakharov, the chief of one of the directorates of the Ground Troops, "to improve their skills in preparing armament for use, and firing the gun and coaxial machinegun employing all types of ammunition in a situation as close to that of real combat as possible. The soldiers can exercise these operations not only at crew strength but also as part of a platoon. For this purpose the classroom would need to be equipped with the appropriate number of trainers."

The following results were achieved during tests on this latest training resource in a certain unit of the Moscow Military District. After 80 minutes of training the students carried out their training standards with a grade of "satisfactory," and by the end of a day of lessons they received good and outstanding grades.

"What does it feel like?" we asked young specialists after an experimental training session.

"Like in a tank," they noted enthusiastically. "You even forget that you're in a classroom."

You can persuade yourself of this by familiarizing yourself with the work stations of the commander and gunner. For example the commander can reconnoiter the "battlefield," select the most important targets and transmit target information to the gunner. During training, the crew carries on simulated fire from the gun and coaxial machinegun against five pop-up targets and two moving targets traveling at a speed of up to 80 kilometers per hour. The shots are accompanied by sound effects and flashes.

All of the work of the tankmen is displayed on the lesson leader's light signal panel. He can determine the type of projectile the specialists are firing, the time they take to detect a target and fire the first shot, and the mistakes they make. In addition at any time the officer can change the tactical situation, expose practice targets and introduce scenario inputs, for example a misfire of the gun.

These specialists also have an opportunity to monitor their own actions. Each work station is equipped with two television sets, and the sighting instruments allow them to visually observe the trajectories of shells and bullets, and their points of impact.

Tests on the new trainer have been completed, and it has been adopted for distribution. Now it is the turn of the troops to make effective use of it. With it, the number of training sessions carried out at practice ranges can be reduced, which will doubtlessly have a tangible economic impact: Significantly less ammunition and engine life will be expended in the training of the specialists.

**Chief Pilot, Designer Discuss Performance of Mig-29**  
*18010327 Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian*  
*No 10, Oct 88 pp 32-5, back cover*

[Interview with Mig Chief Pilot Valeriy Menitskiy and Deputy Chief Designer Mikhail Valdenberg on the occasion of the Farnborough International Air Show, by correspondent Yevgeniy Pavlov; place not specified; first paragraph is KRYLYA RODINY introduction]

[Text] This article was in preparation just at the time the decision was made to enter the Soviet combat fighter in the Farnborough International Air Show. Thanks to the democratization and glasnost processes, it has been made possible to demonstrate to the world's aviation community the technical level of our Air Force and the considerable role played by Migs in the latter. Anatoliy Kvochur and Roman Taskayev, test pilots from the Special Design Office imeni Artem Ivanovich Mikoyan, have demonstrated the Mig-29 in English skies. KRYLYA RODINY correspondent Yevgeniy Pavlov discusses this aircraft with Mig firm's Chief Pilot Valeriy Menitskiy and Deputy Chief Designer Mikhail Valdenberg.

[Pavlov] Valeriy Yevgenyevich, American and French fighters are given much publicity in foreign journals. Now we have a chance to compare our airplane to Western "analogs."

[Menitskiy] The expression "mirror technology" often appears in the foreign press. The inference is that "they" are creating something and that "we" copy and then improve it. That is, we always follow. That simply is not true. Our aircraft offer certain advantages, while theirs offer others. In general, the scales are balanced. The Mig-29 was designed to attain aerial superiority in tactical and operational-tactical zones, that is, to defend air space. It is armed with a gun, close-range thermal seeker missiles, and medium-range radar homing air-to-air missiles. It is superior to foreign types in accomplishing its missions. Its performance is unmatched by the majority of the world's fighters.

Something else that I wish to point out is that American and French fighters have dominated air shows for a long time. Impressive demonstrations and advertising have convinced the community that Western military technology is superior. Our main purpose is to prove that the Mig-29 is a reliable means of protection against the 2,000 fighters, F-16 bombers and other attack aircraft that are based near countries friendly to us.

[Pavlov] Is there a commercial purpose in demonstrating the Mig-29?

[Valdenberg] You must understand that there are shoes, laces, socks, and related goods. As such, advertising for the purpose of selling is only a small and ancillary part of showing the "29".

[Pavlov] In that connection, I recall that in an issue of a Western journal there was a completely blank page in a corner of which in tiny print was the phrase "Rolls-Royce cars require no advertising." My next question, Mikhail Romanovich. What design approach did you employ to achieve these features?

[Valdenberg] The Mig-29's main feature is its aerodynamic configuration. It is of the integral, i.e., lifting fuselage, type. Strictly speaking, there is no fuselage as such; it has been phased out. In our new terminology we refer to it as the airframe (korpus). The design provides high lift capabilities, which engender a wide range of flight characteristics.

The Mig-29 is powered by two bypass engines with high specific characteristics. They assure a take-off power-to-weight ratio greater than "unity." According to our information, no other aircraft in the world offers this kind of acceleration and vertical speeds. All this is directly reflected in the take-off characteristics, of course. The take-off run is short. The power-to-weight ratio continues to increase at medium and high speeds. The craft can fly at high supersonic speeds (above Mach 2) and at very low speeds. It can execute a sustained turn at 9 gs.

[Pavlov] In contradistinction to the American F-16 fighter, our Mig-29 is powered by two engines. This is quite unusual for a light fighter plane.

[Menitskiy] Combat situations require maximum survivability, which the spaced engine configuration enhances significantly. In the event the Mig-29 experiences failure of one engine, air combat can be continued in most cases. This kind of flying has been considered extremely difficult, but the Mig-29 does not require high qualifications. Even if an engine fails at take-off while the other is operating at full power, which forces the pilot to apply all his skills, this does not lead to dire consequences.

[Valdenberg] With two engines reliability is tripled instead of doubled. Let me explain. Assume that an engine stops. What action does the pilot take? He tries to restart. The engine surges. It stops, and he again tries to restart. Another surge. If the situation becomes critical, the pilot must eject. What about the Mig-29? If an engine fails, the pilot picks the altitude most advantageous for restarting. He positions the aircraft to take advantage of the necessary flight conditions. He does not become disturbed and does not hurry. That is, the situation is not made more complicated; the man is controlling the aircraft, after all. The pilot remains cool-headed. Any man may become disturbed, but a courageous and disciplined man can control himself. This does demand mental effort, however. I may have exaggerated a bit by saying that reliability is tripled, but if I did, I did not overstate it by much.

[Menitskiy] The Mig-29's power plant is one of the best of the world's designs. Its specific parameters, altitude and speed characteristics place it at a high level of world

standards. In a spin the engine does not surge even at maximum power. It used to be that in case of a spin you first cut off the engine and then brought the plane out. Now there are no problems.

[Pavlov] Valeriy Yevgenyevich, several years ago there was a feature story about you, about an accident, published in PRAVDA. Was a Mig-29 involved?

[Menitskiy] Yes, we lost two Migs in tests. Aleksandr Vasilyevich Fedotov, my instructor, ejected from one of them, and I from the other. The power plants were to blame in both cases. The engines of that time were experimental and gave us many problems.

However, no matter what happened then, we did improve the power plant and now—I repeat—the engine is one of the best. Credit is due the engine designers, who were creative in resolving all problems that arose. They eliminated all shortcomings, both technological and design, as they were discovered. At this point I would like to say a few words about the special role R. A. Belyakov played in creating the Mig-29. A chief designer is usually a good organizer and leader. He has a sufficient grasp of many of the major problems. Here I stress that our chief designer has a deep grasp of design, aerodynamics, strength, flight dynamics and technology. I had occasion to attend conferences where our chief designer dealt with many outstanding scientists of various types. I never cease to be amazed at the breadth of his knowledge of problems and his ability to ask pertinent questions.

[Valdenberg] I can add to that by saying that R. A. Belyakov's role in creating the Mig-29 went beyond managing enormous collectives to include direct involvement in rendering design decisions. This aircraft incorporates his great personal experience as Mig designer. He came to our design office after graduating from the institute and rose to the position of chief designer. Such people, of which there are many—designers, researchers, manufacturing specialists—we hold in high esteem. They, with the chief designer at their head, are the backbone of the Special Design Office.

I consider it necessary to mention here the name of Aleksandr Vasilyevich Fedotov, who put his heart and soul into the Mig-29. He was the first to fly this aircraft. His great achievement is training our firm's outstanding pilots. He had a feeling for people's abilities; he got people to join us and he trained them. He developed the situation to such an extent that when he suffered the accident and Valeriy Yevgenyevich was appointed chief test pilot, there was no deterioration in quality of flight tests. Fedotov is an outstanding pilot. And there was no deterioration, I repeat. He injected quality, precision and extreme care into his training of people. Flight personnel and engineers at the airfield have all benefited by his experience and ideas. Valeriy Yevgenyevich is continuing these traditions with his comrades, brothers-in-arms of Fedotov, who have

ceased flying due to age but remain active in the firm: Petr Maksimovich Ostapenko; Boris Antonovich Orlov; Aviard Gavrilovich Fastovets; and with young pilots.

[Pavlov] Valeriy Yevgenyevich, although you are the chief pilot, a leader, you are flying to Farnborough as an alternate. Why?

[Menitskiy] Two Migs are flying to England. A two-seat training version and a combat version. The pilots will be Anatoliy Nikolayevich Kvochur and Roman Petrovich Taskayev, comrades of mine who are strong and highly-qualified test pilots. They are capable of any task—from a first flight to extremely complex tests, which they have performed. We must give them a chance to demonstrate their mastery. They are the present and the future of our firm. It is our custom to give youth a chance.

The three of us recently accomplished a performance flight to England, flying a Yak-40 over the same route that Kvochur and Taskayev will follow in the Mig-29. En route we were in contact with flight control services of Western Europe, speaking English. At Farnborough we met with show organizers and specialists. We place the question of show safety at the head of the list. The English and Soviet sides were in complete agreement. The demonstrations have been planned such that risks are entirely excluded. The idea is to demonstrate the aircraft's capabilities, not pilot mastery. We became acquainted with the airfield and associated documents and visited all taxiways and flight lines. By the time we completed our visit, we had worked out all the details to leave nothing unresolved.

[Pavlov] Valeriy Yevgenyevich, in the aviation industry, in line units, even the NII VVS [Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force], you are referred to as a master of aircraft combat employment.

[Menitskiy] That is not the main thing. This experience is necessary, though. But more important are pilot's qualities and thinking like a pilot. Everything else is secondary. Firing is not the most difficult thing to do.

[Valdenberg] Everything has been done to the Mig-29 so that the pilot can destroy the target. The fire control consists of three separate systems which back up each other. The first one employs radar offering outstanding characteristics: long detection and lock-on range in the forward and rear hemispheres; the possibility of seeing a target both in free space and with the earth in background; the capability of "communicating" with the weapon system at the precise instant that the pilot assumes a situation suitable for attack and enabling missile launch. The pilot then presses the button. The second sighting system is electro-optical. The advantage is that the target is not informed that it is being tracked, since the optical system, being passive, does not emit signals. Finally, there is the third system—also optical—which is associated with the eyes of the pilot—so-called helmet mounted sighting. As the pilot turns his head to follow the target, the motion is transmitted to the weapon system, which points the missiles in the direction of the

target. Let me give an example. Say you are following a target. Below you are thick clouds. To avoid detection, you are using the electro-optical system. You approach the target, which dips into the clouds. However, the target blip does not leave the screen, since the radar becomes operational as a result of receiving a signal indicating that there has been an interruption in optical tracking—this is the backup aspect. When the target is no longer obscured by the clouds, it will again be picked up by the electro-optical system.

[Pavlov] Mikhail Romanovich, is the Mig-29 provided with a mechanical flight control system ?

[Valdenberg] Yes, the Mig-29 is provided with a mechanical flight control system for stability in all flying conditions. In addition to its great reliability, it possesses other features. Such as rapid assumption of angle of attack and overload, which is of no small importance for an air-to-air combat fighter. Also, ground control equipment is simplified.

[Menitskiy] There is an overload and angle of attack indication system. It includes a so-called safety rod (ottalkivatel-storozh), which operates to prevent assumption of excessive angles of attack. The automatic control system assures directional stability and controllability characteristics that prevent the aircraft from going into a spin at permissible angles. If the pilot overrides the rod, the aircraft can assume large angles. For this reason, we tested the craft under these conditions and attempted to induce spin. We determined that the aerodynamic configuration is favorable for large angles of attack. In longitudinal motion with the pilot in full control the aircraft does not exhibit any tendency toward rapid development of slip and autorotation.

[Valdenberg] A design must be as simple as possible. Design philosophy reduces to the following: A design must be new if it is to offer new qualities. We employed composite materials, but only where we could effect considerable weight savings. We provided two engines. With the advantages such a design offers, we must admit that this approach is associated with an expense and weight penalty. However, a second engine adds thrust and assures all the possibilities related to reliability of which I spoke. Concerning weight reduction: that is one of our jobs as designers! We were able to do some of that right here, without going anywhere else. We made wide nacelles and the main gear simple, of the telescoping type, not the kind required when more complex design is needed for wider wheel track. The air intakes are essentially new. On the ground the nose inlet is completely closed, with the engine supplied through doors in the upper surface of the aircraft. As the craft gains speed and the nosewheel is raised, the air intake commences to operate automatically. At that time the Mig-29 can be flown without fear of feeding foreign objects to the engines.

[Menitskiy] The Mig-29 is provided with a considerably improved cockpit. It affords more space than in previous fighters. The fixed part of the cockpit canopy has no framing—it is all glass. Its optical characteristics are such

that the pilot's view is not distorted when he fires the gun. The 30-mm single-barrel gun offers a high rate of fire. It is considerably simpler and lighter; its ballistics are such that a small number of rounds is required. A line pilot who fired the gun during testing said that he would be able to hit a service cap.

[Valdenberg] The Mig-29 has been in use in our Air Force and in a number of other countries for several years. It is highly regarded not only by pilots, but also by ground personnel. For example, engine removal and replacement takes hours, not days. However, as is the custom, we do receive criticisms. Technology must be criticized for improvement to be made. This is normal: improving that which is in hand, but still keeping a good opinion of an aircraft.

[Pavlov] Mikhail Romanovich, you spoke of the aircraft's capability of sustaining 9 gs for an extended period of time. However, we all know that no man is able to withstand such . . .

[Valdenberg] This is a critical consideration. The aviation technology of today that we have created exceeds the physiological capabilities of man. The Mig-29 has a long life ahead of it; it will be in service with the Air Force for many years. It will be further improved and endowed with new capabilities, of course, but as far as its power and maneuverability are concerned, it rates very highly on today's scale.

[Menitskiy] I agree completely, and think that my youngest son, who is a devoted reader of KRYLYA RODINY, will find the Mig-29 still in use when he becomes ready. For this reason, I want to caution young pilots, cadets and boys who dream of becoming pilots. The aircraft lets you do what you want, but do not forget that the Mig-29 is a very powerful weapon. You must have a healthy respect for the lift capabilities, aerodynamics, and thrust-to-weight ratio the craft offers. Watch out for the apparent simplicity, for the power that must be under your control at all times.

While previous generation craft had to be flown at high speeds to attain maximum g-loading, in the case of the Mig-29 you get a "9" at other speeds as a result of the high lift characteristics. The ideal combination is maximum g-loading and maximum angle of attack. If the pilot fails to take advantage of this instant, aircraft speed naturally increases and the craft remains in the "9" situation at a smaller angle of attack. This brings about a smaller flight path curvature and inferior combat advantage. In addition, the longer overload time causes a waste of pilot energy. A "9" is no pleasure, even in combat. If the pilot permits himself to become stressed due to ignorance or lack of skill, he invites the inferior tactical situation. That is, always keep in mind that the pilot's capabilities are limited and cannot compete with the aircraft. You must fly this kind of craft with sensitivity. Although the plane is very forgiving, if you want to be the victor in combat, you must keep yourself as organized as possible and not let yourself go slack while maneuvering, with your top priority being skill in handling the craft.



[Pavlov] Mikhail Romanovich, my final question for you. Tell me about risk, responsibility and the courage possessed by designers who do that which no one has done so far.

[Valdenberg] Any project is risky as far as the chief designer is concerned. It is a matter of the particular goal involved. I cannot say that we were taking design risks. We have a good understanding of strength and technology. For the chief designer this kind of craft was a risk in general. Nevertheless, he took on the responsibility of realizing an unheard-of range of characteristics in this particular aircraft. We were successful. Our success is due to the entire history of our collective, which celebrated its 50th anniversary last year. We have a store of knowledge and off-the-shelf solutions. Incorporated into the Mig-29 are new solutions as well as those traditional in our firm. Our analyses indicated that applying some kinds of new solutions would not give us clear advantage, instead leading to unforeseen operational results. While not clinging to the old, we did not hesitate to employ reasonable and proven solutions applicable to the new aircraft. An example is the steel tank, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, if you remember, that we agonized over so much for the Mig-23 when you were still working with us.

The new model is made of the same steel. Today we possess a better knowledge of it, we know how to deal with it

without tribulations. We transferred everything that was useful from the Mig-23 to the Mig-29. After the Mig-9, the jet firstling, was designed, our collective created the Mig-15, which was an outstanding aircraft of the time. I am talking about comparison at the world level. In my opinion, the Mig-29 is a step forward in the same class as creation of the Mig-15. History repeats itself: Ten years after the first Mig-23, the first craft offering a wide range of flight characteristics, we have the Mig-29, a fighter capable of accomplishing any mission in line with today's requirements.

[Pavlov] Valeriy Yevgenyevich, my last question for you. We have not had an air show for more than 20 years . .

[Menitskiy] I know what you mean. Although such holidays are difficult to organize, I believe that air shows where aircraft are demonstrated out in the open are necessary. It is a good idea to hold international air shows in the Soviet Union. This would bring socialization, mutual understanding, and learning.

[Valdenberg] I am sure that our component will be second to none in this show.

#### FIGHTER COMPARISON


	Mig-29	F-15C	F-16C	F/A-18	Rafale A	Rafale D	EFA	EAP	Mirage 2000
Length,m	17.0	19.5	15.0	17.0	15.8	-	14.5	14.7	14.4
Wing span,m	11.4	13.0	9.5	11.4	11.2	-	10.5	11.8	9.0
Height,m	4.7	5.6	5.0	4.7	-	-	-	5.5	5.2
Take-off weight,t, Normal	15.0	20.2	11.4	16.7	14.0	14.4	-	-	10.9
Maximum	18.0	26.5 <sup>1</sup>	17.0	22.3	20.0	20.3	17.0	-	17.0
Thrust-to-weight ratio,normal	1.1	1.1	1.0- 1.1 <sup>2</sup>	0.9	1.0	1.0	-	-	0.9
Maximum Mach speed	2.3	2.5(2.3)	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.2
Maximum speed Indicated,km/h	1500	-	1450	-	-	-	-	-	-
Maximum speed true,km/h	2440	2650(2440)	2120	1900	2120	2120	1900	2120	2340
Service ceiling,m	17,000	18,300	15,200(17300)	15,200	-	-	-	-	18,000
Max. rate of climb,grnd level,m/s	330	285	260	234	-	325	-	-	250
Take-off run w/afterburning,m	240	275	450	427	300	400	500	-	560
Landing run,m	600 <sup>3</sup>	1070	750	850	-	400	-	-	-
Max. range in fighter config.,km	2100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Combat radius in fighter config.,km	-	750	850	740	-	900	-	-	700
Max. g-loading	9	8(7.3)	9	9	9	-	9	-	9(8)

1-With conformal tanks weighing up to 31.0t.

2-Powered by General Electric F-110 engine.

3-With drag chute.

Data appearing in parentheses are as reported in some sources which differ from data usually provided.



**Syrian Pilots Trained To Fly Sukhoi-24**  
*44040251 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic*  
22 Nov 88 pp 31, 33

[Article: "Sukhoi-24 Is a Step on Path of Military Balance With Israel; Training of Syrian Pilots Begun in Moscow; Fighter To Be Delivered to Damascus Next Year"]

[Text] It is no surprise that Israel, along with the United States, has expressed grave concern over recent reports of the Soviet agreement to supply Syria with the Sukhoi-24, an assault fighter jet. The introduction of this fighter into service in the Syrian Air Force is likely to constitute a significant qualitative leap in the force's offensive capabilities, especially in the area of long-range strategic penetration.

In terms of specifications and tasks, the only parallel to the Sukhoi-24 the Western air forces currently possess are the U.S.-made F-111, with which the United States, using its bases in Britain, raided Libya a few years ago, and the Tornado, a European fighter produced jointly by Britain, West Germany, and Italy. The fact is that these three fighter jets are greatly similar, not only in capabilities and purposes but also in form, size, and weight. This similarity is probably due to the fact that aeronautics designers in the countries producing such aircraft must have developed similar solutions in their endeavors to develop this attack fighter jet which is built to carry out similar tasks. To be specific, these tasks are those of attacking and bombing distant targets deep in enemy territory at a high penetration speed and while flying at low or very low altitudes under varied day and night weather and visibility conditions and with heavy attack loads. This makes it evident that these jet fighters are in fact strategic bombers built to carry out practically tasks entrusted to bomber planes in the past. But the difference between those bombers and the new aircraft lies in the ability of these sophisticated attack fighters to carry out the tasks entrusted to them at low altitudes that nearly touch the ground and at a high penetration speed that give them the opportunity to evade hostile air defense systems and to escape detection by the radar surveillance and observation means operating within these defense systems.

As in the case of the F-111 and the Tornado, the Soviet Sukhoi-24 fighter, called the Fencer by NATO circles, is fitted with two moving wings that can fold in flight, thus giving the aircraft a high degree of aerodynamic flexibility. The aircraft is also fitted with two engines and two seats, one seat for the pilot and one for the officer operating the aircraft's complex targeting and navigation equipment. The Sukhoi-24 can attain speeds of 2,500 km per hour (2.3 Mach) at high altitudes and speeds of 1,500 per hour (1.2 Mach) at low altitudes. The ideal offensive range for this fighter, which can carry a total of 9 tons of varied munitions, is 1,800 kilometers. To compare these facts with the fighter aircraft currently used by the Israeli Air Force to attack and bomb ground targets, it suffices

to note that the F-16 Falcon fighter, which forms the backbone of the Israeli multi-purpose fighter aircraft force at present, has a maximum offensive load capacity of 5.45 tons and an ideal range of 925 km. The same comparison applies to the other Soviet fighters currently used for attacking and bombing ground targets, such as the MiG-27 which can carry 4.5 tons and has an ideal range of 1,000 km and the Sukhoi-17 fighter which can carry 5 tons and has a range of 900 km. In practical terms, these considerations mean that like the F-111, which has a load capacity of 9.5 tons and a range of 2,000 km, and the Tornado, which can carry 8 tons and has an ideal range of 1,500 km, the Sukhoi-24 is in a special class distinguished from the other types of both attack and interceptor aircraft.

Introduction of the Sukhoi-24 into service in the Soviet Air Force in the mid-1970's was considered one of the prominent developments undergone by this air force since World War II. From the outset, the objective was to use this aircraft in deep tactical and strategic bombing missions at distances which the other Soviet fighters designed for assaulting ground targets could not attain. This compelled the Soviets at the time to use the big and slow strategic bombers. Thanks to this new fighter jet, the Soviets can now attack British territory from their bases in East Europe and in the western parts of the Soviet Union. By the same token, the U.S. Air Force and the Western air forces using Tornados can employ the Tornado and the F-111 to attack East Europe and the western Soviet Union from bases in Britain without the need to use the B-52, the U.S. strategic bomber.

#### Special Relations

It was normal that the presence of the Sukhoi-24 would be confined to the Soviet Union throughout recent years, considering that it did not seem as if this fighter was made for export.

This is why the recent reports revealing Moscow's agreement to supply Syria with this fighter have drawn special attention. The agreement has been considered a surprise step of an extremely special nature.

If Syria is the first country Moscow has agreed to supply with this sophisticated fighter, then this is not the first occasion on which the Soviet Union has supplied Syria with weapons and equipment never exported before. Another occasion was the supply of SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles which the Syrian Army acquired in 1983 only a few months after the Soviet forces had deployed them. It is to be noted in this regard that in the wake of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Soviet Union supplied Syria with the SA-5 anti-aircraft missiles which have a range of 240 km. Moscow had not supplied any other country with these missiles. The most outstanding example of the distinguished relations in the area of special military cooperation is the new MiG-29 whose

delivery to the Syrian Air Force began in 1986, keeping in mind that this fighter plane is considered to be the Soviet answer to the new generation of U.S. and Western fighter aircraft, such as the F-15 Eagle, the F-16 Falcon, the F-18 Hornet, and the Mirage-2000.

#### **Toward Balance**

It seems that the agreement to supply Syria with the Sukhoi-24 followed talks held between the Syrian and Soviet leaderships in Moscow in 1987 as part of the military buildup Syria is currently implementing within the context of its efforts to achieve its declared objective which calls for attaining a strategic military balance with Israel. On the other hand, it also seems that this agreement came as a consequence of Moscow's refusal to grant the request Damascus made at the time for medium-range SS-23 Spider surface-to-surface missiles which have a range of 500 km. It is worth noting that bolstering the Syrian missile forces has constituted throughout recent years a mainstay of the Syrian military buildup. In the period following the war in Lebanon, the Syrian forces did actually obtain new SS-21 missiles, additional quantities of S-1 Scud missiles which have a range of 300 km and Frog-7 missiles which have a range of 70 km, plus SSC-1 Seapal missiles which have a range of 450 km and SSC-3 missiles which have a range of 110 km. The latter two missiles are designed primarily for coastal antiboat defense tasks. However, they can be used for surface-to-surface bombardment tasks. In explaining its refusal to supply Syria with the SS-23 missiles, Moscow said that these missiles fall within the framework of the treaty concluded with the United States to eliminate medium-range nuclear missiles. As a result of this treaty, Moscow has to disassemble and destroy these missiles and other weapons that fall within this category and that are stipulated in the treaty. The Soviet refusal to meet the Syrian request led to speculation in recent months saying that Syria plans to turn to China to obtain M-9 missiles which have a range of 600 km as a substitute to the SS-23. But both Syria and China have denied such reports strongly.

Regardless of whether Syria does actually plan to acquire Chinese missiles, what is certain is that the Syrian Air Force's acquisition of the Sukhoi-24 will constitute a significant step in this force's capabilities and a development in the modernization and reinforcement program being currently implemented by Damascus in cooperation with Moscow. According to the information available to Israeli and Western circles in this regard, the Syrian Air Force will begin receiving the Sukhoi-24's in 1989. The training of Syrian pilots on these aircraft was begun in the Soviet Union several months ago. The information also indicates that Syria will acquire 48 such aircraft (a full air brigade consisting of 3 combat squadrons) which will operate side by side with the other combat aircraft which the Syrian Air Force possesses at present and which amount to nearly 650 modern aircraft, including MiG-29, MiG-23 and MiG-21 multi-purpose fighters, the MiG-25 interceptor and the

MiG-27 and Sukhoi-17 attack planes. With the acquisition of the Sukhoi-24 and the MiG-29, the Syrian Air Force will be supplied with some of the latest and best interceptor and fighter combat planes operating in the world throughout years to come.

#### **PVO: Criteria for Tactical Training Change Following Ministry Conference**

*18010313b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Jan 89 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Maj Gen Avn A. Borovov, first deputy chief for combat training of the Air Defense Forces, by Maj A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "News: Facts, Events, Commentary": "The New Combat Training Programs Should Erect a Barrier to Simplification"]

[Text] The Air Defense Forces, like the other branches of the Armed Forces, have entered the new training year with a desire to implement the demands set forth at the 19th All-Union party conference with respect to giving priority to the qualitative indicators in the military work. How is this being achieved in the combat training? What has been done to ensure the absolute fulfillment of training plans and programs in the new year and to see that every exercise and class is conducted effectively? Our correspondent asked Maj Gen Avn A. Borovov, first deputy chief for combat training of the Air Defense Forces, to answer these and other questions.

[Borovov] First of all let me say that the units and subunits have begun training under the new combat training programs for the combat arms, which differ fundamentally from previous programs. In what way? Greater independence is given the commanders with respect to organizing the training process. Let us look at the existing practice. The regiment was required to work on precisely the subjects specified in the programs, and in accordance with the schedules contained therein, irrespective of the training level of the flight personnel. The missilemen would desperately need to engage in special training, let us say, but they were scheduled to work on the norms for protection against weapons of mass destruction. The training tasks will now be carried out in a comprehensive manner, and the commander himself will decide how much time he should allocate for this or that area of training.

Are we confident that the combat training programs will be successfully fulfilled in the units and formations? We have grounds for answering this question in the affirmative. Assemblies for formation commanders have been held within the Ministry of Defense, at which they studied the content of the new programs and learned how the qualitative parameters of defense development are defined as applicable to the combat training. Similar work was conducted with the unit commanders in the Air Defense Forces, including troops not directly linked to the central organization (this was done for the first

time). Brief but much-encompassing combat and political training plans have been compiled on the basis of the new programs. All of this permits me to say that the training time will be efficiently utilized.

[Dokuchayev] We know that tactical exercises are the highest form of training for the troops. The experience of recent years has demonstrated, however, that not all of the commanders have been interested in creating a complex situation. After all, the more difficult the conditions, the lower the evaluation of subordinates could be. Some officers even thought up the excuse that safety measures did not permit this. Is a barrier to simplification going to be erected?

[Borovov] We have been struggling with this troubling issue for several years now. The first steps have been taken toward resolving it. We have worked out and provided the forces with new methods for evaluating the performance of the fightingmen in tactical exercises. Essentially what do they consist of? Let us solve a small problem. A battalion has successfully hit all of the targets. A second committed blunders, but this was under extreme conditions. Which of the collectives was better trained? Six months ago we would definitely have said the former, because it destroyed all of the targets. The criteria are now different. They are based on an analysis of the development of a tactical exercise. This means that the commanders will be interested also in training subordinates in a complex situation.

The methods, which were approved by the General Staff, have already been successfully tested in certain units. This, among other things, was discussed at a recent service conference by Col V. Prokopenko and Lt Col A. Biryulin. There is a great deal of work left to be done toward the application of the methods in the training praxis and toward their improvement, of course.

[Dokuchayev] Comrade Major General, last year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA repeatedly wrote about cooperation—more precisely, the absence of interaction—in the training of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Forces. Aviation was not adequately involved in the exercises, and without it....

[Borovov] ...An instructive situation cannot be created, is that what you want to say? Yes, that is so. And we understood very well that no trainer or simulator could take the place of flights by real aircraft. They tried to resolve the problem both at the level of the combat training directorates and the formation commanders at the sites. It could not be done. We could not mesh the combat training plans; departmentalism prevented it.

I hope that the problem will be resolved. A draft document approved by the commanders of the branches of forces has gone out to the units of Air Defense Forces and Air Forces, which will "mesh" the efforts of our main commissariats. Unfortunately, not during the winter period, not until summer, will aviation begin to

interact directly with subunits of the Air Defense Forces and vice versa. The situation will then become more complex, for both sides will have a real opponent.

Just why will exercises involving a large number of aircraft not begin until the summer? This is our fault; we waited too long. It would be difficult to mesh the immediate plans.

[Dokuchayev] Good plans have been worked out and there are good prospects, but will the commanders not be inundated by a flood of paperwork, something which has happened more than once?

[Borovov] The results of the training year just completed show that we did not succeed in reorienting the minds of some officers with respect to combat training. The units in which officers Ye. Zavyalov, I. Chelokyan and I. Ivanov serve achieved poor results in the training. A change has taken shape, however. Commanders and political workers will now be assessed not according to what they construct with their own means and efforts, you see, but for the combat readiness of the unit or subunit.

With respect to the paperwork circle, I would cite just two examples. We used one fiftieth the amount of paper overall for working out the plans. The planning technology principle has been changed. We and the unit commanders arrived at the same opinion that the number of reports has to be reduced three-fold. The decision was adopted.

#### **Military Psychologist on Pilot Psychology, Reactions to Flight Incidents**

*18010313a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Jan 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Maj Gen Med Serv V. Ponomarenko, doctor of medical sciences and professor, under the rubric "Commentary by a Military Psychologist": "Is the Pilot Always to Blame?"]

[Text] I have spent many years dealing with problems of aviation psychology. And during all those years I have been amazed at how little they are taken into account in the daily combat training of the airmen. Even in situations in which it would appear that this could not be avoided—in the study of pilots' functioning in extreme situations, for example.

A dangerous situation develops on a flight.... In the vast majority of cases the assessment is unequivocal. The pilot was at fault. Even the cause is named: poor professional training. Why does everyone blame the pilot, who has found himself in an extreme situation in the air? From the standpoint of psychology, it is all frequently far more complex.

Let me begin with the fact that flight recording documents ordinarily reflect a descriptive picture of the situation and the technical sequence of the signals. In the human mind, however, the same situation can appear in a totally different sequence. The pilot senses a drop in engine thrust as a change in linear or angular speed 2-3 seconds before he sees the tachometer readings, which only confirms a hypothesis already formed about what has happened.

It is amazing that we assess human actions by means of objective control equipment not so much from the objectives and motives of the individual's behavior or his mental state in the emergency situation as from the "behavior" of the aircraft's control elements and the individual's mechanical actions. But a pilot can use various methods for executing a mission.

In order to understand how an aircraft flies we turn to the laws of aerodynamics, but for some reason we do not study the laws of psychological functioning in order to understand how the human being flies....

Remember how many problems there were with the so-called "excessive lever pull" and the exceeding of critical pitch angles by the aircraft. What was happening was that the physical law for indicating units of shift per degree of force applied to the lever was not physiological. The individual flying had the illusory sensation that "there was not enough lever," since at the moment the positive overload took effect the signals received by the nerve endings in the muscles of the hand and informing him of the pressure being applied were distorted. And before the technical devices came to be used on aircraft, many pilots were unjustly accused of incompetent actions.

Neglect of the individual's psychology results in a situation in which personal blame is frequently seen even where there is a physiologically illusory perception of landing lights in fog, haze and dust (compensation errors). Here is an example. Capt V. Ovcharenko had made the third turn when ground reported that visibility was deteriorating. On the glide path the pilot saw the dim approach lights through the thick haze. At the moment of leveling off the brightness of the light increased drastically. "I'm below the glide path!" the thought struck him. Ovcharenko pulled the aircraft control stick toward himself. The aircraft shot upward. The landing was rough, "bumpy," as they say. A great deal of criticism was leveled at Ovcharenko during the critique. He himself could not understand why he had "climbed upward" instead of keeping the aircraft in a descent. The pilot's reflexes had let him down, since the unusual brightness of the lights (a drastic change in illumination) had given him an illusory perception of the angel of incline of the flight path. And so, having nothing to do with the pilot's will, a "premise was born" for which he was assigned all the blame.

The pilot's organism, reacting to flight factors, emits a 7-day norm of hormones, sugar enzymes and other active substances during one flight day. With respect to the state of particular mental stress, it should be borne in mind that the effect of the overload replaces the gravitational vertical; the individual sees the ground below but senses with certainty that he is flying upside down. Duality of consciousness is a unique feature in the functioning of the psyche of flight crews. I think that it is time officially to acknowledge certain objective difficulties of a pilot in the performance of an air mission, because flight work is a special kind of human activity in which the individual's personal qualities cannot fully compensate for extreme effects of the environment.

What I have said does not apply to all of the causes of errors. Unfortunately, many infractions of the flight laws still result from inadequate professionalism. In each case professionalism is taken as the sum total of the individual's social, professional and moral qualities. And since this involves the individual's personality, the in-depth study of psychology as a science is absolutely essential in combat training. There is a restructuring underway today with respect to aviation psychology, of course. A special course is being prepared on aviation psychology for instructors and methods specialists in the flight training, and psychological methods are being worked out for studying the causes of flight incidents. A psychological service is being set up at the initiative of the Political Directorate of the Air Forces. The ice has been broken, but there are still a lot of other unresolved questions, which I am discussing.

A pilot's dependability apparently begins not with his skill in maintaining the flight mode, but with his psychological ability to control himself. In order to control one's will, emotions, feelings and awareness, however, an individual has to know himself. The present flight training does not make it possible to achieve this entirely. Professional culture—that is, a need on the part of the airmen constantly to increase their knowledge and improve their abilities—is essential in order to increase the professional reliability of flight crews. Let us take a look at just one component: professional growth and improvement.

It is dialectical in the military pilot's occupation: to safety through danger. This is precisely the area in which stagnation began to appear in aviation pedagogics. Precisely how? Primarily in a weakening of creativity in the shaping of the professional. Creativity does not tolerate moving in a rut, since it stems from the individual's activeness.

Activeness for a pilot is the psychological mechanism by means of which he looks for a way out of extreme situations in the air. It is activeness, as a psychological feature of the individual, which is always in opposition to the traditional principle "Do as I do." This principle is good for demonstration training purposes, but reducing all of the training to it can result in cramming and

drilling, and in some places it develops capacities for... imitation. Activeness in an individual calls for independent ascent to a higher level of professional skill through an understanding of one's capabilities. My personal experience in studying flight incidents has shown that many first-class pilots surprise themselves by suddenly detecting a lack of preparedness to overcome a difficult situation. They were not taught activeness.

Here is an example. Capt V. Sinitsyn and Lt Col V. Vargin, an instructor, were practicing group flying in a dual trainer. It was during the day and in good weather. Two aircraft were going in for a landing. Concentrating on holding his place, Sinitsyn did not lower the landing gear, but, observing radio traffic rules, he reported this following the lead aircraft. The instructor had not monitored his subordinate's actions. And not until the fuselage had touched the landing strip did the crew begin a second circle.

We are dominated by the stereotypical thinking that extensive experience will ensure reliable action even in atypical situations. This is where inadequate psychological knowledge begins to manifest itself. Skills in piloting and navigation are fundamentally different from skills in defining and resolving complex situations in the air in their psychophysiological mechanisms. The physiological foundation for mental action in the process of defining an atypical situation lies in the fact that the brain reflects a phenomenon which has still not begun—that is, it sees ahead. Automatic skill does not possess this quality. To put it more simply, a typical situation is handled with learned action, while an atypical situation requires cognitive activeness. Our routine thinking is accustomed to a situation in which all information on what is occurring is reflected in the instruments and indicators, and one only has to know and be able to perceive it in good time. Science has proven, however, that in an emergency situation, particularly a fast-moving one with a time reserve of 2-8 seconds, it is not the individual's perception but his thinking which moves to the forefront.

A study of several thousand psychological tests has shown that flight personnel unequivocally attribute the lowered professionalism to a simplification of the combat training. Simplification is not merely a matter of playing it safe; it is a social indicator of stagnation and bureaucratization with respect to the socially active pilot. Practice is needed for shaping abilities. Studies conducted by aviation psychologists have established the fact that if a young pilot flies less than 8-10 hours a month, his dependability drops by 30-40 percent. Prolonged breaks—because of a shortage of fuel, for example—inexorably reduce professional reliability. We do not have the right to economize and jeopardize the life of the crews.

The aviation collective's present life style also needs to be changed substantially. Social and psychological studies have revealed a number of serious, negative social developments: a drop in the prestige of flight work and a reduction in longevity in the profession.

Let us consider the effect of these developments on the pilot's improvement. The drop in prestige has resulted in a reduction in competition among candidates for flight school. This has brought an increase in the number of cadets with mediocre flying abilities.

Flying professionalism depends in great part upon the transmission of experience. Here too not all is in order, however. A poorly conceived approach to the rejuvenation of the cadres is sometimes felt. As a result, the main agents for passing on the social and professional experience and experience in life, the flight and squadron commanders, who are frequently 28-30 years old, are considered not to have prospects. Is this not causing an erosion of the airmen's moral foundation, whereby an accelerated rise to high positions is substituted for professionalism?

In the aviation professionalism is developed by overcoming conflicts. Here is an example from the field of a complex dilemma: Discipline is creativity. Flight work is one of the dangerous occupations. From their days as cadets until they give up flight work, pilots express their individuality, their passion for flying and for overcoming their weaknesses. Their spirituality is reflected also in an insuppressible desire to enhance their skills. But that is only natural for any occupation, you might say. It is, but there is one subtle difference in the aviation: Improvement is achieved by expanding the horizons of danger. If the pilot is professionally unprepared to surmount dangerous situations, an unconscious fear sets in. And in this state he can take unjustifiable risks. It is a subtle matter to develop professionalism in airmen, because there are many so-called "unwritten laws" in their milieu which define informal relations among them.

It is my opinion that the restructuring should not bypass the aviation. We need to regain the democratic basis for trust in the pilot by increasing his independence and dignity. Today, he must overcome the psychological barrier of a sense of "earth-boundness" of his profession. He will become a professional when he senses that his wings are spread not just on his back, but also in his soul.

#### **Results of Investigation Into Leninakan Military Air Transport Crash**

*18010335 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Jan 89 First Edition p 5*

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Aviation B. Berestov, Chairman of the Flight Accident Investigatory Commission, conducted by Lieutenant Colonel S. Levitskiy: "Reporting the Details of What Happened During the Landing"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] As our newspaper promised, we are telling readers about the reasons for the Il-76 accident that took place on 11 December 1988 near Leninakan. The investigation

into the tragedy has just been completed and our correspondent, Lieutenant Colonel S. Levitskiy, met with Chairman of the Flight Accident Investigatory Commission Lieutenant General of Aviation B. Berestov.

[Berestov] I will immediately note that the on-board flight recorder (the so-called "black box") was saved and several instruments and tapes of conversations between the crew and the airfield escaped destruction. After re-examining all possibly variations of the tragedy we have established that the airplane and all of its systems were in working order and that meteorological conditions on the night of 11 December were normal and visibility was up to five kilometers. Military medical personnel did not detect any problems with the crew members' health.

Before beginning his landing the flight commander received the following transmission from the air-traffic controller: "Flight 876! Turn at a distance of 14 (kilometers), leave your position and drop to 3000 (meters); pressure is 634 (mm of mercury); land at 240 degrees. 1100 (meters)." The assistant flight commander who ran external communications confirmed receipt. But he did not report this information to the crew. At 6:18 and 57 seconds the flight commander gave the following command via intercom: "Pressure-734 (and not 634!), passing 2700 (meters)" and continued his descent while watching the instruments that were providing not a real, but a false altitude.

No one in the crew suspected anything until actual contact with the ground. The forward-moving aircraft was only a little on alert. Here is an excerpt from the tapes: "Wait, navigator, are we gaining altitude?" "No, we are descending." This airplane was certainly distracted from other observations.

At an altimeter setting of 1425 meters the Il-76 collided with a mountain that had a slope of almost 60 degrees. The airplane ran into the top of the hill and boulders flew everywhere.

As we see, the main reason for the accident was the crew's error in not setting the barometric altimeter to the pressure at the airfield where the airplane was landing. This error led to a false instrument reading equal to 1,100 meters.

[Levitskiy] Thus the crew was at fault.

[Berestov] During those days the crew was operating as if it were on the front and was experiencing enormous psychological and physical stresses. Here, for example, is the schedule which has the times when the crew had to be awake shaded in red and the times when the crew could rest shaded in blue. There is almost no blue and at times the crew rested in the airplane (there are mattresses and blankets on board, but just the same...). Plus they had to load and unload. Here is a relatively long blue area, but

you can put some red breaks in it: the crew was awakened several times for take-offs which were then postponed because of meteorological conditions.

You must also consider the difficult aerial and navigational conditions over the disaster area in Armenia. By the way, before the accident another crew had made the same mistake, but corrected it in time. This has to be combined with the fact that both crews were very well trained and had experience in landing in mountainous airfields.

This leads us to the conclusion that even under extreme conditions we have to consider the limits of stress under which flight crews can operate. Otherwise there will be problems. By the way, the order that the crew received (although we certainly understand the people who issued it) was in conflict with the aforementioned limits. But it is difficult to stand in judgement in this case, for it is an old problem—not enough competence among combined arms commanders in employing such special types of forces as aviation.

[Levitskiy] What lessons have we learned from what happened?

[Berestov] We have raised at the Ministry of the Aviation Industry the issue of equipping the Il-75 with the necessary type of altimeter. We also have to improve landing equipment—both in the airplanes and at airports. We have to add additional instructions to Il-76 flight instructions to cover setting the dangerous altitude indicator in radio altimeters. This instrument must be set at the highest value when landing at airports high in the mountains!

I would like to again stress that military aviators were acting selflessly and heroically. But obviously one must not make a fuss, hurry and overestimate one's abilities. For example, the dispatcher did not have a copy of the flight manifest with the names of the people on board. This was because the command "Hurry, take off, don't worry about paperwork" had been given. Yet sometimes in aviation this "paperwork" is written in blood. One must never violate flight safety regulations under any circumstances.

[Levitskiy] What did the eye-witnesses say?

[Berestov] Among them was Palayev Fakhrid Izametdin-Ogly who has been born with a silver spoon in his mouth and who had been called up from the reserves. Because he had married, he was late for boarding. All the places were occupied and he crept into the KamAZ [not further expanded] cabin. He said that he had sensed a standard airplane landing descent. Suddenly there was a crash. Palayev lost consciousness and came to his senses next to the burning airplane. He began to run and went about



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200 meters before he laid down. He heard three explosions behind him and then the fire raged. A few minutes later a helicopter crew that had rush there saved the wounded man...

### Ship Commanders' Inexperience, Interference from Above Noted

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1 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the heading "A Commander's Independence": "Who Is the Boss on the Ship?"]

[Text] The sonar operator of the small ASW ship detected the "enemy" submarine almost at maximum range. The commander of the small ASW ship, Gds Capt-Lt I. Knyazev, began taking up a position for torpedo firing. But he did not have to fire. The large unit [soyedineniye] commander, located aboard the ship, considered the contact to be false and recommended continuing the search. Although Gds Capt-Lt Knyazev was sure that the target had been correctly classified by the ship's combat crew, he obeyed. The same thing happened a second time: based on data being received from other ships participating in the search, the vice admiral was skeptical of a new report by the sonar operator about making a contact. The third time, confirming the contact, the small ASW ship commander decisively went to the torpedo salvo point and employed the weapons. The torpedoes accurately hit the target. "Well done, commander," the vice admiral said to Knyazev at the summation of results of the cruise, citing the independence of his actions as an example. Well done, of course, but in a real battle an enemy submarine would hardly show up three times. And a mark was not given for this.

This was a fairly typical case. Senior commanders located aboard ships often actually interfere in command and control of the ship—by advice, prompting, or direct instructions. And they do so even when it is not always necessary. A commander's independence in such cases ends up being very, very relative.

"They now simply cannot let a ship leave base if there is no senior commander on board," Capt 1st Rank D. Shtefanov, deputy chief fleet navigator, comments on the situation that has developed. "This is done supposedly to avoid navigation incidents. I believe that we are dealing with a certain overcautiousness here, which moreover does not always bring the expected result. Statistics also attest to this. Almost all serious violations of rules of navigation which occurred last year and led to negative consequences were committed on ships which had senior commanders on board. One of the reasons for this is that the responsibility for ensuring navigational safety is seemingly eroded between the ship commander and the senior commander on board."

Certainly there are objective indications for increasing the monitoring of a ship commander's actions at sea. On the one hand, the increased complexity of combat equipment prompts this, and on the other hand is the youth of

today's commanders: an age of 33-34 years is not exceptional for officers assigned as commanders of classification I ships. Youth also means a lack of proper experience. How can we manage without senior commanders here? But if that is the case, perhaps early assignment of officers as commanders (when the Navy actually cannot yet entrust ships to them) proves to be too false. You see, the large units actually have to constantly look for experienced people to back up the young commanders. Understanding his incomplete independence, a commander is forced to give up his independence. And so as not to take a chance, other senior commanders, not troubling themselves particularly with pedagogical tasks, often interfere in command and control of the ship without sufficient reason for doing so.

Capt 1st Rank A. Babich, a submarine commander, told me a story in this regard that is almost funny. One day it was necessary to deliver a periscope to his submarine. A torpedo-retriever craft was assigned to do this. But the person assigned to be the senior commander aboard the craft that was to make this short passage was...Capt 1st Rank Babich.

One gets the impression that in such cases someone simply has to insure himself against responsibility—they say, there is a senior commander on board, and he will be held responsible.

"According to regulations," Capt 1st Rank G. Shvechkov, deputy commander of a submarine unit, says, "a ship must have a senior commander aboard in order to go to sea to perform combat training tasks. We strive to keep the senior commander's interference in a commander's actions to a minimum. Let us assume, if 5 days are allocated for receipt of some task at sea, during the first 4 days the ship commander is granted virtually complete freedom. Only on the last day, after the report on readiness, does the staff headed by the senior commander begin checking. Still, the requirement of having a senior commander aboard for going out to sea to carry out combat training missions is not always justified. The ship commander must be trusted more, and changes must be made to regulations in order to do this.

The commander's bridge is not just a special area in the upper part of the superstructure from where the commander controls the ship; it can also be seen as the entire sphere of a commander's activities outlined by the 57 articles of Navy Regulations, which set forth the basic duties of the ship commander, and by the countless numbers of articles, paragraphs and provisions of other regulations and instructions.

Nonetheless, as experience shows, a commander's independence is most limited not at sea but on shore when resolving various daily problems, even those which he rightfully should resolve independently.

As we know, commanders of classification I and II ships enjoy the right to award subordinates awards and money. This is on paper. But what is the actual situation?...

"I have such a right," Capt 2d Rank V. Mikhaylov, commander of a large amphibious warfare ship, smiles mirthlessly, "but I cannot take advantage of it since I do not have the necessary financial resources at my disposal. Money for these purposes, obviously, is accumulating at unit headquarters, and it is awarded in a centralized manner, so to speak, by a list, and even then chiefly on the occasion of holidays. If I had the appropriate award fund, I could award officers, warrant officers, petty officers and seamen for some specific service achievements. And even when the ship is at sea, this would increase the educational importance of an award."

Capt 2d Rank Mikhaylov is not the only one concerned about this problem. Perhaps all the commanders of large ships are familiar with it. The ship commander is also just as helpless when it comes to matters involving money. "Why are the limits on using economic money (i.e., money saved on certain types of products—Author)?" many have said to me. But money allocated for combat training needs is spread out over such narrow shelves somewhere in the top financial levels that a commander often is unable to spend in a year even half of the money theoretically available and so needed for the ship.

Another situation: A ship commander has the right to send subordinates on temporary duty. But he is unable to pay for the associated expenses, for he has no temporary duty fund. Capt 2d Rank I. Lokot, a submarine executive officer, over the course of several months traveled from a remote garrison to the headquarters to take tests for authorization for independent command of a ship, and his expenses were about 600 rubles. But neither the submarine commander nor the unit commander sending the officer on the temporary duty trips were able to reimburse the officer for these expenses—they had no funds for this. The thing is, according to the existing situation, as was explained to me at the Fleet Finance Service, only commanders of large units are allocated money for temporary duty, and they use this money as they see fit.

"But the sum is usually so insignificant," notes Lt Col G. Sukhanov, chief of the Fleet Finance Service, "that the large unit commander, as a rule, prefers not to divide it up between units and ships. Though, of course, it is desirable to have a temporary duty fund on each large ship—naturally, with strict monitoring of its use."

The finance service chief also agrees that commanders of classification I and II ships should have money—and in sufficient amount—for financial incentives for subordinates. But here the fleet needs financial assistance, since, in Lt Col Sukhanov's words, the fleet itself does not have the necessary funds for this or for increasing temporary duty funds.

Ship commanders grieving over the matter see real opportunities, beneficial to the Navy and the state, for expanding their financial independence.

Capt 3d Rank Bykov:

"It is no secret that certain ships are experiencing a personnel shortage. Right now we do not have enough warrant officers. Those we do have are given an additional—and considerable—load. It would make sense to authorize a ship commander to pay warrant officers, at least partially, for the work they are doing for those absent. This would conform to the principle of social fairness."

Gds Capt-Lt Knyazev:

"A commander should be given the right to authorize doubling-up for warrant officers. Right now I do not have a missile team petty officer. After training, Warrant Officer V. Dekun, the senior gunner's mate, could successfully handle those duties—in addition to his own. But we must get him interested in doing this, not just rely on the force of an order. Even if we did it this way: Pay him 50 percent of the rate for the combined position. Both the state and the person would benefit. It would also be desirable for me, as a commander, to establish categories of warrant officers—not only according to their specialty, but also their level of training."

Capt 2d Rank Mikhaylov:

"I have the right to withhold 50 or 100 percent of monetary compensation, based on the results of the year, from an officer or warrant officer who has committed some violation. There are not intermediate levels. But in life, it happens that to withhold half of a person's compensation is too severe, but it also cannot be preserved completely—after all, there was a violation. In my opinion, it would be proper to authorize a ship commander to take away increments of 10 percent—up to 100 percent."

It cannot be denied, many of the proposals to increase the independence of ship commanders require changes which are beyond the competence of fleet and other local authorities. But sometimes global measures are not needed—it is sufficient to introduce elementary order, in particular, in an issue such as this. In October, Capt 2d Rank Mikhaylov, commander of a large amphibious warfare ship, ordered confinement of Seaman A. Mosin for several days for flagrant violation of the rules for standing watch. But at the stockade, they would not accept the arrested person from Warrant Officer A. Perkov, who accompanied Mosin to the garrison stockade. They justified their refusal thusly: "Your unit has already used up its limit of places in the stockade for October." How is a commander to exercise his legal rights?!

The specific problems of commanders of small ships require special discussion. It is quite natural that they have fewer rights and less independence compared with their colleagues from classification I and II ships. But are all the limitations justified?

"If I have to send someone on temporary duty beyond the garrison," complains Capt-Lt V. Feopetov, commander of an ocean minesweeper, "it is mandatory that the commander of the large unit sign the temporary duty orders. Why can't I, having my own stamp, do this?"

The situation is similar on small ASW ships.

"It would be quite possible to permit the commanders of our ships to issue temporary duty orders," believes Gds Capt 1st Rank V. Khutornoy, an experienced instructor of ship commanders.

In accordance with the Disciplinary Regulations, a commander of a classification III ship does not have the right to grant seamen and petty officers short leaves. On his recommendation, this is done by the commander of the large unit. "But do the commanders of large units and units really know our seamen and petty officers better than we do?" the commanders of minesweepers, small ASW ships and patrol escorts ask reasonably. In this respect, a classification III ship, being an independent military unit, is somewhat mechanically equated to a battalion that is part of a regiment.

The commander's bridge, with all its spaciousness—even on small ships—is too crowded for two (of course, this should not be taken literally). Moreover, it is intolerable that issues which are under the authority of a ship commander be resolved by anyone other than the commander himself.

### **Ships' Crews Diverted to Economic, Security Details**

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[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Pilipchuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Baltic Fleet: "Percentage of Diversion"]

[Text] On a day of specialty classes in the "N" submarine unit, a substantial number of the military personnel did not attend class. Why? I asked this question to Capt 2d Rank V. Akulov, unit chief of staff. His answer was that persons on the daily duty detail and the watch crew are absent from classes. In addition, part of the crew, where Capt 2d Rank A. Koloskov is senior assistant commander, is preparing to stand garrison guard duty. Seemingly everything is legitimate. However, the advisability of daily diversion of such a large number of military personnel from training is dubious. For a long time the question has been raised in the navy about reducing the number of details and watches. But this is how it is being "decided" among submariners.

The unit chief of staff reported these data. In 1987 submariners stood 64 guard details, and in 1988 it was already 94; the number of garrison patrols also increased, from 201 to 228. Hundreds of man days were spent on economic projects. Understandably, this does not come from the good life: disproportion between the ship and shore structures can be felt. The situation can hardly be considered normal when missile submarine crews of anti-submarine warfare ships stand guard service at supply warehouses. One other thing is also obvious. It is necessary to take urgent measures to ensure that the personnel get the most out of military training. This includes (and this is emphasized in the guidance documents for the new training year) seeking a reduction in the daily duty detail and guard duties, and actively introducing technical security measures (TSO).

How are things going in the navy with respect to this? In the fleet organization of service department, Capt 2d Rank Ye. Zhukov reported that TSO systems had been set up in two units, and were being readied to be set up in two others. The VMF [Navy] Main Engineering Directorate is satisfying approximately 40-80 percent of the fleet's requests for them, the officer emphasized. But this is not even the worst thing. Calculations show that many technical security devices are still far from perfect, and not all that infrequently go off by accident. And the fleet cannot afford to set up duplicate systems, which would make it possible to avoid false alarms. Preference is given to comparatively inexpensive means, which the personnel are able to install and set up through their own efforts. Capt 2d Rank Zhukov believes that we cannot sit with arms folded and wait until our science invents a sufficiently effective means that will free a larger number of people at the protected facilities. And he cited an example. At one facility a reduction in the number of guards was achieved through improving the fences at the facility posts and on their territory.

Unfortunately, this example is all but unique. And are efforts being made in the units to seek optimal reduction of the daily duty detail? The department does not have such data, as it, apparently, does not exist in practice either. I believe that the service organization department should take a more active position on this matter. It is necessary to look more strictly at whether all of the protected facilities have been brought into complete accord with the Garrison and Guard Services Regulation, and where and how the number of soldiers standing "at the night table" can be reduced.

It is also time to take a fresh look at the organization of patrol service in cities and garrisons, for which purpose an overall very substantial number of military personnel are diverted. Remember the number 228. That is the number of times last year that groups of three submariners went out on foot patrols. But one, or at most two, mobile groups on motor vehicles with radios are able to replace many dozens of patrol groups, walking slowly along the sidewalk. But, in many commandants' offices there are still no specialized vehicles, or portable radios.

Several large unit commanders and chiefs of staff admitted to this correspondent that last year we were unable to overcome the diversion of personnel from military training. Will this situation continue this year? I asked Rear Adm Ye. Chebanov, deputy fleet commander for military training, and chief of the military training directorate, this question.

"This year is the year for reform of military training," stated the deputy fleet commander. "Reliance on qualitative parameters requires from each supervisor, commander and control organ, and all personnel, total concentration on fulfilling their official duties. Under these conditions diverting people from military training is simply intolerable."

"Nevertheless, for example, a large number of naval infantrymen even today are working at construction sites."

"This measure was forced upon us; the decision was made higher up. The families of the officers and warrant officers need housing. Facilities for social and cultural life are necessary. And the construction workers have not yet been able to handle the job. As for the training of the naval infantrymen, it has been planned so as to make up for what has been missed, and completely fulfill the military training plans and programs."

"I have come across this fact. In one of the surface ship units the number of individuals on watch duty was increased without any particular necessity."

"Unfortunately, in some divisions, and on third category ships, there are, in my view, excess elements in the ship details service, and on underway watch. It is necessary, of course, to see where they can be cut out without damage to combat readiness. Another thing also troubles me. Frequently disorganization, lack of planning, and piling up various measures divert people from their work. It is urgently necessary to rid ourselves of these shortcomings."

### **Problems in Naval Aviation Combat Training Discussed**

18010193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Poluyanov, Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet: "Combat Training: A Look at the Problem. We Save Seconds, and We Squander Hours. . ."]

[Text] At the end of last year, an antisubmarine helicopter, piloted by Senior Lieutenant S. Kuznetsov, crashed into a hill. Fortunately, no one was killed, and the naval aviators got away with bruises, but a sleepless night was spent by many people in rescue operations. In addition, dozens of tons of fuel were burned, and quite a few hours of helicopter and motor transport time was expended. In

a word, the operation that General of Aviation V. Akporisov, commander of the VVS of the TOF [Pacific Ocean Fleet], was obliged to direct cost quite a lot of money.

The analysis of the reasons for the crash disclosed quite a few deficiencies in the organization and execution of night flights in the helicopter regiment. The blame for what occurred is placed on air traffic control and on Senior Lieutenant S. Kuznetsov who checked flying equipment. Nevertheless, the guilty party for what happened was the crew commander who, in view of inadequate flying time, had lost his professional skills.

Why was something like this possible? After all, the pilot in the Pacific Ocean sky is not a novice, he has been in the role of helicopter commander for 4 years now, and the crew numbers among those that are combat ready. Speaking at a party conference of the VVS TOF, Major N. Kobernik from the indicated regiment cited several reasons. These include the condition of the training base, a breakdown in flight operations shifts, and inadequate equipping of the ship for training of aircrew members. As we see, the reasons for the low professional skill are really serious and, what is most objectionable, they are repeated from year to year.

The Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which inspected a number of units and subunits of the VVS TOF last year, noted that the aircraft utilization factor was low here and there, that more than 15 percent of flight time is spent on restoring lost skills, and that more than a third of the planned flight operations shifts was not executed.

Here is an example of the breakdown in the flight operations schedule, which I had occasion to witness. The helicopter crews were operating from an airstrip, and they were supposed to perfect night landings on the deck of a ship. But the assigned flight plan was not executed in time: the ship did not arrive in the assigned area at the designated time—the aircrews had to fly according to the alternate version. The discontent of the people was understandable—there were quite a few such modifications in the flight operations schedule, and many crews at that time lost certification for night flights from a ship. And this was under circumstances, as explained by Lieutenant Colonel S. Bezdenezhnykh, a VVS staff officer and military pilot 1st class, that the effective time of certification for such flights was several months!

What kind of skill are we talking about here! It is known that without regular flights a pilot cannot maintain his skills at a high level. Expressing it in sports language, to be in the right shape. For the skill of the air warriors to grow, even the most experienced of them, it is necessary, in the opinion of helicopter crewmen, to work on landings on a ship under night conditions at least once in 2 weeks, and for the younger crews, even more than this.

The helicopter regiment has many young people: according to data of the unit's party committee, the average age of helicopter commanders is 23-24 years, and the crews that have flown more than 5 years can be counted with one's fingers. It is clear that with that kind of a distribution the instructors do not have time to rest, and the pilots have to sweat a lot without any lull in flights. If you listen to officers of the helicopter regiment, specialists in the headquarters of the VVS TOF and TOF headquarters, political workers and party activists, everyone of them understands this full well, and they are even taking steps. But this is not seen in the end results.

Thus, for several months in the past training year, of the 32 ships requested by the aviators for perfecting landings, the fleet allocated a total of 5, and of 23 requested submarines, 7 were allocated. However, the combat training officers of the Pacific Ocean Fleet blame everything on the aviators themselves, who they say do not want to cooperate with the ships that are regularly allocated after each request.

Very well, this could have been done with impunity previously, during the "time of stagnation". It would seem that the wind of perestroika today is blowing into all sails. But, no, as we see, there is a total calm here and there in our fleet. One of the speakers at a report and election meeting of the VVS headquarters, sharply criticized Rear Admiral B. Prikhodko, chief of the directorate of combat training. True, the communists of the department, headed by Lieutenant Colonel V. Glushchenko, got theirs as well. It is within their power and jurisdiction to reason out and to coordinate the plans of the two closely related departments.

You will agree that we look silly when, with a stopwatch in hand, we try to get our crews and teams to cut seconds in getting equipment combat ready, and then we calmly squander many hours of valuable time because of a lack of coordination. But afterwards we are surprised why the aircrews did not detect an "enemy" submarine in time, and why they did not come in time to the aid of those in distress . . .

Vice Admiral E. Baltin, first deputy commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet and Hero of the Soviet Union, proposed in one of his speeches that those to blame for a breakdown in training pay out of pocket for the cost expended on fuel and vehicle use. But maybe such a simple element of cost accounting under our fleet conditions would justify itself in a short time? Apparently it is worth trying. After all, a measure such as not considering a course problem for a ship crew, without the assurance of a specific number of helicopter landings and coordination with aviators, has not yet had a substantial effect on the state of affairs.

I do not know how sailors and aviators cooperate in other fleets. If it is the way our fleet does it, then, is it possible that this is the fruit of a system of training of military personnel that was insufficiently considered?

For example, Maj Gen Avn Akporisov, commander of the VVS TOF, the commander of the aforementioned helicopter regiment, and other experienced pilots and navigators do not approve of the division of the students of the Naval Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko into aviation and naval faculties. In their opinion, joint instruction would be much more useful to the future service of the academy graduates.

A lot of time, so necessary for improving the skills of ship helicopter crews, is lost in breaking through bureaucratic obstacles on the evening before flight duty on a ship's deck. The "OK" for flights is given by the VVS staff, with whom, of course, there is no direct communication in the fleet staff. Try it, go through all of these links. It is unbelievably difficult. For example, Lt Col S. Bezdenzhnykh, who often headed the ship's air group, asserts that not once in his memory did planned flights start on time. From a 6-hour shift, it is barely possible to cut out 2-3 hours for work in the sky, and the remainder of the time goes to office phone calls and negotiations. Would it not be simpler to concentrate everything in one place on shore, for example, in the hands of the TOF operations duty officer?

A few statistics. Last year 17 flight operations shifts were prohibited in the regiment for various reasons, 5 more were interrupted because of weather conditions and, finally, 2 flight operations shifts were used by the helicopter crewmembers for redeployment basing on ships. Not very much was left for purely combat training of flight operations shifts. And here, one more, in my view, serious reason for the spasmodic flight activity of the helicopter crews is brought to light. The shortage of air space. Neighbors are working intensively nearby—ASW and other crews that are flying on aircraft, and who are given preference. Apparently, the VVS command of the fleet assumes that the helicopter crews will always make up for this. But they have been convinced more than once that it does not turn out this way. However, even today everything remains as it was. In corroboration, I will cite the words from a speech by the aforementioned Maj N. Kobernik at a party conference of aviators. "The situation with night flights remains especially poor," he justly said with indignation. "In the daytime we become unscrewed because of reduced flight routes, which extremely limits areas for combat training. And at night, we are not allowed to go 600 meters and farther from the airfield area. . ."

You really cannot envy the helicopter crewmen: with this kind of approach to their combat training, what kind of skill and high objectives in combat training and competition can there be! Is not this the reason why there are so few in the regiment who are skilled in military matters, why there is a low efficiency in ASW search, and why there is almost no drop in the number of causes of flight accidents. To sharpen existing skills, the aviators need regular flights without any kind of indulgences and oversimplifications and with the employment of weapons in training areas and in battle training. But how, let

us say, can a young pilot learn what is needed in war if he is allotted the very, very minimum of rounds for one firing? As for the practical use of missiles, for example, the young pilots can only dream, because such launches are a real event even for experienced crews. Training drills also miscarry at times because of technical imperfections in the training areas. There were more than 20 such incidents in the regiment last year. . .

No, it is impossible to look with equanimity at deficiencies like this in the organization of training for naval aviators.

### **Pacific Fleet Commander on Shortcomings in Combat Training**

*18010198 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 Feb 89 p 2*

[Article by Admiral G. Khvatov, Pacific Fleet Commander: "The Logic of Oversimplification"]

[Text] **It is harmful and immoral—easy variants of exercises and battle drills cost the navy and the state too dearly—but they still exist. Why?**

The missile cruiser commanded by Capt 2d Rank M. Shcherbakov was returning to base, without having completely accomplished its combat training mission. It was an exceptional case, but what stands behind it is rather typical. As it turned out, this is what happened.

The missile cruiser was to attack a group of "enemy" ships. While it was moving out to the mission area, sea turbulence picked up and visibility worsened. All of this complicated the conditions of the training battle. Capt 2d Rank A. Simkin, the unit chief of staff, who was on the cruiser, in order to prevent the weather from having an unpredictable influence on the evaluation index of the crew's actions, decided to remove the ship from the training battle and put off the exercise until later, when the meteorological conditions had returned to normal. The logic of the decision is primitively simple, but it contains, I believe, the entire spectrum of yesterday's views on the organization of combat training: orientation on the evaluation result, and not on real combat readiness; a desire to avoid even minimum risk or any complications, just so long as everything goes smoothly; and, fear of taking on any more responsibility than that assumed by the simplest (and thus least effective) combat training conditions.

Of course, strictly speaking, it would be wrong to object to discretion at sea. However, this desire must also not be allowed to cover up the things that interfere with organizing combat training in a complex situation, which provides true training to the sailors.

Unfortunately, such situations, when combat training at sea is made dependent on factors not directly related to it, are not infrequent. I believe that it can even be said that, in the so-called years of stagnation, a good number

of commanders of ships, units and large units, and staff officers, were formed, who avoid any complicating situation out of excessive caution, whether on an ordinary cruise, or while accomplishing a combat training mission. This indicates that there are certain incorrect points of reference and priorities in the existing system of evaluating commanders and staff cadres, and organizing combat training.

What prompts a combat training organizer to oversimplify, instead of strive to create the most intense situations in training? How can we stimulate a fundamentally new attitude toward training battles? Now, when life itself forces us to give priority to the qualitative parameters of combat readiness, these questions take on particular importance. Everyone entrusted with leadership of military combat collectives in this difficult time is obligated to seek out and find answers to them. I have also thought about this. I wish to share some thoughts.

I am convinced that oversimplification receives a powerful incentive when commanders are evaluated, most of all, on their ability to accomplish all tasks smoothly, without trouble or conflicts. The most successful commanders frequently are still those who never take risks, who "cut out" combat training according to developed molds, and thus make no mistakes. Such commanders are convenient: first, they do not add to the concerns of the higher commander, and second, they invariably deliver up the required evaluation indices. An innovative commander only has to make a mistake in something, or receive a low mark for a combat exercise accomplished under difficult conditions, and some higher commanders will immediately close their eyes to the innovativeness and boldness of his decisions, and remember only the unpleasantness and concern that arose in connection with this. It is understandable that an overly cautious senior officer supports commanders similar to himself. Something else is also clear: We still do not have enough bold, decisive, truly fighting senior officers and commanders. But all of us, both senior officers and commanders, have to move to a new quality in combat training. This means that it is necessary to create a system of organization and criteria for combat training at sea that not only does not inculcate excessive caution and oversimplification, but to the contrary, stimulates bold decisions and actions.

We in the fleet are now taking the first decisive step toward this. Its essence is to give substantially more independence than before to large unit commanders, as well as ship commanders, in the organization of combat training.

Presently the question of giving the large unit commander the authority to evaluate the combat training of the ships himself, during the course of the training period, is being studied. And no matter what evaluations he gives (even "twos"), they will not be reported "upstairs," and thus the chase after high marks at any cost will disappear. And only the indices of record

tactical exercises, held under the leadership of senior commanders, will enter into the assessment of the ships, and the large unit commander.

As concerns the independence of ship commanders, it is manifested, in particular, in the fact that they gained the opportunity to plan the development of the underway task, at their own discretion, based on the level of training of the crew and existing weak points, but are to submit it in its entirety to higher headquarters. In this way we will try to get everyone interested, not merely in working out a plan that has been sent down "from above," as was the case before, but in the high end result of combat training, and to form a principled attitude toward what is achieved.

I believe that the time has come to reexamine even the very criteria of ship readiness to accomplish a given mission, and perhaps to even get away from "school" grades in determining what has been achieved. Today frequently emphasis is placed on the fact: Did the missile (torpedo, round) strike the target or not. And questions concerning how the battle developed, and what a well-trained "enemy" could have done to counter our action, are frequently hardly taken into account. The main criteria of a ship's readiness to accomplish the combat mission, based on the realities of modern combat, are timely target detection, time of reaction to it (that is, surpassing the "enemy" in working out data and making the strike), and only then the results of the strike. Without the first two components, the third loses its meaning. To evaluate missile launches, and torpedo or artillery firing with fives, fours or threes [A's, B's or C's], depending solely on accuracy and observance of general tactical requirements, is self-deception. In my view there can be only two evaluations: the ship is prepared, or it is unprepared in a given combat situation to strike the "enemy" first. With such an approach the real combat readiness of a large unit immediately becomes clear.

In this regard, introduction of the combat training experience acquired by the command of the detachment of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean, some of which are protecting peaceful shipping in the Persian Gulf, is interesting and fitting. One does not determine readiness for actions in that complex, essentially combat, situation by a "school" mark. After working out all types of

defense on the ships, Rear Adm V. Sergeyev, the detachment commander, conducts a comprehensive exercise, with the creation of a tactical situation close to the conditions of real combat. And it has only two evaluations. The ship and crew either are, or are not, capable of successfully accomplishing their missions in the Persian Gulf.

Our fleet also has good experience in organizing combat training without conventions in the course of daily training. This should include, first of all, conducting two-sided exercises, and waging combat in a "duel" situation. Training for such exercises in the large unit where officer A. Komaritsyn serves usually begins long before the ships go to sea. Commanders are oriented to attack immediately any target that is detected while operating at sea, even while accomplishing other missions. Even if this salvo is simulated, it does not allow the ship's combat crew to relax, and keeps the crew constantly ready to use its weapons immediately and effectively.

The unit staff plans a sufficient number of short tactical exercises and group drills, and strictly monitors their accomplishment. Here each ship commander is required to model different variants of combat, make a graphic decision on the map, and calculate combat capabilities—his own and the "enemy's."

All of this work is done in an environment of competition, active sharing of leading experience, and comradely mutual assistance.

Of course, oases of leading experience also existed in the times we now call stagnant. Today life requires everywhere a fundamental turning point in combat training. And it is no longer sufficient to set our hopes solely on dissemination of leading experience. Decisive organizational changes are needed. But, to await them solely "from above" is not in the spirit of the revolutionary tasks of restructuring. Support for ideas, proposals and deeds is required. The shameful slogan "Don't stick your neck out!" is receding into the past. Again demand in the navy is growing for people who think originally, are bold, do not avoid responsibility, and are selfless and honest toward themselves, their superiors and their subordinates, for people for whom oversimplification in combat training is equivalent to military dishonor.



**Insufficient Attention to NBC Defense Decried**

*18010177 Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 89 p 9*

[Article by PO 1st Class V. Duvakin, CPO in charge of the CW team on the large ASW ship Admiral Zakharov, under the rubric "The Higher the Rating, the Higher the Combat Readiness": The Ship's 'Fringe'"]

[Text] I do not know when or where the expression "Undo the pelmeni" got started in the navy. It is used in situations of organizationally imposed conditions which are difficult to overcome. Our CW team frequently finds itself in that unenviable situation.

I had once prepared for a drill in my specialty, studied the literature and documents, and planned how I would run through the training points. The designated time approached, however, and the officer of the day announced... cleanup. And the drill had been specified in the daily combat training schedule for our ship.

I was upset, of course. "They've done it again," I thought. Such things had indeed happened more than once. One would prepare oneself and get the personnel primed, and then it would be "Undo the pelmeni."

All such inconsistencies (when classes and drills are disrupted, when we engage in anything other than our immediate duties at sea) cannot help affecting our competence level, of course. I have served 2 years now, but I am still a specialist 2nd class, even though under certain conditions I could have achieved 1st class. Petty Officer 2nd Class Makhmadov, commander of the CW division, actually performs the duties of a senior CW specialist, but he knows his area of responsibility, the general seagoing defense system, poorly. A lot of complaints could also be made of the training of Seaman N. Nevezhin, master radiological monitor.

Could it be that we CW specialists and radiological monitors are simply not needed on the ship? Certainly not. We are charged with the missions of organizing radiation and chemical monitoring, protecting the personnel against weapons of mass destruction and mopping up after enemy use of chemical or nuclear weapons. The CW specialists issue recommendations, based on the data obtained, to the ship's commander for surmounting the effects of a nuclear explosion and lessening its impact. Finally, the ability of all crew members competently to use the protective gear in situations of smokiness or the spread of toxic substances and a great deal more also depend upon our training.

In short, there are enough missions, and all of them, as you can see, are important. Nonetheless, we are considered to be fringe members of the ship's crew. Why? Because CW training and protection against weapons of mass destruction are considered to be secondary matters.

The main thing, it is felt, is that the electricians provide the conditions for the missilemen, torpedomen and artillerymen to be accurate. Everything else will fall into place.

The combat training has priority, of course. It has been proven, however, that those missilemen will not be worth a cent if they are capable of firing accurately only under "hothouse" conditions but train inexcusably little in a situation of radiation danger. Moreover, in my opinion, it is time to stop separating training subjects into main and secondary categories, relegating to the background such a discipline as protection against weapons of mass destruction.

Many seagoing specialists from among the seamen and petty officers can be called amateurs in this area. Is this a normal situation? When attempts are made to uplift the laggards, the following comes out: there is an acute shortage of skilled, non-T/O instructors at the sites—in the services and divisions. We conducted several special classes to replenish the ranks of training commanders. There was immediate relief. Unfortunately, these classes did not become a regular thing. The load is not the burden for us CW specialists. The obstacle lies in the fact that we are not granted the priority rights which are willing extended to those organizing additional training for the missilemen, gunner's mates and electricians. They have everything, so to speak—both the time and the material support. We have to beg for every little thing, however.

In short, we believe that views on the training of ship-board personnel in the use of CW equipment need to be revised.

I feel that the specific nature of the work performed by the specialists should be taken into account for manning the CW service. The residual principle provides little help in this field. It is time to stop assigning to the positions of CW specialists and radiological monitors just anyone who, for whatever reasons, is not suitable for other combat specialties. After all, one poor specialist in the CW service is incapable of teaching the other crew members anything.

We need to establish a rule that while at sea the CW experts perform only their own duties and are not taken away for various watches. Organizing the service this way is unheard of on the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Frunze. Incidentally, the CW specialists on it were previously assigned to various details not related to their specialty, the way they are on other ships. Such "arrangements" were halted following the Chernobyl tragedy. The CW service on the Frunze is now one of the best in the fleet.

I know that the CW specialists in our squadron have a training room on shore. The trouble is that it cannot be put into order, however. We are therefore forced (if all-hands tasks or something else does not prevent it) to

train with the shipboard equipment itself. It would be better, of course, if the classes, particularly the repair training, were conducted with non-T/O materiel.

It would be a good thing to organize frequent assemblies of training group leaders by specialty. When I served in the Baltic Fleet I knew almost all of the squadron CW experts, since joint classes were the usual thing. For some reason this is not the practice here.

We were once assembled for a review of the subject "Rules For Maintaining the Regeneration Equipment and Safety Measures For Operating It," to be sure. The class was only held, however, after it was revealed that fightingmen on the large ASW ship Admiral Tributs were not using the regenerative canisters competently. If that had not happened, they would probably have forgotten about the CW specialists.

Finally, I believe that we need standardized rules for training personnel for the CW service. One sometimes

finds divergences even in the instructions (those pertaining to the length of time personnel can spend in a self-contained protective mask, for example). They say that such rules already exist, but they have not yet reached us. Certain amendments probably need to be made also in the "Uchebnik khimika flota" [Textbook for the Naval CW Specialist], which was published 12 years ago.

Substantial changes are presently occurring in all areas of our life. One would like for them to affect us too. As CPO in charge of the CW team, I am not indifferent to the state of affairs in our service. I have no doubt that changes are possible. They will not occur, however, until the CW and radiological monitoring specialties become just as important as all the other naval specialties, until the CW service ceases to be on the ship's fringe.

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**Chernyshev on Methods, Time-Scale of  
Conversion of Military to Civilian Production**  
*18010392 Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 Feb 89 p 3*

[Article by Col V. Chernyshev, candidate of technical sciences: "Conversion: The First Steps"]

[Text] At a session of the UN General Assembly, M. S. Gorbachev put forward the proposal that all states, first and foremost the major powers, present in the UN their national plans for the conversion of military production. By this, the Soviet Union directed the attention of the world community to an extraordinarily pressing issue: the transition from an economy of arms to an economy of disarmament. Disarmament must not be limited to destruction of existing arms arsenals; it must be complemented by a conversion of military production, this very same irreversible process will ensure mankind's salvation from the threat of war.

What must be included in a national plan of conversion? In the first place, it must determine types of alternative production, sources to finance it and prospects for its market, and demands for production capacity and raw materials. Secondly, recommendations on the structural restructuring of military enterprises, and the required technological equipment for producing new products. And finally, the issues of retraining and providing work for people freed from the military sector of the economy.

Some Soviet specialists feel that preparation of plans of conversion must be made at the level of the enterprises, regions and branches, and only then on a national scale. It is proposed that the labor collective of each military industrial enterprise develop a long-term plan for the transition to civil production. The trade union organizations must undoubtedly play an important role at this point. Local organs of power, corresponding ministries and departments would develop analogous plans. Then, based on these plans, the central economic organs, headed by Gosplan, would develop a national plan, balanced in terms of industrial branches and territories.

Other Soviet researchers consider premature the detailed planning of conversion on the level of individual enterprises, as long as concrete international agreements on limiting corresponding types of arms and military technology are still lacking. They say, that under the conditions of rapid scientific and technological progress, concrete plans for the transition to alternative production output will soon be obsolete, and will require very frequent revision.

These specialists therefore propose that at first, a national plan of conversion must be compiled, determining its basic directions for each of the defense branches, and considering the probable demands of the nation's economy. Then, it would be advisable to carry out the further development of concrete plans for retooling

enterprises and assimilating civilian-oriented production, in view of the elucidation of the prospects for limiting armaments and armed forces.

Apparently, the point of view of a second group of specialists would seem more convincing. Of course, work in this field is still developing, and a more detailed foundation of rational paths of conversion planning on the basis of both theoretical and practical approaches is needed.

It is completely obvious that the paths of practical solution of the problems of conversion for various countries, capitalist and socialist, are going to differ. There exist in socialist states a number of factors easing the re-profiling of military production. Above all, they have an economic interest in real disarmament and conversion. They lack the social strata which make their living on the arms race. Among the personnel of the defense enterprises there should be no fear of losing work: many branches of the Soviet economy experience chronic shortages of a qualified work force, and it can be anticipated that the problems of job placement in the conversion process will be determined on the basis of previously developed plans. The role of the trade unions in this matter is very great.

The economy of the USSR, unlike that of Western countries, is a planned one, and despite all of the shortcomings of our planning, we are better prepared to develop great national programs, as the national plan of conversion must be. Moreover, in the USSR central planning of structural progress in economics is already being realized, and many Soviet defense plants have experience in production of civilian products.

Nevertheless, despite the factors easing the conversion, all of this in no way means that economic, technological and social problems do not arise while conducting a planned economy.

Thus, let us say that many modern military enterprises have narrow specialties, and utilize specific military technology, especially raw materials and semi-finished goods, which complicates their direct transfer into the production of civilian goods.

The situation with the personnel of military enterprises is not simple either. Under the transition to civilian production, these personnel would lose their advantages in wage levels, as well as absolute priority in receiving financial and material resources.

Under the reorientation toward a civilian market, the personnel of the defense enterprises will also have to reject the principle of "the end justifies any means," so typical for a number of military productions. And this will take a serious restructuring not only of technology, but of control over production and the market.

Although a deficit in the labor force exists here, under the new conditions of management envisioned by khoz-raschet and self-financing, it must to a certain extent decrease, in order that the volume of the national economy in this plan not become "excessive."

And finally, one of our substantive shortcomings is the lack of generally accessible information about the military economy, and this creates difficulties for the theoretical development of the issues of conversion at both the national and branch levels.

At the same time, the circumstance that the Soviet Union has already set out on the rails of conversion of military production is extraordinarily important. As M. S. Gorbachev stated at a meeting with representatives of the "Trilateral Commission" on 18 January 1989, the USSR military budget will be reduced by 14.2 percent, and the production of arms and military equipment, by 19.5 percent. It is known as well that in 1988, as a result of the realization of the Soviet-American Intermediate and Short-Range Missile Treaty, we have begun the conversion of a number of defense enterprises.

Now let us look at the long-term prospects. For the next 8 years (1988-1995), a program has been developed in the USSR for the creation and assimilation of a serial production of highly effective technological equipment for the branches' processing of agricultural production. The volume of scientific-research and design work will increase seven-fold in this field. In total for these years, 4,500 new pieces of equipment will be created; of these, 3,000 by the forces of the branches of the defense industry.

It has been suggested that by relying on the powerful technical potential of the branches of the defense industry, the "transport" of developing branches can be extricated from having technical progress bogged down on both sides. From 1988 to 1995, 29,000 enterprises for agricultural raw material must be built, and 38,000 enterprises must be retooled. The general volume of delivery of the current equipment is 37 billion rubles, with 17.5 billion of that from the forces of the branches of the defense industry.

Over 200 constructors' bureaus and a series of 250 defense industry plants have been geared to develop machine systems for agro-industry; today, they create

military equipment. Some of the military plants under construction are already at a stage of the project where they can be re-profiled toward peaceful aims.

A specialization of defense branch subjects has been determined under peaceful production. In total, an output of 3,000 designations of new equipment for development branches of USSR Gosagroprom must be organized. For example, the Ministry of the Aviation Industry already plans in 1989 to produce 43 percent of the total volume of processing equipment in its plants, and in the future this share will be increased to 65 percent.

The Ministry of Defense Industry is entrusted with responsibility for the aggregates and the side lines up to the processing of livestock and poultry, prepared in metal packaging; the Ministry of General Machinebuilding, for bread baking equipment, sugar, candy, yeast and butter and fat industries. The Ministry of Intermediate Machinebuilding will specialize in the creation of production equipment and milk processing.

Apparently, during the national plan for conversion of military production many difficulties will be encountered, certain complications will appear as practical measures are applied. Nevertheless, as I. S. Belousov, USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman feels, during the course of conversion of military enterprises, a means-of-production market will unavoidably be created for the processing branches; they will develop a wholesale market. But of course, during the conversion process, the assortment of peaceful production of the defense industry must be considered, so that the market is not flooded with unnecessary equipment.

When assessing the long-range prospects for conversion in general, it should be noted that it is not a super-complex or utopian task. Undoubtedly, in order to implement conversion, far from simple problems of a technological-economic and social nature must be resolved. However, the difficulties connected with this, in the opinion of Soviet specialists, would be not very long-term, and would not damage the economy, which, in the process of conversion, will be capable of finding a path toward rational utilization of the freed finances, material-technical and human resources for peaceful, creative purposes. Temporary difficulties associated with conversion cannot be compared with the positive effects of controlling the arms race, restoring health to the international condition, increasing world trust and freeing resources for stable socio-economic development.

**Estonian Komsomol Proposes Changes in Draft,  
Military Service Laws, Training**  
*18010328 Tallin MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian*  
*3 Nov 88 p 1*

[Unattributed article: "At the Estonian LKSM Central Committee"]

[Text] The question of cadres was the first item on the agenda at the Monday session of the LKSME [Leninist Komsomol of Estonia] Central Committee Buro. Raul Kadaru was approved as Kharyuskiy RK [Rayon Committee] LKSME first secretary, Vitaliy Zinichenko as second secretary of the Leninskiy RK LKSME, Kheyki Sarapuu as secretary and chief of the school department of the Kharyuskiy Rayon and Olga Ryuyutel as chief of the protocol section of the general department of the LKSME Central Committee.

A whole set of problems associated with the activity of the Komsomol committees of the higher educational institutions in the republic in military training and the service of students in the army was then discussed. Representatives of the Baltic Military District [MD], the ESSR Military Commissariat and the ESSR State Committee on Popular Education and Students were in attendance.

The concern of students in connection with the procedure for drafting them into military service and the system of military training at the higher educational institutions has not abated for a long time now. The struggle of students for changes in the procedures for military training has grown stronger at all higher educational institutions that have military departments (TGU [Tartu State University], ESKhA [Estonian Agricultural Academy], TPI [Tallinn Polytechnical Institute]). Classes have been boycotted and "cosmetic" concessions have been won (they may now wear beards and more modern-style haircuts), but the basic problems have yet to be resolved. Demands to halt the draft into the army from higher educational institutions remain in force. It is also being proposed to ban the draft immediately after the completion of secondary school, so that those who wish to may enter higher educational institutions and those who have served their draft term could complete training in the military departments on a voluntary basis. The curriculum of military training should be reduced and training times should be made shorter...

The representatives of military departments that spoke at the buro session reported that those who present statements to the military commissariats of the rayons on their intention to continue their study at a higher educational institution have not been drafted for two years now. Students at higher educational institutions will in all probability not be called up for army service beginning in 1990.

The buro's resolution supported the students' demands for changes in the system of military training. A halt to the boycott of military departments and the conversion

to a constitutional path for the resolution of the issues was proposed. It was also resolved to seek a discussion of these problems with the VLSKM [All-Union Komsomol] Central Committee, taking the arguments advanced at the LKSME Central Committee Buro session as the basis for this. The appropriate material should also be sent to the all-union youth press for organizing discussion in the student organizations of the USSR.

The buro decreed that for the adoption of a unified decision, the LKSME proposals be sent to the Estonian CP Central Committee, the Presidium of the ESSR Supreme Soviet, the ESSR Council of Ministers, the Baltic MD headquarters and the republic military commissariat. The attention of the Komsomol committees of TGU, TPI and ESKhA was directed toward the necessity of a more businesslike reaction to problems arising in the student environment and the effective protection of the interests of the students.

The buro discussed the question of the roster of All-Union Komsomol members in the republic Komsomol organization. A sharp decline in the number of VLSKM members in Estonia has occurred since January 1—from 154,836 to 140,381. Some 3,204 new members were accepted over the same period. Some 10,727 (7.6 percent) have withdrawn without removal from the Komsomol rolls.

A real need for the organizational independence of the Estonian LKSM has arisen. The sole precondition for this should be the adoption of the LKSME Charter and the instructions for registration. The roster sector of the LKSME Central Committee has proposed dividing the execution of basic changes in the roster into two stages. A profound analysis of the results of the annual collation of VLSKM members should be done first, and political and organizational conclusions drawn from it; then the search for the so-called "dead souls" should be halted: six months after their departure from the primary organization, they should automatically be considered withdrawn from the ranks of the VLSKM. In the second stage—after the adoption of the LKSME Charter—the instructions for rosters should be approved in the republic Komsomol organization and the exchange of Komsomol documents with the subsequent conversion to the new system for registering members of the organization should begin.

The buro resolved to discuss these proposals at city and rayon committees with the participation of the first secretaries. The new instructions on membership rolls and draft documents for LKSME members should be investigated before December 1.

The question of the drafts of the USSR Law on Changes and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) and the USSR Law on the Election of USSR People's Deputies was discussed. In the face of the importance of the proposed drafts for the democratization of state power in the USSR, there nonetheless remains some confusion in connection with:

- the non-democratic nature of the composition of the drafts—without the participation of the representatives of union republics;
- the decrease in the sovereignty of the union republics based on the provisions of the drafts;
- the attempt to centralize power;
- the excessive haste in the adoption of the draft laws touching on issues of state power.

The LKSME Central Committee Buro has decreed it essential to convene an extraordinary session of the ESSR Supreme Soviet for the purpose of discussing these draft laws. It has been decided—to devise our own position and present it to the ESSR Supreme Soviet—to hold an extraordinary plenum of the LKSME Central Committee on November 15, and there will be a meeting of the first secretaries of the city and rayon committees of the LKSME on November 5 to which the young deputies of the republic parliament will also be invited. A working group headed by Toyvo Sikk has been created of members of the LKSME Central Committee to prepare for the plenum.

Next on the agenda was the question of a discussion of the draft of the ESSR State Language Law in Komsomol organizations. The draft published for republic-wide discussion, in the event of its adoption, could be the first fundamental step on the path toward a legal state. The consolidation of all those living on Estonian soil is very important at this stage. Taking the impending changes into account, it is impossible to allow various youth groups, movements and societies to put their own interests above those of the people. It must be understood that a great deal is being resolved, and that a sober evaluation of the extant situation and an ability to foresee the consequences of this or that decision for the future of the people of Estonia is required of each resident of our republic in the discussion of the language draft.

The LKSME Buro has decided that the city and rayon committees should hold discussions in the local areas on the draft of the language law, and composite proposals should be transmitted to the LKSME Central Committee by November 22. The call of the Forum of Peoples to cease all types of offensive demonstrations directed toward other peoples must be supported in every way. A temporary working group that will elucidate the concrete situation over the course of a month along with the possibilities and actual deadlines for the conversion of office work at city and rayon committees to the Estonian language has been formed, and in each case suitable information in accordance with Article 15 of the draft ESSR Language Law should be provided. Tiyt Veersalu has been named the head of the working group. The working group should summarize the proposals received from the youth and present their composite proposals to the Presidium of the ESSR Supreme Soviet.

The LKSME Central Committee Buro considered it essential to reduce markedly the central committee apparatus. Some 29 key staff members remain from the 58 that has been working there. This will lead to the elimination of duplication in salaried employees and increase their responsibility. We should move to the end result with people who are able to make decisions and answer for their area of work.

**Proposals of the Estonian LKSM Central Committee Buro on Issues of the Military Training of Students at the Higher Educational Institutions of the Republic**

**1. That the Presidium of the ESSR Supreme Soviet:**

1.1. Create a standing commission under the ESSR Supreme Soviet composed of representatives of the deputies and public on issues of the armed forces and weapons on the territory of the republic with broad rights to monitor and take legislative initiatives on a whole range of issues associated with the activity of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

1.2. Establish in the Law on Universal Military Obligation a provision on only a single term of service for citizens of the USSR in peacetime for the purpose of eliminating instances of the drafting of reserve officers who have earlier completed service as privates, non-commissioned officers or warrant officers in peacetime.

**2. That the ESSR Council of Ministers:**

2.1. Offer students on-campus forms of training at higher educational institutions for the postponement of drafting into active military service for the whole period of study beginning in 1989. Not draft the graduates of higher educational institutions who have completed military training for active military service in peacetime.

2.2. Grant students who have completed active military service the choice of completing military training at the higher educational institution or not.

2.3. Establish military training for students who have not completed active military service for a term of 1 year in the amount of 300 hours (including 210 hours of lecture work) and training at a military camp for a span of 30 days, converting to the differentiated training of students depending on their future civilian fields.

2.4. Release the students of medical departments from military training not immediately associated with their fields (leave only the training in military medicine).

2.5. Release the young women students of secondary and higher educational institutions from military training.

2.6. Permit the drafting of the graduates of secondary schools for active military service in the year they complete school only in the fall draft to ensure the opportunity for every student to be prepared for entry into special and higher educational institutions.

3. The Estonian LKSM Central Committee supports the proposals to convert to the training of civil defense in the Estonian language for the students of the Estonian departments of higher educational institutions.

4. To request the ESSR State Committee on Popular Education to take the proposals of the LKSME Central Committee on issues of the military training of students at higher educational institutions into account when developing the republic educational platform.

5. To request and support the university chancellors of higher educational institutions on the issue of establishing temporary rules for the giving of exams in the military departments for students in years 3 and 4.

In the event of consent with our proposals on these issues on the part of the Council of Ministers, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Estonian CP Central Committee, we feel it is essential to prepare the corresponding proposals for all-union organs together.

#### **Recruit's Suicide Elicits Call for Control Committees in Army**

WA18010508 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian No 9, Mar 89 p 11

[Article: "Time to Get to Work"]

[Text] "Tyranny of the old timers" [dedovshchina]... One can hardly find a person today who does not know what an ugly phenomenon is denoted by this phrase. One might discuss why yesterday's school children and students come into the job market unprepared in spite of the fact that the school program envisions military and physical training. One can judge the shortcomings of our system of education and training, which does not instill in the young minds the fundamentals of morality and moral behavior. But there is nothing that can justify the situation of cruelty and arbitrariness which, supposedly contributing to the maturation of the children, leads some of them to tragedy.

Writers and journalists, using the mass media, are trying to draw attention to "tyranny of old timers" and are unmasking it as a disgrace of the society. The situation in the army is becoming a subject of serious discussion at meetings of the Politburo of the CPSU CC.

But here is the latest tragedy. On 8 October 1988, having served only 3 months in the Soviet Army, a student of the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, Vlas Ignatenko, committed suicide.

Badgered by constant mocking, broken down by humiliation, physically exhausted, he reached the point of despair beyond which it was impossible to live. He was brought to his death by his "mentors," urged on by the sergeants and with the full complicity of the officers.

A good, cheerful, and talented youth has departed this life. Is it possible to convey the sorrow of the mother who has lost her only son?!

Vlas' letters make one shudder from the senseless, inhuman cruelty of our young compatriots.

"...yesterday they beat me up and literally put a knife to my throat so that I would do their work along with these criminals and washed someone else's underwear."

"...they took my tablet and found a letter to my parents. And then the crowd read it... they made all kinds of fun of me and beat me..."

"...during the night they tied me to the bed with belts and put a burning match to my foot... they dislocated my rib and apparently collapsed my lung, I am gasping for breath."

"God, how they have humiliated me. You know it is terrifying when everyone is against you. To be brief, I seriously wanted to hang myself. I have detail every other day—busy work. And then the 'blues' promised they would rape me."

"...they have begun to wake me up during the night to wash their (sortir). Once they beat me up when I refused. And I gave in—I began to wash them: the pain is too great when it is in the liver."

The fate of Vlas Ignatenko who, like many, many others, became a victim of "old timer tyranny," convinces us that in spite of the efforts that are being made, the situation in the army is dramatic as before.

The time has come to move on from words of perturbation, tears of despair, and appeals for mercy to concrete actions. We must protect our sons!

Let us create in each republic, kray, and oblast independent committees for social control in the army.

The functions of the committee should consist of exercising social control over the life of military subdivisions. Questions of observing the law, protecting citizens' rights, providing for normal living conditions, and eradicating unauthorized relations—these comprise the main area for the work of the committees.

The committees, which will include parents of military servicemen along with representatives of public organizations, must provide opportunities to meet freely with the soldiers and visit the locations of their units.

The work of these committees in no way affects the interests of the country's defense capabilities or professional military questions—we are speaking about control of the social aspect of army life.

To the USSR government and all interested departments—and there can be none that are not interested!—we are raising the question of creating social control committees. We hope for mutual understanding with the political agencies of the army and navy. We are sure that the army will not put up obstacles to the work of the committees and that they will receive their activity as real assistance from the society in solving today's problems. The creation of the committees will be a real practical embodiment of the idea of unity of the army and the people.

[signed]

B. I. Medovar, UkrSSR academician, deputy of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet;

V. I. Dubodelov, candidate of technical sciences, deputy of the gorsovet;

V. P. Polishchuk, doctor of technical sciences, State Prize winner of the UkSSR, professor;

V. L. Naydek, corresponding member of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences, director of the UkSSR Institute of Problems of Metal Casting;

Yu. V. Moiseyev, doctor of technical sciences, professor;

A. V. Yelskaya, corresponding member of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences;

S. S. Mamota, doctor of technical sciences;

M. I. Yadrenko, professor at Kiev State University;

Yu. V. Kazachenko, professor at Kiev State University;  
and 1,485 other signatures.



## Winter 1988-89 Military School Advertisements

### Military-Political Officers' Schools

18010330 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Nov 88 p 4

[Unattributed article: "The Military Schools Invite You—For Those Who are Choosing a Profession"]

[Excerpts] *At the request of a multitude of readers, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, with this issue, begins the publication of the addresses of military academies and military institutes along with information on some specific features of the training of officer personnel at them.*

*For those who dream of becoming officers, we report that the rules of acceptance to military educational establishments are currently being revised. The editors intend to publish them immediately upon the completion of that work.*

**Riga Higher Military-Political School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union S.S. Biryuzov** (226028, Riga, 28);

**Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined-Arms School imeni 60th Anniversary of Great October** (630103, Novosibirsk, 103);

**Minsk Higher Military-Political Combined-Arms School** (220067, Minsk, 67);

**Sverdlovsk Higher Military-Political Tank and Artillery School** (620108, Sverdlovsk, I-108);

**Leningrad Higher Military-Political School of Air Defense imeni Yu.A. Andropov** (198324, Leningrad, L-324);

**Kurgan Higher Military-Political Aviation School** (640025, Kurgan, 25, oblast);

**Kiev Higher Naval Political School** (252145, Kiev, 145);

**Donetsk Higher Military-Political School for Engineering and Communications Troops imeni Gen Army A.A. Yepishev** (340090, Donetsk, 90);

**Simferopol Higher Military-Political Construction School** (333037, Simferopol, 37);

**Tallinn Higher Military-Political Construction School** (203010, Yagala Peninsula, Kharyuskiy Rayon of Estonian SSR);

**Lvov Higher Military-Political School** (290028, Lvov, 28).

The Military-Political schools prepare officers with higher military and political education for all arms and services of the armed forces (the Lvov school prepares officers with higher military and political education—military journalists and cultural-enlightenment workers). The course of training at all schools is four years.

Acceptances are made to the schools by recommendation of the political organs of the Soviet Army and Navy or rayon (city) committees of the All-Union Komsomol, members and candidate members of the CPSU and members of the All-Union Komsomol from among Komsomol activists, active members of social life or those with work experience. Those entering the Lvov school, aside from entrance exams, have an interview in a selected field, while those entering the journalism department also present their clippings from newspapers and magazines. In selecting a school it should also be kept in mind that the Kiev school trains political workers for a ship's crew, while the Kurgan school trains political workers only for the shore-based services of the navy.

Over the course of study the cadets, aside from the assimilation of social sciences, study a series of military and special disciplines, including a special course in military sociology, the fundamentals of the installation and application of computers and the fundamentals of Soviet military legislation among others, and assimilate the basic combat equipment of their branch of service and driving skills with the granting of driving privileges.

The graduates of the Military-Political schools are awarded the rank of lieutenant and are given an all-union diploma with certification as a teacher of history and social sciences (or military journalist or cultural-enlightenment worker for the graduates of the Lvov school).

### Naval Officers' Schools

18010323 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 Jan 89 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article entitled: "For Those Who Wish to Enter the Profession": "Military Schools Invite Applications—These Schools Train Naval Officers"]

[Text] **Higher School imeni M. V. Frunze** (199162, Leningrad, V-162)

**Higher Naval Submarine School imeni Leninist Komsomol** (198093, Leningrad, L-93)

**Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S. O. Makarov** (690006, Vladivostok, 6)

**Caspian Higher Naval School** (370018, Baku, 18)

**Kaliningrad Higher Naval School** (236026, Kaliningrad, 26, obl.)

**Black Sea Higher Naval School imeni P. S. Nakhimov** (335035, Sevastopol, 35)

**Higher Naval Electronics School imeni A. S. Popov** (198135, Leningrad-Petrodvorets, 4)

**Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy** (190195, Leningrad, F-195)

**Leningrad Higher Naval Engineering School imeni V. I. Lenin** (188620, Leningrad-Pushkin, 4)

**Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering School** (335033, Sevastopol, 33)

Higher naval schools are five-year institutions. Modern nuclear-powered submarines and surface ships of various types are complex systems whose functioning requires the services of various kinds of specialists: in navigation, acoustics, communications, missiles, radiation monitoring, torpedo technology, and mechanics. The naval schools train personnel for all the professions required by the Navy.

Cadets receive practical training aboard combat vessels and training craft. In the course of their studies they all participate in extended deep-sea cruises.

Graduates are awarded an all-union diploma with certification as an engineer in a specialized field. Upon graduating they are assigned to serve aboard submarines or surface ships of the Navy.

#### **Ground Forces Officers' Schools**

18010331 *Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
20 Nov 88 Second Edition p 4

[Unattributed article: "For Those Who Wish to Enter the Profession": "Military Schools Invite Applications—These Schools Train Motorized Rifle and Armor Officers"]

[Excerpts] **Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni MSU I. S. Konev** (480094, Alma-Ata, 94)

**Baku Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet** (370128, Baku, 128)

**Far East Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni MSU K. K. Rokossovskiy** (675021, Blagoveshchensk, 21, Amur Obl.)

**Kiev Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni M. V. Frunze** (252066, Kiev, 66)

**Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni S. M. Kirov** (198903, Leningrad-Petrodvorets, 3)

**Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command Red Banner School imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet** (109380, Moscow, Zh-380)

**Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni M. V. Frunze** (644004, Omsk, 4)

**Ordzhonikidze Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni MSU A. I. Yeremenko** (362006, Ordzhonikidze, 6)

**Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni V. I. Lenin** (700023, Tashkent, 23)

**Blagoveshchensk Higher Tank Command School imeni MSU K. A. Meretskov** (675018, Blagoveshchensk, 18, Amur Obl.)

**Kazan Higher Tank Command School imeni Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Tatar ASSR** (420046, Kazan, 46)

**Tashkent Higher Tank Command Lenin School imeni Marshall of Armored Troops P. S. Rybalko** (702115, Chirchik, 15, Tashkent Obl.)

**Ulyanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command School imeni V. I. Lenin** (432014, Ulyanovsk, 14)

**Kharkov Guards Higher Tank Command School imeni Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR** (310097, Kharkov, 97)

**Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School imeni 50th Year of the October Revolution** (454030, Chelyabinsk, 30)

**Kiev Higher Tank Engineering School imeni MSU I. I. Yakubovskiy** (252063, Kiev, 63)

**Omsk Higher Tank Engineering School imeni MSU P. K. Koshevoy** (644098, Omsk, 98)

The above military schools train officers for duty primarily in motorized rifle and tank units of the ground forces. The period of study in command schools is four years, while in engineering schools it is five years. Warrant officers in the Omsk Combined Arms School and the Chelyabinsk Tank School undergo three years of study.

The training programs offered by the command schools emphasize general military and specialized disciplines, acquisition of skills in firing various types of small arms, and handling of combat vehicles and motor vehicles.

The greater part of the programs offered in the engineering schools involve technical disciplines, the study of the design of combat and motor transport vehicles, and the operation and servicing of vehicles in the field.

Graduates of combined arms and tank schools are awarded an all-Union diploma with certification as an engineer specializing in the maintenance of wheeled and tracked vehicles.

### **Aviation Engineering Schools**

18010344 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Jan 89 p 3

[Unattributed announcement of Aviation Engineering Schools: "Military Academies Invite"]

[Excerpts] Aviation Engineers and Technicians Trained Here

The Kiev Higher Military Aviation Engineering School (252043, Kiev, 43);

The Riga Higher Military Aviation Engineering School imeni Yakov Alksnis (226031, Riga, 31);

The Voronezh Higher Military Aviation Engineering School (394064, Voronezh, 64);

The Irkutsk Higher Military Aviation Engineering School imeni 50th Anniversary of the All-Union Komsomol (664036, Irkutsk, 36);

The Tambov Higher Military Aviation Engineering School imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy (392006, Tambov, 6);

The Kharkov Higher Military Aviation Engineering School (310048, Kharkov, 48);

The Kharkov Higher Military Aviation School of Radioelectronics imeni Lenin's Komsomol of the Ukraine (310165, Kharkov, 165);

The Kaliningrad Military Aviation-Technical School (236044, Kaliningrad, 44, oblast);

The Vasilkov Military Aviation-Technical School imeni 50th Anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol of the Ukraine (255130, Vasilkov, 3, Kiev obl.);

The Perm Military Aviation-Technical School imeni Leninist Komsomol (614049, Perm, 49);

The Achinsk Military Aviation-Technical School imeni 60th Anniversary of the All-Union Komsomol (662100, Achinsk, 1, Krasnoyarsk Kray);

The Kirov Military Aviation-Technical School (610041, Kirov 41, obl.);

The Lomonosov Military Aviation-Technical School (188450, Lomonosov, town of Lebyazhye, Leningrad obl.).

The period of training in the engineering schools is five years. (At Voronezh, except for the specialty of meteorology, and at the Kharkov School of Radioelectronics, except for the specialty of electronic flight operations support systems, it is 4 years). At the technical schools it is eight years.

Present-day military aviation constitutes a difficult military-technical complex that includes various types of aircraft, missiles and fire arms, automation and control equipment, electronic flight operations support systems, etc. Reliable and uninterrupted operation of this complex is ensured by highly qualified specialists, engineers, and technicians of many types. The aviation schools train all of these specialists.

Graduates of the schools are sent to combat units of the Air Forces and to Naval aviation. They are awarded the military rank of lieutenant and an all-union diploma with certification as an engineer or technician, depending on the type of training.

### **Air Defense Officers' Schools**

18010318 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jan 89 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed Article: "For Those Who Select the Profession—Military Schools Invite You"]

[Excerpts]

Armavir Higher Military Aviation School imeni Chief Marshal of Aviation P. S. Kutakhov (352913, Armavir, Krasnodarsk Kray);

Stavropol Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots and Navigators imeni Marshal Aviation V. A. Sudets (355021, Stavropol, 21, Kray);

Gorkiy Higher Air Defense Missile Command School of the PVO (603023, Gorkiy, D-23);

Dnepropetrovsk Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command School of the PVO (320119, Dnepropetrovsk, 119);

Leningrad Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command School imeni 60th Anniversary of Great October (197061, Leningrad, P-61);

Orenburg Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command School imeni G. K. Ordzhonikidze (460010, Orenburg, 10);

Poltava Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command School imeni Army Gen N. F. Vatutin (314000, Poltava);

Engels Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command School of the PVO (413109, Engels, 9, Saratov Oblast);

Yaroslavl Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command School of the PVO imeni 60th Anniversary of Great October (150016, Yaroslavl, 16, Oblast);

Kiev Higher Engineering Electronics Air Defense School imeni Marshal of Aviation A. I. Pokryshkin (252064, Kiev, 64);

**Minsk Higher Engineering Surface-to-air Missile School of the PVO** (220057, Minsk, 57);

**Kiev Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Engineering School imeni S. M. Kirov** (252048, Kiev, 48);

**Smolensk Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Engineering School** (214027, Smolensk, 27);

**Vilnius Higher Command Air Defense Electronics School** (232003, Vilnius, 3);

**Krasnoyarsk Higher Command Air Defense Electronics School** (660053, Krasnoyarsk, 53);

**Zhitomir Higher Air Defense Electronics School imeni Leninist Komsomol** (262023, Zhitomir, 23);

**Pushkin Higher Air Defense Electronics School** (188620, Pushkin, 1, Leningrad Oblast);

**Cherepovets Higher Military Engineering Electronics School** (162608, Cherepovets, 8);

**Daugavpils Higher Military Aviation Engineering School imeni Yan Fabritsius** (228402, Daugavpils, 2, Latvian SSR).

The term of study in the aviation and command schools is four years. In the engineering schools, as well as in the engineering faculties of the Pushkin and Kiev electronics schools, and the Minsk Surface-to-Air Missile School, it is five years.

The Armavir School trains fighter pilots for PVO [Air Defense] aviation; the Stavropol School trains pilots and navigators. The rest of the schools train specialists for air defense missile complexes, radar stations, and ASU [automated command and control systems].

Students who complete the Armavir or the Stavropol schools are issued an all-union diploma with certification as a pilot-engineer or navigator-engineer. Those who graduate from command schools are awarded the certification of electronics operations engineer.

Graduates of the engineering schools are awarded a diploma with the certification of mechanical engineer, electronics engineer, electro-mechanical engineer, or electrical engineer, depending on their chosen speciality.

#### **Rear Service, Construction Schools**

18010347 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 Jan 89 First Edition p 2

[Article: "For Those Who Select the Profession—Military Schools Invite You"]

[Text]Rear Services Officers are Trained Here:

**Volsk Higher Military Rear Services School imeni Leninist Komsomol** (412680, Volsk, 3, Saratov Oblast);

**Gorkiy Higher Military Rear Services School imeni MSU I. Kh. Bagramyan** (603125, Gorkiy, D-125);

**Ulyanovsk Higher Military Technical School imeni Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy** (432050, Ulyanovsk, 50);

**Moscow Higher Command School for Road and Engineer Troops** (143911, Balashikha, 11, Moscow Oblast);

**Yaroslavl Higher Military Finance School imeni Army Gen A. V. Khrulev** (150038, Yaroslavl, 38);

**Leningrad Higher School for Railroad Troops and Military Transport imeni M. V. Frunze** (190000, Leningrad, Center).

The term of study is four years. At the engineering faculties of the Gorkiy and Ulyanovsk rear services schools, and the Leningrad Railroad Troops and Military Transport School, it is five years.

During their schooling the students study general military and specialized subjects, and the organization of food and clothing support of units.

School graduates are issued an all-union diploma and a certification as engineer-economist, equipment engineer, mechanical engineer, construction engineer, traffic control engineer, lines of communication engineer, highway construction engineer, road and bridge construction engineer, financier, or economist.

#### **Officers for Construction Units are Trained Here:**

**Leningrad Higher Military Engineering Construction School imeni Army Gen A. N. Komarovskiy** (192185, Leningrad, D-185);

**Pushkin Higher Military Engineering Construction School** (188620, Leningrad, Pushkin, 2);

**Kamyshin Higher Military Construction Command School** (403850, Kamyshin, 10, Volgograd Oblast);

**Gorkiy Higher Military Construction Command School** (606204, Kstovo-4, Gorkiy Oblast);

**Tolyatti Higher Military Construction Command School** (445681, Tolyatti, GST-681);

**Volga Higher Military Construction Command School** (141980, Dubna, Moscow Oblast);

**Khabarovsk Higher Military Construction School** (680022, Khabarovsk, 22).

The term of study in the command schools is four years, and in the engineering schools is five years.

The students study architecture and city design and construction, military construction project technology, and capital construction economics.

School graduates are issued an all-union diploma, and a certification as construction engineer, sanitary engineering equipment engineer, electrical engineer, power engineer, mechanical engineer, building and structure construction and maintenance engineer, or electrical power systems maintenance engineer.

### **Engineering, Chemical Troops, Motor Vehicle Schools**

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
19 Jan 89 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article entitled: "For Those Who are Selecting a Profession: The Military Schools Offer an Invitation".]

#### **Here They Prepare Engineering Officers...**

[Excerpts] **The Kaliningrad Higher Engineering School of the Engineering Troops** (236022, Kaliningrad, 22, oblast);

**The Kamenets-Podolskoye Higher Military-Engineering Command School imeni Marshal of Engineering Troops V.K. Kharchenko** (281900 Kamenets-Podolskiy, Khmel-nitskoy obl.);

**The Tyumen Higher Military-Engineering Command School imeni Marshal of Engineering Troops A.I. Proshlyakov** (625028 Tyuman, 28).

The duration of training [at the above schools] is 4 years (in the Kaliningrad school it is 5 years).

In the schools they familiarize one with all types of modern engineering vehicles, sapper equipment, and a significant portion of the training time is devoted to the study of chemistry, explosive substances and electrical equipment.

Those completing the command schools are given an all-union diploma with a certification in wheeled tractor and tracked equipment; as an engineer or engineer-mechanic.

#### **Chemical Troops Officer Schools**

**The Tambov Higher Military Command School of Chemical Defense imeni N.I. Podvoyskiy** (392011, Tambov, 11).

**The Kostroma Higher Military Command School of Chemical Defense** (156015, Kostroma, 15).

**The Seratov Higher Military Engineering School of Chemical Defense** (410037, Saratov, 37).

The duration of training [at the above schools] is 4 years (in the Saratov school it is 5 years).

Cadets at the schools study organic, non-organic and analytical chemistry, physical-chemical methods of analysis, and specialized equipment in the inventory of the chemical troops.

Graduates of the command schools are given an all-union diploma with a certification as an engineer in the maintenance of chemical defense equipment; and engineer—or a chemical engineer.

#### **And Military Motor Vehicle Personnel...**

**The Ryazan Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering School** (390014, Ryazan, 14).

**The Chelyabinsk Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering School imeni Chief Marshal of Armored Forces P.A. Rotmistrov** (454029, Chelyabinsk, 29).

**The Samarkand Higher Military Motor Vehicle Command School imeni Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR** (705056, Samarkand, 56, Uzbek SSR).

**The Ussuriysk Higher Military Motor Vehicle Command School** (692521, Ussuriysk, 21, Primorskiy Kray).

The duration of training in the command schools is 4 years, in the engineering schools it is 5 years).

The Cadets study all makes of motor vehicle and tractor technology and receive a driver's license certificate for categories V, S and D wheeled and tracked vehicles. The graduates of the command schools receive an all-union diploma with a certification as an engineer in the maintenance of motor and tractor equipment; an engineer or engineer-mechanic.

#### **Military Schools, Institutes Invite Applications**

18010376 *Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
17 Jan 89 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article entitled: "For Those Who Are Selecting a Profession: Military Schools and Institutes Offer An Invitation".]

[Text] **The Leningrad Higher Military-Topographic Command Red Banner, Order of the Red Star School imeni General of the Army A.I. Antonov** (19702, Leningrad, P-42).

Term of studies—4 years.

Those completing the school receive an all-union diploma with certification as a topographic engineer or as a geodesic engineer.

**The Ryazan Higher Airborne Assault Landing Command Twice Red Banner School imeni Leninist Komsomol** (390031, Ryazan, 31).

Term of studies—4 years.

Graduates receive an all-union diploma with certification as a wheeled and tracked vehicle maintenance engineer.

**The Leningrad Higher Military Engineering School of Communications imeni Lensovet** (193316, Leningrad, 316).

Term of studies—5 years.

Those completing the school receive an all-union diploma with certification as a electronic-signals radio-engineer, an electronics equipment engineer or as a mathematical engineer.

**The Military Engineering Red Banner Institute imeni A.F. Mozhayskiy** (197082, Leningrad, p-82).

Term of studies—5 years.

Those completing the institute receive an all-union diploma with certification as a military mechanical engineer, an electrical engineer, an electronics equipment engineer, a construction engineer, a metrological engineer or as a radio-engineer.

**The Red Banner Military Institute** (109033, Moscow, Zh-33).

Term of studies—5 years.

Admission leads into a department: translation, military-juridical or military-political.

Graduates receive an all-union diploma with certification dependent upon the speciality selected.

**The Military Twice Red Banner Institute of Physical Culture** (194044, Leningrad, K-44).

Term of studies—4 years.

The Institute prepares physical culture and sports specialists for troop units and subunits, and trainers for various types of sport.

Those completing the institute are given an all-union diploma with certification of physical culture instructor.

### **Change of Curriculum at Military Schools Urged by Philosophers**

*18000505 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Feb 89 p 2*

[Letter to editors by Col V.Kovalevskiy, Ph.D. Philosophy, professor; Col (Ret) N.Lysukhin, Ph.D. History, docent; Capt 1st Rank V.Puzik, Ph.D. Philosophy, professor and Col (Ret) Ye.Rybkin, RSFSR Honorary Scientist, Ph.D. Philosophy, professor: "To Raise a Creative Person" under the "Letter to the Editors" rubric; first paragraph a boldface introduction]

[Text] What should be the direction of perestroyka in the teaching of social sciences and what path is the most correct and efficient one? This question has been the subject of many seminars and debates among military social scientists as well as military academy students and cadets. In the present letter, teachers of the Military Academy imeni F.E.Dzerzhinskiy express their views on the subject.

It has become totally clear that the set of scholastic subjects and fossilized propaganda plans, formulas and postulates which for decades have formed the basis of social sciences instruction at higher educational institutions can no longer be considered marxism-leninism. Yet, the dogmas' stagnant and stultifying impact will not change if the sequence or methods of teaching them are altered or a number of subjects are no longer taught. We think it is obvious. Yet, we must mention it since some social scientists view that path as the most promising one. For instance, professors at the Military Academy imeni M.V.Frunze propose to replace several social sciences with the general course "Marxism-Leninism and Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice". Their point of view was expressed in the article titled "To Restore Interest in Theory" published in KRSNAYA ZVEZDA's June 12 issue.

But let us be realistic. Merely combining, joining or enlarging something often does not turn out to be a good thing. There are reasons to doubt it; they are provided by the very history of social sciences instruction at military academies. After [Stalin's] "Short History of the VKP(b)" was introduced, the number of departments was sharply curtailed and everything was very soon reduced to the study of that "encyclopedia of marxism-leninism." Only after the 20th party congress did the "rehabilitation" of social sciences take place, and independent departments reappeared or were newly established and specific courses were introduced.

Experienced teachers know what the introduction of a general course means in practice: philosophers are sent to lecture on economics and historians on philosophy, while scientific communism teachers are assigned to supervise field work in party and political studies. At first it is done as an exception and but later becomes norm.

Another matter needs to be kept in mind: the introduction of a general course, by legitimizing the "versatile" use of teachers, gives a go-ahead to the process of draining those subjects of their basic content and harms the development of military theory. A department is not merely a teaching unit but a research vehicle as well; it is a form of theory's existence and development.

One of the reasons cited by supporters of general courses is the fact that the social sciences curriculum at academies contains nothing new compared to that at service schools. But this refers to the past, to the period of stagnation and dogmatism, when programs and curricula remained unchanged for decades and when even textbooks all over the country were mass-produced or reduced to common denominator. How can one not see that after April 1985 nothing but ruins remain of the concrete blocks of social sciences dogma, that regeneration of social sciences has been gathering strength. The historical, philosophical and social thought is being reborn based on the principle of fidelity to truth.

The renewal of content offers an opportunity to create extremely interesting educational programs for both service schools and academies. There is plenty of material for a good teacher. The proper academic level of instruction will be achieved by finding and preparing at military academy departments gifted professors able to teach their own independent courses.

Naturally, we are all concerned with the fact that curricula are somewhat removed from military practice. One of the ways to solve this problem is to introduce practice-oriented themes into theoretical courses and to offer special courses. The question is, however, how to organize such special courses. Before preparing lectures, we need to raise the issue at a scientific level. However, there are no dissertations, monographs or methodological materials on the subject, i.e., no scientific foundation exists as yet. Is there not a danger that the schematic approach in theory will be replaced with the same in practice? In general, is it possible to supply future military commanders with recommendations for all possible events in life?

The ability to evaluate correctly and competently events in public life and on duty, and to make appropriate decisions, is determined not by the level of theoretical knowledge of the officer but by his ability to think independently and by his methodological and professional expertise. To build such professional expertise and such personality in an officer is the goal of basic academic education. It can be achieved only if all the wealth and opportunities inherent in history, philosophy, economics, literature and the arts, and all the treasures of humanities, are fully utilized.

For the study of specific practical questions there are special departments, commanders' training schools and an entire range of non-academic facilities for marxist-leninist and professional training and retraining of officers, which include independent studies. As to military

academies, the most promising and reliable way to relate theory to military practice here should be new, thorough and specific courses on military social sciences, complete with appropriate new departments and labs.

The creation of new training and research units at leading higher education institutions will help conduct scientific sociological research on all aspects of life and activities of the Armed Forces.

### Acceleration of Military Educational Reform Called For

18010195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Prof A. Shramchenko: "Taking into Account the Needs of the Troops"]

[Text] Judging by letters from our readers, solving the problem of bringing back tactics as an art of conducting battle raised in the dialogue of our correspondent and Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces Lt Gen V. Khazikov, published on 7 January, is closely linked with restructuring in both the sphere of theory and practical activities of military cadres. Today the conversation is carried on by a military scientist and a line officer.

As a scientist who has devoted many years to military education I cannot but agree with the idea of Maj Gen I. Vorobyev (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 February) on the lack of proper appreciation in our schools and academies for the significance of fundamental scientific-theoretical training in operative and tactical subjects.

In this reference, I believe that it would be worthwhile to put more emphasis on the preparation of works, monographs and collections of articles on tactics. We also need monographs which would reflect the issues of tactical art in the times of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, the experience of fighting in Afghanistan and that of combat training of the troops. After all, in recent years we have concentrated on producing textbooks and aids the main purpose of which was to substantiate the provisions of combat manuals.

The role of military schools in the endeavor of bringing back tactics as an art of conducting battle can hardly be overstated. Correspondingly, I believe that their operations should be evaluated taking into account the quality of scientific work in priority sectors including such as tactics of arms and specialized troops.

To my mind, the current system of instruction in general tactics and commanding and controlling the troops in battle is a serious obstacle to improving the level of tactical training of students at present. Here are, for example, typical study questions of the problems practiced and short exercises: formulating a defensive action (offensive action, meeting engagement) battle plan,

assignment of combat missions, conducting commander's reconnaissance, organizing coordination, formulating a battle plan for repelling (conducting) a counterattack, and so on. These, however, are issues of commanding and controlling the troops.

Where is it said that a study of practical issues in tactics should begin with the fundamentals of control and, worse yet, in the same tactical situation? Experience dictates that it is more expedient to outline the most typical combat episodes in tactics of every kind of combat and study them. For example, the following typical combat episodes may be distinguished in offensive combat: delivery of fire for effect, movement to the jump-off point for the attack, attack on the defensive position, routing the reserves of the opposition. Tactical problems and training exercises should be prepared on the basis of these episodes. This manner of conducting classes would facilitate the acquisition of systemic knowledge by students and foster their ability to solve problems creatively in the complex environment of a real battle. This purpose can also be served by map exercises which, in my opinion, should be brought back in the course of the process of instruction.

Much is being done now in order to promote participation by students at seminars during the solving of tasks by the method of exercise. However, the effectiveness of such classes still remains low. This is understandable: no matter how an instructor "manipulates" at a four hour seminar he can only listen to reports (contributions) by 7 to 10 students, sometimes fewer. At best, he may ask others to complement or give more specifics on the report.

Is it not better to do it this way: if, say, 12 hours is allocated for a seminar on regiment-level offensive battle then 8 hours should be assigned for individual conversations with the students. In this case, all of them will be active participants in the class. In summation, a four-hour seminar should be conducted at which the most difficult questions should be discussed. Tactical situations should also be prepared by a certain method, gradually increasing their complexity in order to carry on continuous instruction from the simple to the complex.

Certainly, this does not exhaust the potential for improving the system of instruction. Specifically, we cannot do without introducing up-to-date simulators, without using the methods of problem-oriented and programmed training with technical means of instruction and control. Psychological, pedagogical and methodological training of officers also is in need of serious improvement. Taking into account the fact that a profound study of military psychology and pedagogy will call for extra time,

it is worthwhile to consider the adjustment in the training of, say, cadets in higher general military command schools to that of instructors of military training and history in high schools. Issues of military psychology and pedagogy, social and psychological aspects of commanding and controlling the troops, issues of methods of combat training in military academies deserve more profound attention.

Increased emphasis on fundamental theoretical training of students certainly does not reduce the role of practical orientation in their instruction. On the contrary, it should be reinforced in a variety of ways. Let us take, for example, diploma problems. Unfortunately, they are frequently prepared without taking the needs of the troops into account and gather dust on the shelves after they are defended. What if we give assignments to students ahead of time, say, during their practice assignments taking into account real conditions and needs of units and formations? Or, say, trust the students to prepare and conduct a command staff exercise on maps under the direction of instructors? Practices whereby the study of a kind of battle is completed by preparing a tactical briefing or a group exercise would facilitate the development of skills of students, including methodological skills.

Certainly, all of this calls for enhancing the independence of military schools. For example, at present the academy must coordinate respective chapters of the curriculum it is preparing with commanders of arms, specialized troops and services. On the one hand, this is supposedly beneficial, and the link with the troops is closer. On the other hand, "the departmental patriotism" of individual commanders interferes with the endeavor to a great degree.

It is no secret that our school needs better training facilities. This task should be solved in a centralized manner which would make it possible to create facilities at an up-to-date technical level and more economically. In general, when we touch on restructuring in military schools, we should consider its scientific support. For example, the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences handles issues of improving instruction in schools, and the Scientific Research Institute for the Issues of Higher School does that for colleges. For starters, we could set up, say, a scientific-research laboratory at one of the general military command academies which would work out a new concept of the instruction and indoctrination process, better curriculae, study and methodological aids, etc. in cooperation with the staff of professors and instructors. Following experiments and the introduction of corrections, the results of research could be implemented in the process of instruction.

In a word, the restructuring of military schools needs to be accelerated vigorously.



## **Soviet-Japanese Round Table Discussion on Pacific Security**

### **Commentary by Japan's Kato**

*18010336 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
25 November 88 Second Edition p 3*

[Article by Masakhiko Kato, NHK Telecorporation commentator: "USSR Initiatives Should Be Studied"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA

[Text] The VII Round Table Meeting of USSR and Japanese journalists was held recently in Moscow. Masakhiko Kato, NHK Japanese Telecorporation commentator presented a report on the situation in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean Region and we are publishing it with the author's consent. A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA columnist also presents his views on security problems in that region.

The specific trends in Soviet foreign-political policy that are being implemented relative to the ATR [Asiatic-Pacific Ocean Region] under the leadership of M. Gorbachev were revealed in speeches in Vladivostok in July 1986 and in Krasnoyarsk in September 1988. This is what has aroused our great interest in those two speeches. The contents of the speech in Krasnoyarsk generated special attention because it was more all-embracing and was filled with specifics in comparison to the Vladivostok speech.

In contrasting the speech at Krasnoyarsk with the one at Vladivostok, we first of all attach a lot of significance to two events. The first is the time the former was delivered. M. Gorbachev was speaking with initiative at a time when the situation in Asia was reaching a critical stage. We noted the important progress in South Korea's developing relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and the push the Olympic Games in Seoul had provided. The development of trade relations will obviously lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations over time. And there is serious movement in relations between the KNR [Chinese People's Republic] and South Korea. In discussing Soviet-Chinese relations, not only has an agenda for a meeting between their ministers of foreign affairs been established, but there is also the possibility of a summit meeting in the spring of 1989. It is of tremendous significance that the Soviet Union's new proposals relative to the ATR were announced precisely at this time.

Second, the speech in Krasnoyarsk demonstrated the Soviet Union's active desire to overcome the difficulties that exist in Japanese-Soviet relations. One could say that this situation was the distinctive trait of the speech at Krasnoyarsk as compared to the one at Vladivostok. The Vladivostok speech primarily stressed only Japan's important economic significance as a "World Power." The Krasnoyarsk speech not only stresses Japan's great

importance, but also says more: meetings with Y. Nakasone and a number of other important Japanese representatives "... have allowed us to better see the problems and possibilities for ways to overcome stagnation." This clearly reflects the Soviet Union's active desire to overcome the difficulties in its relations with Japan.

The Krasnoyarsk speech did not indicate what specific "problems" he had in mind. However during an interview with the Japanese mass media upon returning from the USSR to his own country Y. Nakasone stated that he and the USSR Central Committee General Secretary touched upon the territorial problem during their conversations. This allows us to conclude that the territorial issue was one of those "problems" mentioned in the speech. If this is so, the Krasnoyarsk speech allows us to open a new phase in the history of Japanese-Soviet relations.

It is precisely for this reason that we can give high marks to the General Secretary's Krasnoyarsk speech. In addition to this, we should note that the individual proposals that were announced in the speech contain a number of items that require further study. We will examine several of those items.

First, one of the seven proposals announced at Krasnoyarsk that I would like to pick out is the one concerning consultations among the primary naval powers concerning not building up naval forces in that area. Because of a different USSR and U.S. geopolitical proposal the realization of this proposal would lead to results that would be advantageous to the Soviets. Why? Because the Soviet Union can deploy its ground forces within its own enormous littoral area, but the U.S. does not have these same capabilities. The establishment of equivalency between the armed forces of the East and the West, both in ground forces as well as air and naval forces, must be a starting-point for detente in ATR and there should be a transition to their combined reduction after that. One must consider that, as opposed to Europe where the discussion primarily concerns ground forces, an armed forces reduction in Asia includes incomparably much more complex components.

Second, the speech proposed using a multi-lateral approach to work out a freeze on the level of naval and air forces in that area where the borders of the USSR, KNR, Japan, KNDR [Korean People's Democratic Republic] and South Korea come together. Under present conditions it would be very difficult to quickly convene a multi-lateral conference to discuss the problem of freezing armed forces. Before this can be done, we have to strengthen the level of trust among the parties. And in order for this to happen priority must be focused not on immediately discussing the problems on a multi-lateral basis, but on bi-lateral treaties between the KNR and the USSR, between KNR and South Korea, between the USSR and South Korea and between the other states. We must put special effort into thinking about how to bring the KNDR into the negotiation process.

Third, the speech proposes that the United States and the Soviet Union mutually give up military bases (the U.S.—bases in the Philippines and the USSR—Cam Ranh Bay). As regards this proposal, one must keep in mind that these bases have totally different strategic military significance. The bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines are important bases designed for the defense of U.S. Naval and Air Forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas as a whole. As to Cam Ranh Bay, it plays only a secondary role supplementing the naval base in Vladivostok. There is little possibility of this proposal being considered as it does fully take into account the differences between these bases.

In other words, Asia is radically different from Europe from the point of view of geopolitical conditions and political stability. Whereas Europe is basically continental, Asia is a continental and a sea area. In addition, Europe has been divided into two major camps, East and West, and despite the confrontation, stability is coming into being. Neither East nor West is developing into a single bloc in Asia and the political situation is not stable. Thus it seems that, based on the understanding of the fundamental differences between Asia and Europe, the proposals announced in the Krasnoyarsk speech contain many elements that must be reviewed. Stabilizing the political situation in ATR requires the creation of an Asiatic-type Helsinki system that is more complex than the one in Europe.

#### Commentary by Golts

18010336 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
25 November 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Golts, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
Commentator: "We Must Search Together"]

[Text] I will immediately state that I do not intend to "rebuff" Masakhiko Kato, although I certainly do not agree with all of his recommendations. I will further state that the approach shown by my colleague from NHK does inspire confidence. The initiatives that were advanced in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk were an invitation to work jointly to find ways to improve the situation in the area through the participation of all interested states, and this was confirmed during the course of M. S. Gorbachev's visit to India.

One thing that deserves approval is that in critically analyzing the proposals in the Krasnoyarsk program, the Japanese journalist did not see them as "propaganda" (this was the approach taken by high-ranking U.S. Pentagon and State Department representatives). M. Kato presented his own recommendations which seemed more promising to him. Finally, it is very important that the author of this report sees a future in developing the situation in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean Region to improve relations between its states without employing confrontation and without continuing the notorious Western policy "from a position of power."

But we have to improve relations with one another without ultimatums and without resorting to dictates. And at this point I have to touch upon that same "territorial problem." It is not a question of whether such a problem exists in Soviet-Japanese relations or not. It exists at such a plane that the Japanese side persistently raises it at all levels.

Another thing is that we should approach the entire complex of mutual USSR-Japanese relations from a position of reason and consider the reality that has developed since the post-war period. There is no way that it can be called constructive to have the development of all ties with the USSR depend on the resolution of one issue (one of Tokyo's conditions). In the final account this approach is to Japan's detriment as this, as the saying goes, ties Japan hand and foot and limits its abilities to show initiative in resolving the main problem of maintaining firm peace and stability in the ATR.

As regards to the so-called "Korea issue," in my opinion it is a confused and painful problem. The sides are experiencing a lot of suspicion in their relations with each other. The primary task of the states in that region is to create conditions for a fruitful dialogue between the North and South. The KNDR's latest proposals are creating a good foundation for this. At the same time it is impossible not to see that the stumbling blocks have been and continue to be the American military presence in the southern area of the Korean peninsula. And this presence is aggravated by the fact that the U.S. troops have nuclear weapons.

But let us return to the Krasnoyarsk initiatives. M. Kato correctly indicates that military equivalence must be the starting point for detente in the region. In examining the balance of powers that has developed, one must not lose sight of the fact that our country decided to eliminate all of its medium and shorter range missiles from the Asiatic part of the USSR. Moreover, we unilaterally decided not to increase the number of any nuclear weapons in Asia. And this is at a time when the U.S. is increasing the number of its sea-launch cruise missiles in this area and is continuing its provocative maneuvers during which it is developing maritime attacks against Soviet territory. Our ground forces have been deployed to guarantee our reliable defense. I do not think that one can seriously talk about a "threat" coming from us. In fact, the USSR does not have a common land border with a single one of the countries that the U.S. has been called upon to "defend against the Soviet military threat." And therefore one does not have to be a great strategist to understand that the offensive potential of ground forces in this situation is determined to a large degree by the availability of assets to conduct maritime assaults. The United States has almost a two-and-one-half fold advantage in landing craft and vessels able to transport troops. And additionally the U.S. has a three-fold advantage in the number of combat ships in the Pacific Ocean.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union was not guided by the desire for unilateral advantages when it made proposals relative to not expanding naval forces. It is simply that this is a very critical military-political issue in the ATR, for the zone of confrontation there runs precisely along the line of fleet contact. And this is precisely the area in which we are striving to achieve a reduction in military confrontation.

By the way, we have also focused on the problem of ground forces. We have not increased the number of Soviet Ground Forces in the Far East for several years now. Moreover we have reduced their number along the Soviet-Chinese border and have moved some of the Soviet forces from Mongolia. We are showing restraint in conducting military exercises and are not increasing their number and scale. And it seems to me that the issue of ground forces can be added to the negotiating table. This is so that we can begin preparing for such negotiations.

And I also have to agree with the NHK columnist that it is impossible to resolve the problem of not expanding naval and air forces in areas where USSR, KNR, KNDR, Japanese and South Korean shorelines come together until such time as the level of trust has been increased. However I do not understand why a multi-lateral conference cannot accomplish such tasks, especially if it is preceded by intense preparatory work within the framework of some negotiation mechanism that includes military experts, as the Soviet Union is proposing. This process could begin with consultations among the USSR, U.S. and KNR, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, relative to the situation in the region. The idea about bi-lateral consultations is less attractive, for such negotiations could drag out for many years.

As regards the problem of trust, two years ago our country proposed specific measures for that. We specifically had in mind having the countries in the region make advance notifications about moving and maneuvering ground (amphibious) forces and conducting naval and air force maneuvers. Unfortunately our partners ignored these initiatives.

Now about the Soviet proposal to have the U.S. eliminate bases in the Philippines at the same time we close the Soviet naval technical supply point at Cam Ranh Bay in the SRV [Socialist Republic of Vietnam]. I agree with the Japanese journalist that these military objectives are not equally valuable (although I have seen many articles in the Japanese and American press that discuss the "special importance" of the military base at Cam Ranh). But is it not time to move from military arithmetic to political algebra? Personally speaking, the USSR has already made this transition and has agreed to eliminate more medium and shorter range missiles than the United States has. Carrying out the proposal relative to mutually eliminating military bases would create a type of "null variant" in U.S. and USSR presence in South-East Asia. The situation in the region would only

improve from this. I also want to focus attention on the fact that Vladivostok which is being equated to the American base in the Philippines is located within the confines of the USSR's national territory, something that cannot be said about Clark Field and Subic Bay. The USSR has certainly not raised the issue of eliminating American bases in the Hawaiian Island!

Another thing about the bases in the Philippines, the largest American military bases outside the confines of the U.S., is that they are very convenient in carrying out the Pentagon's strategy of forward basing, a strategy that has nothing in common with maintaining the security of the Asiatic people. In my opinion, we should not look for the answer in the differences between the European and Asiatic geopolitical situations and political conditions because we have not succeeded in reducing the level of military confrontation in the ATR. The fact is that the U.S. still does not want this. The U.S. feels that the region is a useful platform for military pressure against the USSR. Moreover, judging by a recent speech that U.S. Deputy Minister of Defense U. Taft made at the Institute of Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins, Washington intends to expand its military power here until the end of this decade. And Washington does not intend to do this without assistance from Japan.

The security of the Japanese Islands cannot be guaranteed by military means alone. People in Tokyo must obviously think about getting themselves into and helping the United States get into the process of reducing the level of military confrontation in Asia and on the Pacific Ocean. Tokyo is still not in any hurry to advance its own ideas on how to guarantee the security in the region, preferring to go along with Washington. Meanwhile the time for dialogue is at hand. And this dialogue must not be conducted in the newspapers alone.

#### **Military-Technical Review: Western Fighters of 1990's, Ground Support Aircraft**

*18010371 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Feb 89 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Engineer A. Shikov: "An Experimental Fighter and a Heavy Attack Aircraft"]

[Text] What will the fighter airplanes of the 1990s be like? Foreign military experts are in no hurry to answer this question fully, but judging from press reports the problem of designing aircraft with broader combat capabilities occupies the minds of many specialists of the USA and NATO countries. Several experimental and demonstration airplanes have been tested within the framework of this effort, to include the swing-wing F-111, the F-16 with supplementary vertical control surfaces at the nose of the fuselage, the X-29 with forward-swept wings, and the new F-15 SMTD. It is reported in the foreign press that one more demonstration fighter code-named the X-31A is expected to make its appearance soon.

Reviewers note that the idea of creating such an airplane came about as a result of at least two basic causes. The first is that preliminary sketches and studies showed that even in the future, fighters will have to be ready to engage in close fluid aerial combat with the enemy in visual contact using aircraft guns. This imposes greater requirements on the maneuvering characteristics of the aircraft and on the pilot's capability for enduring sizable accelerations during aerial combat.

The second cause, emphasizes the journal JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, has to do with American competitiveness. The fact is that England, the FRG, Spain and Italy are involved in the design of a new all-European fighter, the EFA. And although this craft is not yet flying, its developers believe that it will be easily modernized and that it will acquire new qualities that are presently difficult to achieve. This is what led to a Euro-American program to design a new experimental airplane that will possess so-called "supermaneuverability."

The term itself implies that the fighter is capable of conducting fluid combat at an angle of incidence beyond stalling. Specialists feel that the airplane should be capable of changing its attitude in space irrespective of its trajectory. This will permit significant expansion of the possibility for quickly aiming weapons on a target. For example when attacking a target traveling a little above him, the pilot could tip the airplane's nose up and hit the enemy even though the aircraft continues to travel in the same direction.

Or here is another example. When engaged in combat at maximum acceleration while making a banking turn, the pilot is able to turn the fighter's nose in the direction of the target without changing the general trajectory of its motion. Such maneuvers could be especially effective, foreign experts believe, when firing the aircraft's guns.

The USA and the FRG intend to implement all these ideas in a fighter code-named the X-31A. To achieve supermaneuverability, the new airplane will be equipped with devices that deflect the engine's thrust vector in both the vertical and horizontal planes, with special aerodynamic control surfaces allowing for very large deflection angles, and an onboard automatic system that will improve the airplane's stability and controllability at large angles of attack.

It is felt that these and other innovations will impart high maneuverability at subsonic and supersonic speeds. Separate control of the flight trajectory and the airplane's orientation in space will be achieved by means of an improved onboard computer controlling both the aerodynamic control surfaces and deflections of the engine's jet nozzle.

Around \$60 million have been allocated for the airplane's development. The main developer on the American side is Rockwell, while the German side is represented by Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm. Other companies have been

included in the work as well: General Dynamics (the propulsion unit and cabin equipment), Honeywell (the control system) and other contractors. However, the qualification is made in the foreign press that the program foresees creation of only a demonstration fighter, which will be used to test the possibility itself of achieving "supermaneuverability."

The X-31A is small: The length of the fuselage is around 14 meters, and the wingspan is 7 meters. It weighs a little more than 4.5 tons, the maximum takeoff weight is 6.5 tons, and the airplane possesses a standard F-404 engine.

The new airplane will have a "duck" aerodynamic design with the air intake beneath the fuselage. This design precludes blanketing of the air intake by the nose of the fuselage at large angles of attack and slide. To permit effective operation at angles of incidence beyond stalling, the lower manifold will deflect downward to prevent stalling.

Two X-31As are currently being built. According to the plans foreseen by the program, the first flight of the new craft is to take place in late 1989.

It was reported in the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW that the Pentagon has allocated \$155 million to reequip 12 Hercules military transport airplanes as Gunship heavy attack aircraft (code-named AC-130U), which are to replace the AC-130H Peiv Spekta [transliteration] currently in the inventory.

As with "H" modification airplanes, the new craft are to be armed with a 105-mm large-caliber gun with an ammunition load of 98 shells, a 40-mm Bofors gun with a rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an ammunition load of 256 shells, and, in place of two M-61 Vulcan 20-mm guns, one five-barrel 25-mm GAU-12/U with a rate of fire of 3,600 rounds per minute and an ammunition load of 3,000 shells. All of the armament will be installed on the left side of the fuselage for use against targets lateral to the airplane's trajectory.

Foreign reviewers feel that the 105-mm gun, which was designed on the basis of a light army howitzer, is now the most powerful installed in modern airplanes, and it ensures good fire accuracy. When the gun is fired at a range of 3 km from the target, deviation of the projectile does not exceed 3.5 m.

As far as the GAU-12/U five-barrel gun replacing the Vulcans is concerned, the hope here is that its heavier projectiles, which possess considerable muzzle velocity and better ballistic characteristics, would make it possible to hit light armored equipment.

All of the armament of the AC-130U attack aircraft is to be installed on special stabilized platforms connected to the onboard fire control computer; this would make it easier for the pilot to control the airplane during an attack on ground targets, since the guns would be aimed

automatically. However, despite the high degree of automation, besides the individuals who actually pilot the airplane, the crew includes three loaders, two observers, two weapon system operators, two navigators and one fire control officer.

The program to create the heavy attack aircraft foresees installation of the latest electronic equipment—television, infrared and laser. The radar station installed aboard the airplane has a considerable effective range and good resolution. It is capable of detecting targets such as bridges at ranges up to 130 km. Inasmuch as a

radar station operating in continuous emission mode exposes the location of an airplane, short-term single-cycle scanning is foreseen, after which the radar image is "frozen" on the display.

It is reported that at a range of up to 18.5 km, the station is capable of mapping the ground surface with a resolution of 2.6 m and distinguishing moving targets. According to information in the journal INTERAVIA the onboard radar station has higher resistance to interference, and it can change its operating conditions in relation to signal frequency and amplitude, pulse repetition frequency and sensitivity. According to the plans, the new modification of the airplane is to make its first flight in 1991, and the remaining 11 are to be delivered in 1993.

**New Republic-Level Center to Aid Vets, Promote Army Democratization**  
*18010181 Vilnius KOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian*  
*22 Dec 88 p 1*

[Article by A. Serebrennikova under "School of Courage" rubric: "The Soldiers Returned Home..."]

[Text] Internationalist soldiers from various cities and rayons of Lithuania met last week at the Republic Palace of Pioneers and School Children. The objective of the meeting was to organize a coordinating center of the Republic Council. The main content of its work is to aid in carrying out democratization in the army, immortalizing the memory of those who perished, and looking after those who were wounded, disabled war veterans, the families of those who perished, children's homes, boarding schools, hospitals and rehabilitation centers and to see to it that the disabled and families of the fallen obtain all of the privileges established by the Government of the USSR.

Precisely this complex matter was discussed especially vigorously. It is no secret that the Afghans, as we now call the internationalist soldiers, often are not yet encountering support and mutual understanding on the part of some public organizations. Housing is problem number one. A great many documents have been adopted on privileges. But they require explanation. In addition, different statements are being given to the internationalist soldiers. At the meeting, therefore, the representatives of ministries and departments explained the position of our republic in relation to privileges.

I honestly admit that, in listening to the statements of officials, I could not grasp many aspects of the proposed privileges. There was a mass of documents and a mass of nuances, in which it was not easy to get one's bearings. For example, about 18 categories of people have the preferential right to obtain living space out of turn. They include families in which there are seriously ill persons, veterans of war, families with many children, single mothers and so on. Also included are disabled veterans of Afghanistan. Certainly one can stand in such a line as long as he likes.

I looked at the faces of those assembled and saw that these young men, having experienced the entire cruelty of war, have a different perception of much in life. This period put its own stamp on them, having changed something inside them. They differ greatly from others of the same age. They have a sharpened sense of fairness and are intolerant of lies and hypocrisy. Their rejection of shortcomings is so intense that it sometimes leads to disruptions. This is not their fault. It was their fate to fight in our peaceful time. Yes, the country needed for them to be there. They carried out orders. Sometimes at the cost of their own lives.

Rosvaldas Shyashygalis has 2 years of Afghanistan behind him. He drove an armored personnel carrier. He returned home to his native Prenay safe and sound. On the outside. But look more closely in his eyes. It was they

that stopped me. It can be said that his situation is favorable with respect to the obtaining of an apartment. He got one only 2 years after returning "from there."

"The finance section where I work gave me a lot of help in this. Of course I visited many different official channels. I had to apply considerable effort of my own. This, however, is not the point. The attitude of..."

Yes, the attitude of some high officials even here, at the meeting, was clearly one of irritation at the just demands of the internationalists.

The question of providing living space in a very short time was raised. What does this mean?

"The USSR Council of Ministers passed a decree," explained Vladimir Kostogriz, director of the defense-sports section of the Komsomol Central Committee. "It speaks of the time periods for the allocation of apartments to disabled persons and of the determination of short waiting times for the rest of the internationalist soldiers. Each republic must establish this framework itself proceeding from its own possibilities. I emphasize once again: the decree does not set time limits. They are determined by the person in the republic with responsibility for the housing situation."

Many of the stories that the Afghanistan soldiers told at the meeting about the problems that they are encountering in "civilian life" are similar. They differ only in their addresses. Thus, the boys still frequently run into a wall of instructions and the indifference of bureaucrats. Some refer to the absence of directions "from above" and others have no time. This is why it is right that the internationalists themselves, who have felt the harshness of adversity more acutely than anyone else, are trying to take on the difficult responsibility for others.

"We need our own organization," they said, "which would have the right to appeal to different offices with their demands. Not for themselves but for those who are waiting for this help. And many families of soldiers who perished in Afghanistan as well as disabled veterans are waiting for this help."

Yes, at times in their statements the boys became bogged down in details and "got carried away." But one thing was clear. They want to do something. For this reason, the summary document of the meeting included sensible proposals on the establishment of a coordinating center of the Republic Council under the Komsomol Central Committee (two delegates from each zone). The proposal of the Directorate for Health Resorts of the Lithuanian SSR on the establishment of a rehabilitation center for internationalist soldiers was adopted. An account will be opened for this purpose. There was also discussion of the position on the All-Union Association of Military-Patriotic Societies. It will deal with the preparation of draftable youth for service in the army, the resolution of the social questions of reserve soldiers, and the establishment of contacts with progressive movements and organizations in foreign countries.

I read in one of the newspapers that today 33 state and public organizations have been given the obligation to participate in the military-patriotic education of young people. But if too many cooks spoil the broth, what can one say about 33? In pointing to one another, not a single one of them can guarantee that the lads will become real soldiers. And this caused the participants in the meeting to express their desire to assist inductees. The former soldiers in Afghanistan want to help change the situation.

Invited to the meeting with Afghanistan soldiers were key workers of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, republic Council of Ministers, Lithuanian Republic Council of Trade Unions, the staff of the Red Banner

Baltic Military District, the military commissariat of the republic and other representatives of ministries and departments. One would like to believe that all of their promises and assurances of assistance will be realized. Today as never before, it is necessary to support them. R. Ruzas, representative of the internationalist soldiers in Kaunas, spoke about this on behalf of the initiative group.

Thus, the meeting came to an end. The delegates elected a Republic Coordinating Council of Reserve Soldiers and a delegate to the meeting of the coordinating council of the All-Union Association of Military-Patriotic Societies. The assembly of Afghanistan veterans confirmed that they are a great force. And they want to be useful in the cause.

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